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1. A Joint History 
Even at first glance, it is apparent that, despite their separateness, there are many similarities in the 
histories of the two Copperbelts. Crucially, both became major economic hubs, though it happened earlier in the 
case of the Congolese Copperbelt. By the early 1960s, Katanga – the Congolese province in which the 
Copperbelt is located – accounted for about 8 % of the world’s total supply1 and Katanga’s largest company, the 
Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK), ranked third among the world’s copper producers.2 Zambia, far 
from falling wide of the mark, was leading copper supplier with a yearly output of 633,000 tons valued at 
£164,300,000 at the time of its independence in 1964.3 A second key similarity, which is not unrelated to the 
first one, is the fact that both Katanga and Northern Rhodesia (as Zambia was known before independence) 
started their ‘careers’ as colonial territories as the property of quasi-state companies rather than a colonial office. 
When the fearsome Leopold II of Belgium grabbed for himself a territory eighty times larger than his own 
country, he in fact had few means to administer it properly. He consequently entrusted the administration of 
Katanga to the Compagnie du Katanga on April 15, 1891, and until 1910, it was under the exclusive auspices of 
this company that mining settlement processes in the Katanga were initiated and carried out.4 In practice, this 
lack of state control resulted in an ambiguous, semi-autonomous status, which endured even after Katanga 
passed under the responsibility of the Belgian state in 1910. Until 1933, partly because of the lack of adequate 
communications between the capital (then in Boma) and the interior of the colony, and also because the 
industrial development of the province necessitated a large measure of decentralisation, the administration of 
Katanga was entrusted to a Vice Governor General who enjoyed full executive powers.5 This allowed Katanga 
to function as a company territory practically independent from the rest of Belgian Congo. As for Northern 
Rhodesia, it did not pass under the control of the Colonial Office before 1924. Before that, its administration 
and the development of its mining potential were entrusted to the all-powerful British South Africa Company 
(BSAC).6 If the colonial Secretary of State had considerable power in theory, in practice the imperial 
government exerted limited influence in Northern Rhodesia. Local officials were appointed either at the 
BSAC’s recommendation or by the BSAC directly.7 Finally, also largely thanks to the mining industry and its 
recruitment policies, both Copperbelts became the home of a ‘cosmopolitan’ community. By the 1930s, 
Copperbelt towns in Katanga and Northern Rhodesia were bustling towns bringing together workers from all 
over central Africa and there was more and more talk of African ‘urbanisation’ and ‘detribalisation’. At the 
same time, a comparatively large community of independent-minded white settlers also developed on both sides 
of the border. Although the Katanga was the most thinly populated area of the Congo at the time, with a density 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Le Katanga économique, p.15. 
2 The UMHK was also the world’s largest producer of uranium and one of the world’s biggest producers of cobalt, exporting more than 
60 % of the world’s supply in 1960. See S. HEMPSTONE, Katanga Report, p.53; J. GÉRARD-LIBOIS & B. VERHAEGEN Congo 
1960, Vol.I, p.223. 
3 J. PARPART, Labor and Capital on the African Copperbelt, p.22. 
4 Congo Bulletin, 1906, FO 367/1/427. 
5 R. LEMARCHAND, ‘The Limits of Self-Determination: The Case of the Katanga Secession’, p.409. 
6 B.J. PHIRI, A Political History of Zambia, p.10. 
7 Ibid. 
! 7!
of 3.44 per square kilometre, it was nevertheless the province where European settlers were the most numerous. 
The Katanga claimed a non-African population of 34,047 in 1956, representing about 31 % of the total 
European population of the Congo.1 As for Northern Rhodesia, although it was originally conceived as a 
tropical dependency rather than a settler colony, the development of the Copperbelt attracted more and more 
white migrants (many of whom came from South Africa) reaching a total of 65,277 in 1956.2 Such 
overwhelming concentrations of economic and human resources, all of which can be traced to the presence of 
copper, are far from trivial. They had profound political implications for both Zambia and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo.  
In fact, copper was the reason why the Copperbelt was split in the first place. The fact that that area of 
central Africa was copper-rich was well known long before the first European adventurers set foot in it. Copper 
had been mined for hundreds of years by local African societies and probably provided an important basis for 
the rise of major centralised societies, most notably the Luba and Lunda empires, which exported copper ingots 
via Portuguese traders to the Atlantic coast.3 In this context, it was not long before the Copperbelt attracted the 
attention of non-African explorers and colonists alike and its mineral deposits soon found itself at the heart of a 
competition between two would-be colonising powers: the United Kingdom and Belgium. The outcome was an 
artificially-drawn and awkwardly-shaped border drawn across the Copperbelt: the result of a deliberate ploy to 
ensure that both King Leopold II and the United Kingdom received their ‘share’ of the copper pie.4 Locally the 
effects of that division were very significant. An article published in the Times of Zambia, on November 30, 
1964, i.e. just over a month after Northern Rhodesia became an independent nation, sheds some light on why 
that was so: 
‘Most of Zambia’s tribes came originally from the Congo. The largest group, the Bemba-Lunda-
Lovale, arrived here around the beginning of the 18th century from the great Luba-Lunda kingdom of 
Mwata Yamvo. 
At its height, the Luba-Lunda empire controlled most of the Kasai and Katanga provinces of the 
Congo, and large areas of Angola and Zambia. The Luba, senior partners in the alliance, mined copper 
at Kipushi, and made the copper crosses that were the first form of coinage in Central Africa. 
The name Mwata Yamvo (“Great Chief”) was used as a title, handed down from father to son. This is 
at variance with the present system of inheritance employed by the Bemba, by which brother succeeds 
brother, and when the generation is extinct, the inheritance goes to their sister’s son. 
Legend declares that the Bemba were the followers of a certain Mwata Yamvo’s sister’s son, which 
may account for the Bemba custom of inheritance. The Lovale system of tracing descent is similar. 
The Lunda of Luapula Province are the descendants of the followers of Kazembe Pa Nchinda, the 
third son of a Mwata Yamvo, who settled in the lands to the east of the Luapula River. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 R. LEMARCHAND, ‘The Limits of Self-Determination: The Case of the Katanga Secession’, p.406. 
2 B.J. PHIRI, A Political History of Zambia, p.12. 
3 M. CORNEVIN, Archéologie africaine, p.224. 
4 D. POTTS, ‘Counter-Urbanisation on the Zambian Copperbelt?’, p.584. 
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The Lunda of North-Western Province are likewise the descendants of Mwata Yamvo’s fourth son. 
Other sons established groups of Lunda in Angola, near Solwezi and elsewhere. 
The Bemba, second largest tribe in Zambia, were led from Mwata Yamvo’s domain by a man called 
Chiti Muluba (“Chiti the Luban”). Later Bemba chiefs were given the title “Chitimukulu” (The Great 
Tree).(…) 
This clearly shows that close contact between the Bemba and the empire of Mwata Yamvo must have 
existed at one time. Even today, sections of the Bemba, Lunda, Aushi and Ndembu tribes live in the 
southern Congo.’1 
This article suggests two things that will be of great importance in the present narrative. Firstly, it suggests that 
the creation of the border did not only result in the splitting of a geological ‘pie’ but also in the splitting of a 
culturally homogeneous region. Secondly it introduces the idea that migration and population movements are an 
important feature of the region’s history. In fact ‘migration’ is a word that is closely associated with the 
Copperbelt. The rise of the copper industry stimulated the emergence of a system of organised migrant labour 
from relatively remote areas to supply the mines that were, for the most part, located in areas with low 
population density. For decades, people of all origins crisscrossed the border between Belgian and British Africa 
in search of waged employment or other options for making money.2 Thus the region of the Copperbelt, which 
had already been the scene of many population movements in pre-colonial times, saw the appearance of new 
patterns of movement, ones that rested on a purely economic underpinning and therefore brought into contact 
people who would not have otherwise met.  
If the Copperbelt was originally inhabited by peoples who were culturally akin and who shared 
longstanding trade relationships and if, even when separated, the growing copper industry induced renewed 
population movements and economic exchange, why are we so determined to see these two territories as 
separate? Or perhaps the question should be phrased differently: why are we so determined to overlook the links 
that exist between these two territories? A major part of the answer, as suggested at the outset, must be the fact 
that, in academia, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo belong to separate (French and Anglo-
Saxon) research traditions. Further colouring our understanding is the existence of specific paradigms that were 
developed at one point in connection with one region or the other and stuck for better or for worse. 
 
 
2.  ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Paradigms for the Copperbelt 
 
1. MODERNISM AND ITS FAILURE  
According to Deborah Potts, ‘Zambia has something of an iconic status in African urban studies.’3 This 
special interest stems in great part from the work of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (RLI) set up by the British 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 ‘Origin of Zambia’s tribes: Migration from the Congo’, Times of Zambia, 30 November 1964. 
2 C. PERRINGS, ‘Consciousness and Proletarianization: An Assessment of the 1935 Mineworker’s Strike on the Northern Rhodesian 
Copperbelt’ in Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1977), pp.40-41. 
3 D. POTTS, ‘Counter-Urbanisation on the Zambian Copperbelt?’, p.583. 
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Government in 1937 to undertake social research in British Central Africa. The RLI research that acquired the 
most visibility was that which focused on the development of urban centres in the Copperbelt region as Africans 
migrated in to work in colonial mining enterprises. This research consisted of the analysis of the changing 
relationship between the towns and rural areas on the one hand and in how or whether in-migrants changed their 
attitudes and perceptions because they were living in urban rather than rural areas on the other. The distinctive 
approach of the RLI to African urban life was based on a metanarrative of transition, in which tribal rural 
Africans were swiftly becoming modern, urban members of an industrial society.1  RLI studies gained 
momentum at the time of Zambia’s independence. In the 1960s, Zambia was emerging as the fastest urbanising 
– and therefore industrialising and modernising – country in Southern Africa.2 Thanks to its growing industrial 
success, as well as the rapid social and economic transformations that accompanied it, Zambia and its industrial 
core, the Copperbelt, came to exemplify, epitomise even, ‘emerging Africa’. As James Ferguson put it in his 
influential Expectations of Modernity:  
‘Zambia at its 1964 independence was a highly urbanised nation and newly so. The mining towns that 
had sprung up on the Copperbelt symbolised newness in a way that older cities could not. Here, unlike 
many other parts of Africa, the very idea of cities was a “modern” one. And “urbanization” was 
understood to involve not simply a movement in space but an epochal leap in evolutionary time.’3 
And indeed, by 1964, large-scale copper mining seemed sure to propel the nation along the road leading to what 
was referred to as ‘modernisation’. ‘Over the heart of a poor and primitive continent, civilisation has laid a 
finger of steel; it has stirred a hundred tribes together; it has brought them new wealth, new ambitions, new 
knowledge, new interests, new faiths and new problems’, was the way Godfrey Wilson, head of the RLI from 
1938 to 1942, put it.4  
It is easy to forget, because of the long period of unrest that followed, that around the time of 
independence, levels of optimism were similarly high in the Congo. In the 1950s, the Congo had moved at a 
very fast pace. From 1950 to 1956, industrial output tripled and annual reports trumpeted, with barely disguised 
gratification, the colony’s rapid economic growth.5 Like in Zambia, such rapid industrialisation was 
accompanied by profound transformation in the society, as Africans moved to towns to work in new enterprises. 
Although no institution similar to the RLI was set up, the emergence of ‘detribalised’ Africans was of no less 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Ibid, pp.583-585. It should be noted that the RLI-inspired narrative of transition is still contested and has been for over 60 years. As late 
as the early 1990s, the debate around the Zambian Copperbelt and urban studies in Zambia again emerged over five issues of the Journal 
of Southern African Studies in an argument developed between the anthropologist James Ferguson and the historian Hugh Macmillan. 
While Ferguson challenged RLI assumptions that urbanisation, industrialisation, economic growth and ‘development’ were all unilinear 
processes, Macmillan argued that RLI paradigms were in fact informed by a cyclical view in which the ups and downs of the world 
economic swings would affect urban trends in the Copperbelt and elsewhere. See J. FERGUSON, ‘Mobile Workers, Modernist 
Narratives: A Critique of the Historiography of Transition on the Zambian Copperbelt’, parts 1 and 2; H. MACMILLAN, The 
Historiography of Transition on the Zambian Copperbelt: Another View’. 
2 By the late 1980s Zambia was among the most highly urbanised countries south of the equator. Over 50 % of its population was urban, 
living in the Copperbelt towns and Lusaka for the most part. See B.J. PHIRI, A Political History of Zambia, p.2. 
3 J. FERGUSON, Expectations of Modernity, p.4. 
4 G. WILSON, ‘An Essay on the Economics of Detribalization in Northern Rhodesia (part 1)’ in Rhodes Livingstone Paper No. 5 (1941) 
as quoted in J. FERGUSON, Expectations of Modernity, p.2. 
5 W. RENO, ‘Congo: From State Collapse to ‘Absolutism’, to State Failure’, p.45. 
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concern to the colonial authorities. In the Congo, this challenge was met by ensuring that a politically contented 
and economically productive workforce could be integrated into the process of progressive change. This 
fostered the appearance of an urban elite, called the ‘Évolués’, who spoke French, had accepted European values 
and patterns of behaviour, and usually held white-collar jobs. Members of this growing native middle class were 
treated as a privileged group by the colonial administrators and out of it came the first rulers of the independent 
Congo.1 With rapid industrialisation and a growing middle class, from an aggregate perspective there was good 
reason to believe that independence would usher in an extended period of economic growth for the Congo. Even 
the initial period of trouble that Congo went through immediately after independence (about which more will be 
said in Chapter 4), though it did dampen enthusiasm, did not entirely crush it. Neither did the arrival of arch 
dictator Joseph-Désiré (later Sese Seko) Mobutu when he seized power in 1965. By 1962 industrial output had 
recovered to its pre-1960 heights and economic reforms in 1967 and fiscal austerity convinced foreign investors 
that Mobutu’s state, despite being characterised by clientelism and personal rule, was serious about promoting 
economic growth, so that by the mid-1960s and into the 1970s the country was once more being held up as an 
example of rapid modernisation.2 
Yet interest in the modernist discourse gradually dwindled to be replaced by ‘Afro-pessimism’ and its 
grim predictions for the future prospects of the continent. This was due in no small part to the steep economic 
decline that Africa went through in the 1970s. The collapse of the copper price (twice) in the 1970s, the oil 
crises, and the almost exclusive reliance on mineral extraction for their economies were key factors in the 
economic decline of both independent Congo and Zambia. Zambia, despite a post-independence history devoid 
of bloody conflicts, stood as one of the biggest growth losers for much of its independent history (although 
things have taken a more positive turn in recent years).3 As Ferguson put it, ‘the script of Zambian “emergence” 
via industrialization has been confounded by more than two decades of steep economic decline (…) leaving 
Zambia near the bottom of the World Bank’s hierarchy of “developing nations”’.4 As for the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, the end of its period of economic ‘bliss’ was followed by a period of such economic and 
political decay that, to this day, it is regarded as a paradigmatic case of state failure. In 2013 Congo ranked 
second in the Failed States Index, which since 2005 has been published annually by the research institute Fund 
for Peace and the magazine Foreign Policy.5  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 See B. KADIMA-TSHIMANGA, ‘La société sous le vocabulaire : Blancs, Noirs et Évolués dans l'ancien Congo belge (1955-1959) in 
Mots, Vol. 5 (1982), pp. 25-49.   
2 W. RENO, ‘Congo: From State Collapse to ‘Absolutism’, to State Failure’, pp.46-47. 
3 H. MELHUM, K. MOENE & R. TORVIK, ‘Institutions and the Resource Curse’, p.1. 
4 J. FERGUSON, Expectations of Modernity, p.6. 
5 The Democratic Republic of the Congo has been in the top 10 ever since the list was started and has been in the top 5 since 2009. See 
The Failed States Index page of the Fund For peace Website, available at http://ffp.statesindex.org, [accessed on 29 July 2013]. 
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The point here is not to discuss the validity of such ‘labels’ but rather to point out the powerful paradigms 
that they created or reflected, and the way they still inform our vision of these countries. According to such 
paradigms, the history of Zambia can be summarised as that of the failure of modernist revolution, and that of 
the Congo as the slow disintegration of a promising economy into lawlessness. It is however revealing that, in 
both cases, main trends of theorisation had a lot to do with mineral wealth and macro-economics. Since mineral 
wealth stands prominently in the histories of both countries, it is not surprising and neither is it unjustified. Yet, 
there is a danger that overemphasis of one paradigm, prominent though it may be, might leave little room for 
nuance or indeed for the exploration of altogether different paradigms. Therefore, though copper and macro-
economics will play an important role in the present narrative, the focus will not be on them. Instead, I will be 
juggling with two main themes: transnationalism and nation-statism. 
2. NATION-STATISM AND TRANSNATIONALISM 
Perhaps the most important paradigm the present study will strive to challenge is the tendency, in 
academia but also generally, to think in terms of a ‘nation-state framework of analysis’. Not only do the 
authority and sovereignty of the nation-state enjoy a near sacrosanct quality internationally, but, in history, and 
political and economic sciences, the nation-state is more often than not taken as the basis for intellectual 
enquiry. As W.I. Robinson put it: ‘The nation-state is still taken as the basic unit of analysis, and 
transnationalism and globalization are seen as merely some new stage in international relations or in cross-
national comparative studies.’1 In Africa, like in the rest of the world, the nation-state is understood to be living 
a severe crisis, at the root of which is the supposedly new and worldwide phenomenon of globalisation.2 And 
indeed one can see how, with its emphasis on the idea that national borders should be defined in terms of 
movement of capitals rather than political boundaries, the concept of globalisation is at odds with that of the 
nation-state. Yet, according to Frederick Cooper, not only is the demise of the nation-state greatly exaggerated – 
the resources controlled by governments have never been higher – but one should not assume that in the past, 
the nation-state enjoyed a period of ‘unchallenged salience and unquestioned reference for political 
mobilisation’.3 To be sure, for Basil Davidson it is not globalisation that constitutes Africa’s greatest challenge 
but the nation-state itself, or, to be more precise, the crisis of institutions brought about by the inherent 
illegitimacy of the African nation-state. “Nation-statism” was a product of the rising nationalism of 
independence-aspiring Africa. ‘Nation-statism’, Davidson argues, ‘looked like a liberation, and really began as 
one. But it did not continue as a liberation. In practice, it was not a restoration of Africa to Africa’s own history, 
but the onset of a new period of indirect subjection to the history of Europe.’4 Similarly, I. Ll. Griffiths bemoans 
the way in which the current ills of Africa – including famine, civil war and boundary bickering, as well as 
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plummeting economic performance – are too easily attributed to immediate causes. Instead, he argues, ‘the 
immediate causes of African misery must be put in the context of basic structural defects, both economic and 
political, deriving from the comparatively recent and short-lived colonial period when almost the whole of 
Africa was divided between European powers.’1 Though he recognises that this context is by no means the sole 
cause of Africa’s plight, the colonial inheritance is, in his opinion, crucially important and not easily disowned. 
The key to the impact of colonialism on Africa was the division of the continent into colonial territories. For, 
when the European powers partitioned Africa between themselves between 1885 and 1914, the partition, solely 
dictated as it was by European politico-economic interests, was imposed on the continent with little regard to the 
distribution of peoples or pre-colonial political units. Crucially this European-originated partition survived 
African independence almost intact, with two basic concepts alien to Africa surviving with it: ‘nation-states’ and 
‘boundary lines’.2 There have been numerous examples of disputes over borderlines erupting in civil war and 
violence. One such example was the boundary dispute between Lybia and Chad over the Aouzou strip, a region 
in the north of Chad which is reputedly rich in minerals. When the dispute was submitted to the International 
Court of Justice in The Hague, Judge Ajibola quickly came to the conclusion that the dispute between those two 
states could be traced to the legacy of artificially delimited boundaries bequeathed to Africa by European 
powers: 
 ‘For about a century, (…) Africa has been ruefully nursing the wounds inflicted on it by its colonial 
past. Remnants of this unenviable colonial heritage intermittently erupt into discordant social, political 
and even economic upheavals which, some may say, are better forgotten than remembered. But this 
‘heritage’ is difficult, if not impossible to forget; aspects of it continue, like apparitions, to rear their 
heads, and haunt the entire continent in various jarring and sterile manifestations: how do you forget 
unhealed wounds?’3 
There is another way in which current interpretations of nation-state and the crisis it is supposedly going 
through are misleading. By analysing globalisation as a single system of connection that has penetrated the 
entire globe and by seeing this process as happening now, Cooper argues, globalisation theorisers have misread 
the ways in which a 400-year-long process defined both Africa and the Atlantic-centred capitalist economy.4 
Indeed, according to Cooper, africanists, when discussing processes of globalisation, should be particularly 
sensitive to their historical dimension, given the manner in which ideas, cultural movement or migrant networks 
spread across the boundaries of social units in the past. The very notion of ‘Africa’ has never existed in a 
vacuum, having been instead shaped for centuries by linkages within the continent and across oceans and 
deserts, by the trans-Saharan and Atlantic slave trade, by various trading and religious networks, and by cultural 
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and economic connections across the Indian Ocean.1 Yet, specialists on Africa have been drawn into the 
globalisation paradigm, positing globalisation as a challenge which Africa must meet, as tensions between ‘a 
past of territorial boundedness and a present of interconnection and fragmentation’ are supposedly increasingly 
felt.2 In contrast, Cooper contends that historical analysis presents a ‘more back-and-forth, varied combination 
of territorializing tendencies’.3 In this way, Cooper argues for ‘more modest and more discerning ways of 
analysing processes that cross borders but are not universal, that constitute long-distance networks and social 
fields but not on a planetary scale’.4 In other words, he argues in favour of a focus on ‘transnational’ relations as 
a way of thinking about African history in ways that emphasise spatial connection but do not assume the 
‘global’.  
Transnationalism, however, is somewhat of a multifaceted concept, as it has never been given an 
adequate theoretical framework of analysis. As Rainer Bauböck describes it: political transnationalism covers ‘a 
wide range of phenomena and can be studied using a variety of approaches’,5 its specificity being the fact that it 
‘creates overlapping memberships between territorially separated and independent polities’.6 S. Vertovec, in his 
‘Conceiving and Researching Transnationalism’, also gives definition a shot, by acknowledging that: ‘To the 
extent that any single “-ism” might arguably exist, most social scientists working in the field may agree that 
“transnationalism” broadly refers to multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the 
borders of nation-states.’7 In the latter reading, borders must necessarily represent long-established power 
relations, and transnationalism, as underlined by Katharyne Mitchell, ‘embodies an inherently transgressive 
quality’.8 Regarding migrant flows, it is considered that communities have been able to ‘erode’ inconvenient 
and artificial borders by developing concrete transnational links across them.9 Taking the argument to another 
level, Bauböck argues that such interconnections affect conceptions of membership as well as the institutions of 
each interconnected country.10 Nonetheless, Corrado Tornimbeni warns that fluidity must not be exaggerated, 
and that the extent to which the presence of an international border has become enmeshed in the social life and 
in historical developments since the colonial times must not be underestimated.11 As Georges Balandier 
contended as early as 1951, conquest itself created a ‘colonial situation’, defined by external coercion and 
racialised ideology within a space marked by conquest boundaries.12 Underlining the historically artificial nature 
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of state boundaries in Africa, therefore, does not mean that they never gained significance over time since ‘once 
conceptualised, [boundaries] are given meaning and sentiment by those who reside within them’.1  
 
 
3. Objectives 
In the light of what has been set out, this thesis will endeavour to put the significance of the Katango-
Zambian border in its historical context by retracing how transnational identities developed and consolidated on 
the one hand (chapters 1, 2 and 3), and by examining the geo-socio-political significance of such identities for 
Zambian state-building, on the other (chapter 4). It will also be demonstrated that patterns of migration and 
exchange changed over time, as did their rationale. The copper industry in particular, stimulated a new and 
politically significant type of migration: labour migrations. Not only did its magnitude dwarf any other 
population movement that had taken place before but it was also entirely economically-induced and therefore 
transcended cultural boundaries. In addition, it will be shown that it was not only people that transcended 
boundaries. The various mining companies active on the Copperbelt did not develop separately but were instead 
linked across the colonial border by their overlapping capital composition, infrastructure and labour practices, 
making the two Copperbelts economically interdependent.  
In this way, although it is not my intention to examine the debate about the contrasting interpretations of 
borders and border crossing in Africa, I will aim to show how the international boundaries were ‘eroded’ by 
African migrants while, at the same time, these boundaries came to be of great significance socially, 
economically and politically. This research is not therefore aimed at minimising the importance of borders but at 
examining how in the case of Katanga and Northern Zambia, borders were more porous than could be expected 
and that this had very real practical consequences. This thesis has two (closely interwoven) objectives therefore: 
one that is purely historical – retracing a history that has been overlooked – and another that is paradigm-based 
– to challenge conventional ideas about the ‘nation-state’ as most logical framework of study.  
!
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CHAPTER 1 
The Setting 
 
‘Lorsque les premiers explorateurs blancs découvrirent cette partie de l’Afrique que l’on nomme le 
Katanga, ils y trouvèrent 3 monarchies qui étaient non seulement unies par des liens familiaux, 
économiques et sociaux mais aussi, et ceci est de loin le plus important, dont le destin historique était 
lié depuis des siècles. … Lorsque les Belges et les Anglais, les uns au nord et les autres au sud, 
essayèrent de faire main basse sur le Katanga, les chefs des Balubas, des Lunda et des Bayeke, 
solidaire face au nouveau danger qui menaçait leur souveraineté, luttèrent de toutes leurs faibles 
forces.’1  
Extract from the speech of Moïse Tshombe, President of the short-lived secessionist state of Katanga 
(1960-1963), made at the occasion of the second anniversary of Independence on July 11 1962. 
 
Needless to say, the above-quoted statement has strong political connotations. President Moïse Tshombe 
means to imply the durability and endurance of the Katangese nationalist sentiment and does so by emphasising 
not only the cohesion of the region but also the ‘ancientness’ of that cohesion. Yet, for all his aplomb, 
Tshombe’s assertion is also a wishful, not to say risky, one since the only statement that can be made with 
confidence about pre-colonial central African history is that it is not well known. The rarity of written 
testimonies and the exclusive reliance on sources such as oral tradition and archaeology make its study a rather 
delicate matter. Jan Vansina himself, who is generally regarded as the foremost authority on the pre-colonial 
history of the peoples of central Africa, had to admit in the introduction chapter of his influential Kingdoms of 
the Savanna that: ‘the gaps in the data are little short of appalling and because of that any synthesis is out of the 
question.’2  
Until the 1870s and 1880s, the central African interior escaped any direct contact with the slave and ivory 
trade moving in from both the Atlantic and Indian coasts. This means that the pre-colonial history of Katanga 
and Zambia is as ‘African’ as the history of any region located deep in Africa’s interior can be. But it also 
means that it escaped the attention of literate observers. As a result, for all but the past century and a half, 
written records are few and far between. From the end of the seventeenth century there are occasional reports 
from Portuguese traders, and for the nineteenth century there are some travellers’ books, such as David 
Livingstone’s, but even for that period, written African records are virtually non-existent.3 This dearth of written 
accounts throws the historian back upon a diverse set of sources and the use of methodologies that are 
comparatively new and still subject to debate. Paramount among those is the pioneering treatment of oral 
traditions by Jan Vansina, who, in his Oral Tradition: a Study in Historical Methodology published in 1965, 
offers a guide on how to collect and criticise different types of African traditional stories. In this book, he 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 President Tshombe’s Speech of July 11 1962 as quoted in R. YAKEMTCHOUK, Aux origines du séparatisme katangais, pp.24-25. 
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describes African traditions as ‘unwritten sources couched in a form suitable for oral transmission’, and 
therefore as ‘not necessarily untrustworthy’ historical sources despite their ‘special nature’.1 There has been 
much work done on oral tradition since – Vansina himself published a substantial revision of his own views – 
and the debate on the validity of oral tradition as valid historical sources will probably never be entirely settled. 
Unfortunately there is no space here to go over this complex debate, but nor is it the point of this chapter. 
Suffice it to note that for certain points in history in that particular area of the world, these stories akin to myths 
are virtually the sole source of information available to the historian and that one has to make do with what is 
available. Even oral tradition, however, only goes so far back in the past. It is only from around AD 1500 that, 
through the study of oral and cultural traditions, as well as linguistics, main outlines of political and social 
change begin to come into focus. And it is not before around AD 1700 that a chronology of events can be 
fleshed out in any detail from the same sources. For earlier periods the historian is almost entirely dependent on 
archaeology, which, though useful to trace changes in material culture, is not usually enlightening as far as 
social and political organisation is concerned.  
What follows, therefore, is a summary of the broad processes of interactions, in terms of the movement of 
peoples, cultural diffusion, commercial exchanges and state expansion, that took place in and around the 
Copperbelt region from the appearance of stratified societies to the eve of European penetration in the late 
nineteenth century. In other words, this chapter will strive to explore how far the description of Katanga – and 
by extension northern Zambia – as an interconnected whole, consisting of kingdoms ‘united by familial, 
economic and social bonds’ as Tshombe so confidently claimed, is justified.2  
 
 
1. The Archaeological Evidence 
Archaeological evidence suggests that the area that is now divided between Katanga and north-eastern 
and central Zambia was not only occupied from an early date but also showed a substantial degree of 
homogeneity in terms of pottery and economic practices, characterised by the cultivation of crops, the herding 
of cattle and the use of metal artefacts.3 Unfortunately, the archaeology of central Africa has not been 
thoroughly investigated. Most of our knowledge about the early occupation of the region comes from a series of 
cemeteries, notably Katoto in the valley of the upper Lualaba in Zambia and Sanga in Katanga. The cemetery at 
Sanga is one of the most excavated and best-known Iron Age sites in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is located near the 
lake Kisale in the Upemba Depression, a 200 kilometres long basin located in southeast Democratic Congo. The 
Upemba Depression is notable for bearing witness to continuous socio-economic and political developments 
reaching as far back as the fifth century AD. But it is even more notable for providing convincing evidence for 
the emergence of kingship, or at any rate a marked degree of social stratification, early in the second 
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millennium.1 Significantly, the Upemba Depression is also where certain oral traditions have placed the origin 
of Katanga’s very first kingdom and oldest culture: that of the Luba. In turn, the Luba kingdom and culture is 
where many kingdoms of the central African savanna trace back their origin.2 Consequently it figures 
prominently in the history of central Africa as well as in our own modest story.  
Excavations run in Sanga provided possible evidence of early chieftainship in central Africa. The 
excavations undertaken in 1958 revealed a series of tombs, dated to the late first millennium, in which copper, 
iron and ivory jewellery often adorned the deceased. Weapons, pottery, tools and the remains of animals would 
also often accompany them.3 The presence of such items in burials is of some significance. For one thing they 
indicate that the occupants of these tombs belonged to a society of hunters whose economy was able to support 
highly skilled craftsmen in ceramics and metallurgy. For another they suggest that these goods came to serve a 
purpose that surpassed their purely practical function. They seem to have become associated with one’s position 
in society and therefore imbued with status and meaning. Furthermore, the same 1958 excavations revealed 
fragments of single iron bells, dated to between the eleventh and the fourteenth centuries,4 as well as iron gongs 
and ceremonial axes, all of which have long been known in the Congo basin as symbols of chieftainship. 
Similar bells have been found in two other sites: Ingombe Ilede (Zambia) and Great Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe). 
These two southern sites are dated to a somewhat later period, around the fourteenth or fifteenth century, and 
include extended burials and a mass cemetery of a type that calls to mind the cemeteries of Sanga. For these 
reasons, Andrew Roberts argued, the distribution of iron bells and other ‘prestige’ grave goods may be taken as 
evidence for the diffusion of some sort of chieftainship.5  
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Three important points emerge from this discussion. One is that the southern Congo basin seems to have 
contributed significantly to the cultural development of a very large part of central Africa during the second 
millennium AD, and that seems to be particularly the case in Zambia. This view is supported by oral traditions, 
which, as we will see in the next point, derive the ruling dynasties of many states in Zambia and adjacent 
regions from a Congo basin origin. The second is that the centralisation of political authority, the spread of its 
imagery and the interplay of several cultural traditions may be seen as both local and ancient processes. 
Although natural resources and economic potential were diverse, particular and widespread emphasis appears to 
have been placed on the working of metal and its use not only for everyday utilitarian objects but also for items 
intended for display, symbolism, and exchange. Lastly is the fact that these are only snippets into very ancient 
and ill-known processes. No amount of literature can conceal the fact that, in reality, very little is known about 
the early occupation of central Africa. Archaeology for this period remains virtually unknown. What is more, 
there is little archaeological evidence that can be dated later than 1500 or so.1 However, for this later period we 
can begin to make some use of the evidence preserved by human memory and of Jan Vansina’s pioneering 
methodological treatment of oral history. 
 
 
2. The Luba and Lunda according to Oral Tradition  
1. THE BIRTH OF THE LUBA AND LUNDA ‘EMPIRES’ 
According to oral tradition, the area between lake Tanganyika and the upper Kasai was originally 
organised into a multitude of smaller chiefdoms, among which were the Bungo, the Bena Kalundwe, the Kaniok 
and the Hemba.2 At one point in the mythical past, Luba traditions have it, an immigrant called ‘Kongolo’ 
appeared in the area and became the founder of the ‘first Luba kingdom’.3 Kongolo’s origins are unknown, but 
whoever he was, it would appear that he and his successor, Kalala Ilunga, embarked on a policy of expansion, 
subduing the southern part of their kingdom. Kalala Ilunga’s accession to the throne and his vast programme of 
campaigns inaugurated what has been called the ‘second Luba Kingdom’.4 At its apogee in the mid-nineteenth 
century, the Luba would control most of the region between the Lubilash river and lake Tanganyika and 
between the forest and the northern part of the Copperbelt.5 After Kalala Ilunga, however, fraternal struggles for 
the ‘throne’ seem to have become rife. Expansion continued albeit at a slower pace, and seems to have consisted 
more in the slow absorption of communities standing in the periphery of Luba influence than in actual 
campaigns of conquest. No real attempts at expansion are recorded before King Mwine Kadilo, who is thought 
to have reigned around 1700. The recorded sources do not enable us to see why the drive for expansion slowed 
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down.1 It may be that the Luba kingdom now had to contend with the influence of a new state, both a neighbour 
and an offspring: the Lunda kingdom.  
Oral tradition indicates that the cradle of the Lunda nation was an area in the valley of the Nkalaany, or 
upper Bushimaie, River in the west of Katanga. It seems that in the mythical past, Lunda land was already a 
loose but single political unit, administered by a succession of generations of brother-sister ruling couples. Some 
sort of dynastic chronology only appears with a man whom Edouard Bustin refers to as the man ‘who may be 
said to serve as a bridge between the myths of origin and the “historical” past’: Mwaaku or Mkwaakw.2 
Mkwaakw had a son named Nkond. Nkond himself had three children: two sons, Kinguri (also spelled Cinguud 
or Tshinguli) and Cinyama (also spelled Cinyaam or Tshiniama), and a daughter Rweej (also spelled Lueji). 
Kinguri and Cinyama were cruel and lazy, and quarrelled with their father. Because of this quarrel (the nature of 
which vary according to different accounts), the latter named Rweej his heir as ruler of the Lunda instead of his 
sons. Rweej became queen when he died and married a Luba hunter named Cibinda Ilunga, who also happened 
to be the brother of the then Luba king, Ilunga waLwefu. Cibinda Ilunga then became the rightful king of the 
Lunda by virtue of marriage.3 It is generally recognised that this story metaphorically portrays some kind of 
Luba influence on the Lunda state, with the marriage of Rweej to Cibinda Ilunga symbolising the introduction 
of Luba forms of political authority in the budding Lunda statehood. According to Vansina, this myth is almost 
certainly a euphemistic description of the conquest of the area by the Luba kingdom, a hypothesis he sees 
strengthened by the fact that ‘many Lunda titles are derived from Luba land’.4 The Lunda kingdom, however, 
functioned as a kingdom on its own right and its construction as an ‘empire’ took place under the successors of 
Cibinda Ilunga. Cibinda Ilunga’s grandson, mwaant Yaav Naweej, pursued a deliberate policy of expansion and 
consolidated court organisation to such an extent that his personal name became a generic title for Lunda 
kingship, as Mwaant Yaav or Mwata Yamvo. Under his reign, the Lunda kingdom expanded from the valley of 
the Nkalaany to the whole area between that river and the Kasai in the west to the springs of the Lulua in the 
south.5  
The interpretation of these stories and the dating of the actual events they describe (or are metaphors for) 
rest on rather shaky ground. The drawing of a chronology for Lunda history after the reign of Naweej, for 
instance, is crippled by the important irreconcilable discrepancies that are present in sources for that period.6 
But it is the date of the creation of these kingdoms and of the appearance of kingship that is especially disputed. 
Kongolo’s foundation of the Luba kingdom has been dated to c.1500 and Kalala Ilunga to c.1600, with Vansina 
placing the conquest of the Lunda area by the Luba kingdom in or around AD 1600.7 These dates are calculated 
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from the sum of kings’s reigns (approximated to 20 years for each king), counting back from the only event 
whose date is known with some certainty. This single datable event occurred early in the seventeenth century 
when Lunda-led armies of trained warriors called 'Jaga' or ‘Imbangala’ swept over the Mbundu regions of 
northern Angola, an event recorded by Portuguese observers (see point 2 below).1 However, according to J.C. 
Miller, the dating of the origins of Luba kingship to the sixteenth century is based on too literal an interpretation 
of the traditional evidence. Instead he strongly argues that greater sophistication is needed in inferring 
chronology from such tradition of origin. According to him, not only should many of these stories be taken 
much more metaphorically but most names mentioned in traditional stories are more likely to refer to titles 
rather than actual persons, in which case one name could actually refer to multiple people. Reinterpreting the 
traditions as chronicles of named positions rather than individual rulers significantly alters the dating of the 
entire complex of early Lunda and Luba states in Katanga and would push the beginnings of kingdoms in this 
part of Africa to ‘the thirteenth century or perhaps long before’.2 This, incidentally, would coincide with the 
evidence of the Upemba Depression. Even if one could spend endless time discussing what the concepts of 
kingship and kingdoms really mean in this case, Luba stories of their first kings could nevertheless be regarded 
as representing memories of political structures far older than their royal genealogies would suggest.3 
2. MIGRATIONS OF LUNDA GROUPS 
The Lunda influence did not stay limited to its traditional heartland in western Katanga but sparked off 
the appearance of a series of smaller Lunda-ised groups with ramifications spreading far and wide. Oral 
tradition suggests that much of the initial Lunda expansion towards eastern Angola and northeast Zambia in the 
seventeenth century took the form of migrations involving segments of the original population (under 
circumstances that remain far from clear). These migrations supposedly found their origin in the fact that 
Rweej’s two brothers, who had not objected to her becoming queen, refused to plead allegiance to the 
newcomer. As a result, they left Lunda land to migrate in different directions.4 Kinguri’s migration eventually 
led to the foundation of the Kasanje kingdom, home to the Imbangala, on the Kwango in Angola, and to 
contacts with the Portuguese. Though Kasanje is of lesser interest to the history of the Lunda, as it never really 
fell within Lunda’s orbit, it provides our first tentative correlations with Western chronology and allows us to 
place Kinguri’s original departure from Lunda sometime around 1490.5 For his part, the second brother, 
Cinyama, migrated to the south, into the area situated between the upper Kasai and upper Zambezi, in modern 
Zambia, to bring Lunda rule to the Lwena. This second thrust is even less documented than that of Kinguri as its 
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inland direction made it escape the attention of external observers.1 Other groups believed to have departed at or 
about the same time are said to be the ancestors of the Cokwe, the Minungu, the Shinje and the Songo,2 
although here again there is considerable uncertainty as to whether or not these migrations are part of the two 
major currents of dispersion identified above, or indeed if they took place at all.  
Yet another migration, some traditions have it, involved some of the Luba followers that Cibinda Ilunga 
brought with him from his native Luba land when he married Rweej. These followers, after considerable 
peregrination, reportedly founded the Bemba nation and settled between lakes Tanganyika, Mweru and 
Bangweolu where they set out to subdue different parts of the country. In that particular instance, therefore, it is 
difficult to identify the origins of the Bemba as either Luba or Lunda (a fact that gave rise to some quarrelling 
among students of Bemba tradition). At several points on the way, several parties decided to stay behind and to 
leave the bulk of the group to move on by themselves. These split-away groups founded the Bisa and Lala 
chiefdoms.3 In this way, new ‘tribes’ and chiefdoms were established through a common process of settlement 
by ‘Luba’ immigrants but with no mass migration having taking place.4 This has led Vansina to argue that ‘the 
names of the present day “tribes” may reflect not any real cultural differences but the vicissitudes of the 
implantation of chiftainships’.5 A similar evolution, he says, occurred in all other parts of eastern Zambia and 
Katanga.6  
This, then, is the summary of the first Lunda expansion over wide parts of Africa through extensive 
migrations. What emerges from the conflicting oral traditions, is that, beginning in the first half of the sixteenth 
century, a continuous stream of Lunda/Luba migrants moved westwards and southwards from the heartland 
until they had gradually occupied or brought under control large portions of territory. The story of these 
migrations is a rather tangled one. For one thing, it is possible that migrations, as suggested by archaeological 
evidence, had taken place before. For another, instead of two migratory thrusts led by the two brothers, there 
would have probably been several, none of them involving large numbers (maybe a hundred at a time or even 
less).7 For yet another thing, they might not have been migrations at all. At least not in the sense in which this 
term is usually understood. There has been a tendency, especially among historians of the 1960s to read 
traditional migration stories quite literally and to ascribe political and cultural change that occurred in one or 
another specific place to population movements. This has led to a tendency to view African state-formation as 
depending ‘on the arrival of skilled outsiders who imposed fully-developed state institutions on less skilled 
peasants with little subsequent alteration in the basic political structures established at the ‘conquest.’8 This 
tendency has since then been widely criticised being described as ‘part of an intellectual tradition that sought to 
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explain cause and effect by discrete, discernible events, denying the complex interplay among processes that are 
quite impossible any longer to give shape to.’1 Since the early 1970s, the migration hypothesis has been be 
replaced by an emphasis on local developments and innovation. In the case of the Lunda expansion, ‘migration’ 
might have consisted in the transfer of the Lunda title from one neighbouring state to another without 
necessarily involving any Lunda individuals.2 If it did involve individuals, their ‘migration’ would have taken a 
much longer period of time and followed a more complex evolution than the conventional model of a 'migration' 
by a single group of people going from a point A to a point B. Migrating groups would have split, settled, 
integrated some of the elements of the culture that they encountered, then split again, moved on again having 
acquired a slightly new identity. These migrations therefore did not necessarily imply an extension of political 
control from the Lunda heartland over the far-flung areas that came into its sphere of influence. They represent 
instances of cultural diffusion. In any case, by the turn of the seventeenth century, the grasslands south of the 
Katanga lakes and the north Zambian plateau were occupied by a number of peoples with very similar cultures 
who shared a great many clans among them. Most of them, regardless of historical facts, traditionally claim 
Luba origins.3 
3. THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: TWO MIGRATORY THRUSTS 
The first half of the eighteenth century saw two further instances of Lunda expansion, which will be 
described as ‘thrusts’ for lack of a better word. One ‘thrust’ took place in a southerly direction and supposedly 
involved three ‘Lunda-ised’ chiefs, Musokantanda, Kanongesha, and Shinde, each of whom carved out for 
himself a chiftainship in the upper basin of the Zambezi.4 In that area were a number of smaller kingdoms akin 
to those of the Luba, including Lwena and Kaonde.5 Musokantanda subjugated the Kaonde. Kanongesha 
established himself in the area of Mwinilunga and Shinde settled farther to the south. These ‘Lunda-ised’ 
intruders called themselves Ndembu, a name quickly adopted by their subjects too, so that they collectively 
came to be known as the Ndembu. Though the Ndembu regarded the Mwata Yamvo as their ‘overlord’ and sent 
him tributes,6 in effect the Mwata Yamvo eventually had to create the office of sanama or governor for the 
newly acquired lands to the south for it could not be controlled properly from the capital.7 
It was, however, in the Luapula valley, about 800 kilometres east of Mwata Yamvo’s capital, that the 
Lunda empire made its greatest impact on Zambia. Lunda expansion to the East was arguably a little like a 
‘thrust’ in the sense that it was relatively abrupt and conquering in spirit.8 This eastwards thrust, which seems to 
have owed its first impetus to a search for salt, eventually resulted in the foundation of two semiautonomous 
kingdoms: one on the upper Lualaba (Kazembe of the Lualaba), which controlled salt and copper deposits, and 
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3. The Socio-Political Organisation 
Traditional stories therefore suggest that chieftainship was well implanted in Zambia by the sixteenth 
century and that this owed something to influences emanating from the Luba and Lunda. Yet, if these stories are 
likely to contain a kernel of truth, they should not be taken at face value. As Hugues Legros put it: ‘ces récits 
doivent être considérés comme des “clichés”. Ils prennent la forme d’épisodes stéréotypés qui renvoient avant 
tout à la manière dont la société produit et pense son passé.’1 Consequently, he continues, these stories should 
be thought of as ‘mythes de transfert’ which could refer to a ‘véritable migration, mais aussi à des transferts 
d’idéologie ou d’identité ou à des contacts politiques ou commerciaux entre deux régions.’2 Similarly, Andrew 
Roberts points out that the main purpose of these myths ‘is not to record what really happened, but rather to 
explain and justify the customs and institutions of the present day’.3 In that sense they are meant to help to 
provide a sense of community and political identity more than they are meant to preserve the memory of real 
historical events. Undeniably all customs found in northern Zambia are suspiciously similar to those of the 
Lunda/Luba traditions. For one thing there is a great number of technical similarities ‘in the vocabulary of 
political institutions, and in the insignia of chieftainship, such as iron bells and bowstands, and wooden slit 
signals, or ‘talking drums’.4 But more importantly, there are many similarities in political ideas. 
Luba political organisation is not well known and only a rough sketch can be drawn. The most important 
political idea of the Luba was their approach to kingship and authority. Luba kingship was based on the concept 
of bulopwe, an inborn and sacred quality which was vested in the blood – it was transmitted from father to son – 
and gave chiefs legitimacy as rulers.5 In addition, around the king was developed a form of government that 
combined a central government and some degree of decentralisation and flexibility in incorporating foreign 
leaders within its ranks. Of this system, tribute exchange and control of redistribution were cornerstones.6 
Another important particularity of Luba history is the development of an ideology and institutions that were 
exported to clients all over the kingdom and which enabled the king to claim a degree of loyalty from them.7 In 
broad terms therefore, the main concepts introduced by the Luba were loosely centralised kingship and 
mechanisms of integration of alien groups in the Luba structure. In contrast to the Luba, the Lunda placed much 
less emphasis on royal blood as a qualification for political office. Instead they found ways of associating non-
royal officials with the royal family and giving non-Lunda subjects key positions in the Lunda kingdom. This, 
they achieved thanks to two central concepts: one was the clear-cut distinction between rights in land and 
authority over men, and the other, the interacting notions of ‘positional succession’ and ‘perpetual kinship’.8 
The notion of perpetual ‘kinship’ and the related custom of ‘positional succession’, perhaps the most important 
concept introduced by the Lunda, was the idea that a chief, or any other figure of authority, was considered a kin 
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of all other chiefs and figures of authority, regardless of their cultural or familial affiliations. In this way, when a 
chief or headman succeeded to a title, he regarded certain other title-holders as ‘father’, ‘brother’ or ‘son’, 
regardless of their actual relationship to him. Thus the Lunda kingdom consisted of a web of titled positions, 
linked in a hierarchy of perpetual kinship.1 Secondly, an important feature of Lunda politics, which was in fact 
originally a Luba idea, was the clear distinction made between land and political chiefs. When a Lunda kingdom 
took over a territory, its chief might be left in control of his own chiefdom as an ‘owner of the land’ on 
condition of swearing allegiance to the higher authority of the Mwata Yamvo and paying him tribute. Whether 
peaceful or forcible, the integration of the various villages – or Ngaand – into the Lunda political network took 
the form of the dispatching to a given area of a political administrator, the cilool, whose primary role was that of 
a tax collector and who had no authority over the land itself.2 Therefore, the chief of a local chiefdom, though 
nominally no longer the highest authority, could still in practice act as the absolute boss of his own domain. As 
a result, these two concepts, if made to work together, offered the opportunity to assimilate strange and distant 
group within Lunda society while minimising the possibility of conflict with local traditions. This made 
assimilation into the Lunda political and tributary network relatively easy to accept. In the words of Jean-Luc 
Vellut, extended Lunda society was an: 
‘ensemble complexe où l’on peut distinguer deux niveaux d’organisation économique et politique : 
celui des communautés villageoises groupées autour de l’un ou l’autre lignage, parfois mais non 
nécessairement Lunda, et celui de la superstructure politique présente à des degrés divers dans tout 
l’empire, et dont l’expression la plus pure est la cour .’3 
The kingdom of Kazembe is an illustration of the efficiency of these tactics. Between the mid-eighteenth and 
the early nineteenth century, all the peoples of the lower Luapula valley and the westernmost reaches of the 
easterly plateau were incorporated into the emerging kingdom of Kazembe.4 The important ethnic cleavages 
present within this territory created high potential for tension and the sheer size of the kingdom meant there was 
no means to enforce Kazembe’s authority, militarily or otherwise. Kazembe was essentially a conquest state, 
which made it necessary for its rulers to perform a ‘travail de légitimité’ or, in other words, to make Lunda 
overrule acceptable to local populations. To achieve this, the rulers of Kazembe drew on the Lunda cultural 
resources and elaborated ‘a complex set of institutions of peripheral rule’.5 Kazembe kings deployed 
representatives to their subjects, the bacilolo, whose job was to propagate Lunda government principles and 
symbols to their designated districts. The bacilolo expropriated Luapulan bacilokwe of their former right to 
allocate land to new villages and settlers but at the same time respected the original occupants of the valley as 
‘owners of the land’, endowed with special ritual competences over their districts.6 In this way, as summarised 
by Cunnison, ‘wherever governors went, a system of communications and tribute was set up between the 
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outlying capital and the metropolis (…) each district capital was a centre of Lundahood’.1 In addition, the 
intruding Lunda also adopted the Bemba speech of their subjects, though Lunda survived as a court language,2 
while at the same time a the production and diffusion of a Lunda-centred history and ideology contributed to 
bind foreign rulers and subject peoples.3 In this way, despite its great extent, the kingdom of Kazembe achieved 
a greater measure of cohesion than its western Lunda counterpart. Its structure resembled that of Mwata 
Yamvo’s but co-existed with, and contributed to, the continuing diversity among Kazembe’s people.  
The existence of such flexible structures explains the breadth that the Luba and Lunda influence was able 
to reach (by the nineteenth century, Lunda/Luba governmental patterns were disseminated over an area ranging 
from Angola to Malawi). In fact, the term ‘empire’ that is usually attached to the names of Luba and Lunda, is 
in itself misleading. ‘Empire’ implies the existence of clearly defined boundaries and a strong central state 
endowed with an equally strong state apparatus exercising tight control over its territory. In reality all Luba, 
Lunda or Lunda-ised states consisted rather of a nucleus which was tightly controlled by the central 
government, while in outlying provinces, the authority and power of the central government faded away more 
and more the farther one went from the centre. At some point one would reach a point far enough from the 
nucleus for Luba/Lunda hegemony to be more cultural than actual. And even the term of cultural hegemony, 
which I have just most consciously used, is to a large extent misleading. It would be erroneous to think of the 
origins of chieftainship, or any other custom or institution, simply, or exclusively, in terms of diffusion from 
somewhere else. As Roberts pointed out: ‘however important outside influences may be, they are unlikely to 
take roots unless local conditions are favourable.’4 And indeed, the fact that even at the height of their power, 
the Lunda were not able to subject the few groups that challenged their authority – as was the case with the 
Kongo or Sala Mpasu in the north in the mid-nineteenth century – goes some way to show to what a great extent 
conquest depended on the acquiescence of the conquered.5 
Therefore, we should think in terms not so much of invasion and conquest, but rather of newcomers 
acquiring authority by virtue of techniques and ideas which were found to be both attractive and adaptable. And 
attractive and adaptable Lunda governmental practices were indeed. So attractive and adaptable that Jan 
Vansina was able to argue that: 
‘The crucial event in the earlier history of central Africa has been not the creation of a Luba kingdom 
by Kongolo and Kalala Ilunga but the introduction of Luba principles of government into Lunda land 
under Cibinda Ilunga and their transformation by the Lunda. The new political pattern which evolved 
around 1600 in the Lunda capital could be taken over by any culture. Its diffusion was to condition 
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until 1850 the history and the general cultural evolution of a huge area. Even now its effects on the 
peoples of central Africa are still discernible.’1 
 
 
4. The Importance of Trade Networks 
In her review of the excavations carried out at Sanga in 1991, Marianne Cornevin noted that 
‘malheureusement la tradition orale se borne à transmettre des noms et, dans les meilleurs des cas, des 
évènements d’ordre militaire ou politique; elle « oublie » les facteurs économiques qui sont généralement à 
l’origine des transformations socio-politiques.’2 Yet, from other evidence, it appears that trade played a vital 
role in state expansion and cultural diffusion, and perhaps even in the emergence of specific types of state 
organisation. Trade, in central Africa, was plentiful, varied and operated at several levels. Vansina distinguishes 
three different types of trade: the local trade (from village to village within a given population); the regional 
trade (between culturally different peoples within a single state) and the long distance trade, which was 
introduced with the arrival of European traders in the fifteenth century.3 Richard Gray and David Birmingham, 
on the other hand, contend that it is difficult to distinguish the different phases of trade primarily on the basis of 
geographical scale or the distances and commodities involved. For if one tries to draw such distinctions, they 
contend, ‘the distinction between village and regional trade, defined by Vansina, becomes blurred right at the 
start.’4 Instead, it seems that all sorts of commodities were moving across large distances and being exchanged 
between all sorts of communities from an early stage. Therefore Gray and Birmingham prefer instead to 
distinguish ‘subsistence-oriented trade’ from ‘market-oriented trade’,5 which allow for flexibility of interaction 
between several types of trade. ‘In practice,’ they add, ‘the populations of central and eastern Africa lived in 
varying degrees of dependence on subsistence production and market exchange, and subsistence-oriented trade 
often continued to co-exist with an incipient, developing commerce.’6  
1. PRE-LONG-DISTANCE TRADE IN CENTRAL AFRICA 
It has too often been supposed that trade in Africa only began with the export of gold, ivory and slaves 
that was introduced by the Portuguese in the late fifteenth century.7 In reality, when the Portuguese arrived at 
the mouth of the Congo, they stumbled upon a developed and centralised commercial system, operating a 
complex currency system: the Kongo kingdom.8 The Kongo kingdom was by no means an isolated case. To 
many central African societies, including that of the Luba and Lunda, the Long-Distance trade was simply the 
latest stage of a long process of economic interaction between African societies. It has been noted, in the first 
section of this chapter, that archaeological evidence points at the existence, at least from the beginning of the 
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second millennium, of extended regional trade systems thanks to which subsistence and prestige goods travelled 
widely. In turn, this extended regional trade seems to have facilitated the appearance of a high degree of 
specialisation and a complex system of tribute.1 What is more, the importance of certain commodities, such as 
iron and salt, may explain why the expansion of certain states took a specific axis or why certain states became 
more centralised than others. Katanga, where – perhaps not so incidentally – the comparatively highly 
centralised Luba state emerged, possessed three valuable raw materials that were in strong demand all over 
central Africa: iron, salt and copper, all highly-prized ‘prestige’ goods. It was thus no wonder that Katanga 
should be highly coveted. The eastwards expansion of the Lunda in the early eighteenth century and the related 
growth of the kingdom of Kazembe were in part determined by the ambition to secure access to the mineral 
resources of southern Katanga. At least, this is what is suggested by the fact that traditional accounts attribute 
great importance to the salt-producing district on the upper Lualaba River.2 The salt-pans were located all 
around the Katanga lakes, and at Kiburi on the Upper Lualaba and Mwashya on the Upper Lufira. These were 
controlled first by the Mwata Yamvo, then by the Kazembe, whilst the salt and mineral mines north of the lake 
were under Luba control. From these Lunda and Luba strongholds, salt from the Mwashya and lake salt-pans 
was apparently exported to eastern Katanga.3 As it happens, the main deposits of copper were located in the 
same area, at Mwilu near the salt-pans of the Lualaba. The principal copper mines belonged to chief Katanga 
(after whom the province of Katanga was later named), and copper was exported in the form of bars or crosses, 
northwards, to the Luba, and southwards, to Kazembe.4 And indeed most of the copper found by archaeologists 
in Zambia came from Katanga,5 while the archaeological record of the Upemba Depression testifies to the 
northwards spread of the trade. In fact, as Vansina argues, the fact that copper was in use across the whole area 
suggests strongly that all of central Africa between the Kasai, the Zambezi and the great lakes had a single net 
of interlocking regional trade systems.6 
2. THE LONG-DISTANCE TRADE IN CENTRAL AFRICA 
The first European contact with African shores south of the equator was made when the Portuguese 
discovered the kingdom of Kongo in 1482. Trade started sometime after 1493,7 but it was not until the 
eighteenth century that the search for commodities such as gold, ivory and slaves was carried into the unknown 
country north of the middle Zambezi. By the 1650s, traders had reached Kasanje, the capital of the Imbangala 
near the upper Kwango. There traders exchanged European goods for ivory and slaves with the Imbangala, who 
themselves organised caravans to the capital of the Lunda kingdom, and vice-versa.8 Meanwhile, while contact 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 T.Q. REEFE, The Rainbow and the Kings, pp.93-96; A. WILSON, ‘Long Distance Trade and the Luba Lomami Empire’, p.579. 
2 G. MACOLA, The Kingdom of Kazembe, p.44. 
3 J. VANSINA, ‘Long-Distance Trade-Routes in Central Africa’, p.387. 
4 Ibid, p.386. 
5 A. ROBERTS, A History of Zambia, p.104. 
6 J. VANSINA, ‘Long-Distance Trade-Routes in Central Africa’, p.387. 
7 J. THORNTON, ‘Early Kongo-Portuguese Relations’, p.183. 
8 The western trade route occasionally bypassed the western Lunda kingdom, especially when Kasanje was replaced by Bihe, capitals of 
the Ovimbundu as main trading town in the West around 1850. By 1795 a new pattern of long-distance trade passing through Bihe, 
rather than Kasanje, was well established and extended as far as Cokweland, their direct neighbour, and made contact with the Lwena. 
! 34!
was established between the main Lunda kingdom and the Atlantic coast, Kazembe was already in contact with 
the eastwards trade route and the Indian Ocean. The Kazembe kingdom had been involved in long-distance 
trade since its inception in the earlier seventeenth century, collaborating for that purpose with neighbouring 
peoples, mainly the Bisa and the Yao. The Yao, who lived on the eastern side of Lake Malawi were by then well 
established as the leading African traders in east central Africa.1 At the same time, from the moment Kazembe’s 
suzerain had secured regular access to European goods, which happened around 1740, some of these were 
carried eastwards to Kazembe’s capital on the Luapula, where they were exchanged for salt and copper. By the 
later eighteenth century, Kazembe was also sending slaves to Mwata Yamvo, who exported them northwards to 
the lower Congo. In this way then, the east and west trade routes linked up at Kazembe’s and formed a single 
trade route that crossed the whole continent from east to west. The linking of the eastern and western trade 
routes was only made possible by the fact that the vast territories of the Lunda empire were connected by deeply 
ingrained tributary/trading networks and the fact that these were successfully recycled for the purpose of the 
long-distance trade. Since these tribute/trade routes also ran through the salt- and copper-producing districts of 
Katanga where they linked up with the regional networks of the Luba area,2 these items were easily available for 
the international market. In this way, the two networks of economic exchanges interpenetrated and fed upon 
each other. If it is problematic to postulate a clear-cut separation between regional and long-distance trade, it is 
however probable that the incorporation of the former in the latter boosted the regional networks’ capacity and 
reach and therefore stimulated the traditional economy.  
3. TRADE AS CATALYST FOR CULTURAL AND POLITICAL EXPANSION 
Trade seems to have had a fluctuating effect on, and a polyvalent relationship with, the politics of central 
Africa. The Bisa and the Yao, for instance, though they were eminently successful trading peoples, never 
created any centralised states.3 The kingdom of Kazembe and the main Lunda kingdom, on the other hand, are 
typical examples of important states that derived their strength from their commercial position. The Lunda 
empire grew to become one of Africa’s main suppliers of slaves to the outside world in the eighteenth century 
while Kazembe was the strongest power to reckon with in southern Katanga and northern Zambia for most of 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. There are several factors that could explain this disparity, but the 
most significant one must be the nature of the commodity that was traded. The trade in minerals, in particular, 
probably required a high degree of organisation and control. Mining being a located activity, the trade to gold, 
copper, or salt mines could become the focal centre of rapidly growing economic and political power. This 
could explain the centralised quality of the Luba state.4 The extending regional trade did not foster further 
expansion of the Luba state, but it did lead to improved communication between peoples and polities, thereby 
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strengthening Luba authority in the region. In the case of the Luba therefore, trade and politics interacted, 
feeding upon one another.1 Similarly, the growth of the Lunda kingdom did not take off until it was supported 
by a strong commercial network. The centralisation of the Mwata Yamvo’s authority and the political expansion 
of Lunda influence mainly took place in the eighteenth century, which means that it coincided with the 
expansion of trade to the Atlantic Ocean.2 It is easy to see how trade could be a channel for expansion and 
centralisation. Regional circuits were dependent upon, and limited by, the existing political structures. There 
were no regular markets, but the court of chiefs could serve as centres for redistributing the varied tributes 
levied from their subjects.3 Rulers usually tried to keep a tight monopoly on trade. In exchange for guaranteeing 
order and law on the routes and market, they levied transit tolls and market taxes4 from which they derived 
wealth and prestige. This wealth and prestige they invested in the strengthening of their political positions. The 
first Portuguese traders to come to see Kazembe’s capital were impressed by the size and variety of the Mwata 
Kazembe’s possessions and noticed that the latter ‘was very generous at times in giving slaves and pieces of 
cloth to his vassals.’5 Most of these exotic goods obtained through trade constituted a capital which the king 
spent with a view to strengthening links of political subordination and patronage. Since cultural and political 
symbols were no doubt exchanged along with trading goods, the route joining the Lunda heartland and the 
Luapula River no doubt enhanced the prestige of the rulers of the kingdom of Kazembe and contributed to 
maintain them ‘au sein des différentes communauté participant a la Grande Tradition Lunda.’6 Thus the 
dynamics of commerce and politics are hard to disentangle. The political history is very important for an 
understanding of the trade, while conversely the trade helps to explain certain relevant aspects of the political 
structures or even some actions of external politics, such as the seizing of a region where valuable materials 
were to be found. Not only did trade foster the establishment of a complex web of tributary networks but it also, 
at various points, served as catalyst for expansion. 
 
 
5. The Crumbling of States (1840-1900) 
After the middle of the nineteenth century the patterns of history in central Africa changed suddenly. 
Instead of the uniform succession of rulers at the head of a set of stable kingdoms semi-isolated in or around the 
vast Lunda Empire, there now appears a pattern of increased violence and instability. The origins for these new 
patterns must be sought in the fact that in the middle of the nineteenth century, the peoples of Zambia and 
Katanga were exposed to important changes both in the nature and direction of the region’s external contacts. 
Previously, the main line of contact of the area with a wider world had taken the form of trade but those contacts 
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had mainly taken place through the intermediary of go-between groups. From 1840 onwards there was a variety 
of new external pressures, coming from both west and east, in the form of newcomers, some of whom turned 
out to be conquerors. Incidentally, this period of violent convulsions coincides with the beginnings of European 
exploratory interests in the region. By the time the first Europeans effectively worked towards effectual 
penetration, they encountered a different balance of power that had thus far existed. In 1800, there had been four 
main ‘centres of authority’ in central Africa: the main Luba kingdom, the main Lunda kingdom, the kingdom of 
Kazembe and the Lozi kingdom (a kingdom located on the upper Zambezi, in the West of what is now Zambia, 
which only had tenuous link with Mwata Yamvo1). By 1900, all these kingdoms had, to all intents and purposes, 
fallen.  
1. IN THE WEST: THE COKWE 
The Cokwe are responsible for the overthrow of the traditional patterns of life in the western half of 
Katanga, in Kasai, and in the southern parts of the Kwango-Kasai area. In a very short period from about 1852 
to 1887 they had overrun all the Lunda groups everywhere. Yet until 1850 they were almost unheard of.2 They 
were originally a small group of nomadic peoples who lived near the headwaters of the Kwango, Kwilu and 
Kasai rivers. They had been engaged in hunting, collection and trading of ivory and wax, gun-running and other 
related activities under the political supervision of Lunda chiefs. In the process they had been extending their 
control over an ever-increasing area, their expansion following the lines of the trade routes on which they were 
active.3 By the mid-1860s advanced parties had penetrated deep into Kasai and the Cokwe were en marche in 
several directions. Within little more than a decade, they virtually controlled a large corridor extending as far 
north as Tshikapa (Kasai) and thus effectively cut off the Mwata Yamvo from the westernmost portions of his 
empire. The Cokwe expansion into the Lunda homeland proper began in the 1870s when they took advantage of 
the dynastic struggles among the Lunda aristocracy that were taking place at the time. While Lunda trade 
continued to expand, the Lunda king was facing the growing insubordination of Mdumba, the then sanama 
(governor of the southern Lunda provinces). Mdumba eventually had the Mwata Yamvo killed, took his place 
and, with this act, inaugurated a period of dynastic strife and violent convulsions. These culminated with the 
Cokwe invasions of 1885-1888, the complete collapse of the Lunda state, and the taking-over of its territory, 
capital and trade networks by the Cokwe.4 
2. IN THE EAST: THE YEKE  
At the same time as the Cokwe were advancing in the west, both the authority of the Luba king and what 
remained of the Mwata Yamvo’s control over the Kazembe eastern domains were being shattered by the 
ruthless empire-building activities of a new group: the Yeke. Projected practically out of nowhere into the midst 
of the intricate web of kingdoms and chieftaincies that was Katanga at that time, the Yeke established a 
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kingdom which, though short-lived – it existed from about 1856 to 1891 – became for a while the most 
powerful state in south-central Africa.1 The Yeke were originally Nyamwezi traders who came to Katanga from 
their native northwestern Tanzania presumably to buy ivory to bring to the east coast.2 By 1800, some 
Nyamwezi had already found their way to Kazembe’s capital, and from the 1850s onwards, one of these 
Nyamwezi traders, Msiri, obtained permission to settle permanently in Katanga. Once the permission was 
granted, Msiri and a band of followers made alliances with local neighbouring chiefs and soon started to extort 
ivory from them, eventually seizing control of the copper mines. Msiri also established close trade relations with 
the traders of both east and west coasts, which allowed him to be constantly well supplied with firearms.3 Thus 
armed, Msiri’s armies were able to incorporate all the possessions of Kazembe west of the Luapula into the new 
Yeke state between 1865 and 1871 while tribute collectors were placed next to all major Luba kings and chiefs.4 
In this way, Msiri had obtained near absolute political power and a kingdom of his own. His was a new type of 
kingship, one that no longer rested on a ritual or magical underpinning but on commercial supremacy and 
military abilities, used to maintain a strong centralised and hegemonic state.5 From 1884 to 1887 Msiri was at 
the height of his power and his capital, Bunkeya, became a major centre of trade as well as a large urban 
agglomeration.6 For the Luba empire and what remained of the Kazembe kingdom, the growth of Msiri’s 
conquest state was very bad news. Msiri had established his conquest state in southern Katanga, close to the 
southeastern frontier of the Luba empire, at a time when the Luba were coming under increased pressure from 
various sources. The Luba empire had not been seriously affected by the development of a world economy, for 
it was located too far in the interior to be touched directly by this trade before the nineteenth century.7 Yet 
international trade was the reason for the Luba kingdom’s ultimate collapse as traders gradually chipped away at 
the empire’s most distant client states. First, Arab-Swahili slave and ivory traders from the east African coast 
moved into the eastern regions of the Luba empire, as well as into its north-eastern frontier zone, undermining 
the authority of the centre in those areas. Then Ovimbundu slave and ivory traders coming from Angola did the 
same as they were penetrating the empire’s heartland from the southwest.8 As a result of all these processes, by 
the time the first Belgian-led expeditions reached Luba in 1891, the empire’s frontiers and heartland had already 
been dismembered.9 As for the Kazembe kingdom, it too entered into conflict with its greedy neighbours. Not 
only had the Yeke’s invasion considerably reduced the territorial extent of the kingdom and effectively cut off 
Kazembe’s links with the Mwata Yamvo and Angola, the remnants of Kazembe’s territories were being further 
encroached upon by some of his former allies, trading partners or tributaries. In the northwest, Kazembe’s 
access to copper and ivory started being challenged by the Luba kingdom, which in a last-ditch attempt for 
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survival, was seeking to obtain greater control over trading routes.1 Meanwhile, to the south, the Bemba were 
also agitating. The Bemba, by contrast to other groups, had done very well out of the east African trade. Their 
infertile homeland had nothing to offer in terms of minerals or agricultural products but they hunted elephants 
and by 1880 they also exported slaves. This allowed the Bemba kingdom to become at once larger and more 
closely knit together by ties of royal kinship, thereby making it difficult for a weakened kingdom of Kazembe to 
prevent Bemba slave-raiders from encroaching upon the north-eastern plateau.2 Thus the Kazembe kingdom, 
which in 1800 had been the most extensive and powerful in Zambia, had by 1870 been greatly reduced and its 
authority greatly diminished.3 
3. DISRUPTED AND YET NEVER SO INTERCONNECTED 
By 1890, practically the whole of central Africa had been drawn in some way into the world economy. 
For old kingdoms such as the Lunda’s and Luba’s, the result was disastrous as they found themselves seized 
between what Edouard Bustin calls ‘the advancing tentacles of two giant exploitative systems reaching at them 
from opposite ends of the globe’.4 Yet, as was mentioned in the previous section, the long-distance trade had the 
effect of broadening, rather than weakening, the processes of interaction that were already in place, at least until 
the Yeke invasion of the late nineteenth century. Until the mid-nineteenth century, Katanga had still not been 
entirely integrated into long-distance networks, even if part of its economy and production had already taken an 
orientation that went far beyond pure subsistence economy. Commerce was dominated by salt and copper and 
was structured along two main routes: a north-south one dominated by the Luba kingdom, and a south-west one, 
dominated by Mwata Yamvo on the Atlantic side, and by Kazembe on the Indian side. Therefore, if Katanga 
had been introduced to international commerce, the latter only had a limited distribution in the interior as these 
three main axes worked quite independently from each other.5 In turn, the long-distance trade contributed to the 
intensification of contacts between the groups controlling these axes. The rulers of the Kazembe kingdom, 
although politically independent and well beyond the reach of the Mwata Yamvo, kept in constant 
communication with the Lunda heartland throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a fact that is 
certainly due in no small part to the long-distance trade. The Portuguese trader Caetano Pereira noted in 1796 
that Mwata Kazembe III Lukwesa Ilunga continued to send tribute to his “father” in the form of slaves and 
copper from southern Katanga.6 As late as 1868, Mwata Kazembe VII Muonga Sunkutu planned to send a 
‘tribute of slaves’ to his ‘paramount chief, Matiamvo’,7 while the latter reciprocated with a flow of trade items 
such as mirrors, cowries, and beads.8  
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The arrival of the Yeke had a profound impact on the way commerce and trade were approached in 
Katanga. The very foundation of the Yeke kingdom was commercial, and it actively participated in the long-
distance trade. The Yeke connected their newly conquered region to all the international trading networks that 
were operating at the time in their original Tanzanian region and they tapped into the local exchange networks 
they stumbled upon to cultivate these connections. Through their settling in the Copperbelt region, they found 
themselves at the hinge of both east and west trade and progressively passed from the eastern zone of influence 
to the western one. In this way, they established the necessary connections between long-distance trade 
networks which, until then, had remained separate. Consequently Katanga found itself integrated into a structure 
essentially oriented towards the international market of which the long-distance trade was the principal 
component.1 In the first phase of their occupation, which lasted from c.1855 to c.1870, the Yeke busied 
themselves co-opting traditional Katangese trade based on salt and copper. During that phase the copper trade 
expanded considerably. By 1867 the leading Bemba chiefs bought copper from visiting Yeke traders from 
Katanga. Thus north-eastern Zambia kept receiving copper, even though Kazembe had lost control of the 
Katanga copper trade by this time.2 In the second phase of Yeke occupation, which culminated in the 1870s, 
copper was supplanted by slaves and ivory. These new products imposed new constraints which were 
diametrically opposed to those imposed by the copper trade. Mobility became more important than localisation. 
To hunt for slaves and ivory required the availability of great stretches of land in which there was no political, 
social or economic opposition to tackle. Unsurprisingly therefore, the adoption of the ivory and slave trade by 
the Yeke coincides with their expansionary thrust in the 1870s.3 Resulting the growth of the international trade 
and the arrival of intruders, therefore competition to capture or retain the lucrative new trade increased and 
many regions were brought in closer touch. The long-distance trade acted as a magnifier for cultural, political 
and economic exchanges of all kinds across the continent. This phenomenon led Andrew Roberts to argue that 
the later nineteenth century saw: 
‘a marked expansion in the scale of social and political relations, in so far as peoples were drawn into 
the structures of larger kingdoms, and came within the orbit of long-distance trade. (…) Ideas and 
skills circulated widely. (…) The lines of division between peoples were less marked than ever before; 
their political and cultural identities were increasingly merged in wider groupings. Yet there was no 
single focus for such imitation and assimilation; instead there were a number of different spheres of 
influence, which were linked to the outside world by routes which led in all directions.’4 
 
 
Conclusion 
It is almost a truism at this point to say that a lot more research will be needed before any historian can 
hope to sketch a more precise picture of pre-colonial central African history. But several factors can be inferred 
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from what is known, not the least of which being the fact that virtually all inhabitants of the studied region share 
many cultural ties whose origins stretch back centuries. All the available evidence, in any form, points to that 
fact. Archaeological research shows that the area that is nowadays bisected by the Katanga-Zambia boundary 
has been occupied from an early date. The Upemba Depression, especially, bears witness to the early 
developments of chieftainship, as well as the wide diffusion of cultural and commercial exchanges. 
Unfortunately, there is only so much that archaeology can tell us, and, on its own, it is certainly not enlightening 
when it comes to the sketching of a timeline of events. A considerable amount of research has been undertaken 
on the oral traditions relating to the kingdoms that flourished in this area but it is not easy to correlate these 
results with those obtained by archaeologists. Many ‘tribal histories’ or ‘myths’ exist in Katanga and Zambia, 
most of which describe how a ‘tribe’ was founded by an adventurers (or several) arriving from Luba or Lunda 
country. However, there are limits to what can be inferred from genesis myths. Mythical stories of origins and 
migration are often to be interpreted as exactly that: mythical stories. They should not be taken as narratives 
about historical events and characters, nor can they automatically be taken to indicate the routes of previous 
population movements, however plausible they might sound. A story of founding individuals migrating from 
Katanga may well be true in so far as it reflects the spread of peoples and ideas from that region, but it may also 
well telescope into a single episode events and processes which spanned decades or even centuries. 
By the eighteenth century, in the area occupied by the Luba and Lunda in Katanga and Zambia, several 
‘larger’ kingdoms had emerged or were in the process of doing so. Prominent among those, in both size and 
sphere of influence, were the Luba kingdom, the Lunda kingdom of Mwata Yamvo, and the kingdom of 
Kazembe. It is tempting to interpret the history of these kingdoms as a long process of the extension of their 
domination and a balance of power between them. However this interpretation simply does not square with the 
evidence. As Vansina argues convincingly: ‘There was no balance of power, there was no over-all domination 
of one state, there was no dichotomy between the states in a system of alliances – in other words, the area was 
not one supranational field for power competition.’1 The Luba, Lunda and Kazembe kingdoms were not really 
‘kingdoms’ in the sense that they were not endowed with clear boundaries nor with a ruler with all-
encompassing authority over his lands and subjects. The expansion of these states was more cultural than 
imperialistic. This is not to say, however, that there was no formal system of interaction between different 
groups, nor that there was never any rivalry between them for a piece of land or access to certain resources. 
From the early Iron Age onwards, trade had become an important feature of the region’s landscape. The tools, 
weapons, and basic condiments of many homesteads were often indirectly obtained from an area far beyond the 
social and political horizons of the peoples that used them. The growing importance of trade soon took on a 
political dimension as ‘prestige’ goods were increasingly imbued with symbolism and used in the perpetuation 
or strengthening of relations of subordination. At the same time, their wide circulation made sure that 
increasingly wider regions of central Africa were put into contact. For this reason the trade routes help to 
explain the great cultural similarities between different peoples of the savanna south of the equatorial forest; 
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with the goods travelled customs and ideas. But the trade routes are only partly responsible for this 
phenomenon. Migration and political expansion also account for such similarities, at least in part. The 
phenomenon cannot be understood if one of these two aspects is taken out. As a result, as Vansina continues, 
‘boundaries between the states were vague, sometimes even overlapping, and there was little conflict of power 
between the states (…) Yet (…) they shared common cultural and economic ties and probably influenced each 
other in other respects than purely political ones.’1 Even the disruptions and violence of the nineteenth century 
did not really change this logic of flexible interaction that had existed for centuries. If anything, the Atlantic and 
Indian trades could even be credited with the broadening and quickening of those exchange processes. Even the 
short passage of the Yeke, with extremely centralised kingship based on the military control of people and 
territory, did not change the essentials of the regional dynamics that existed. The Cokwe, for their part, did not 
even bother to alter the organisation of the Lunda kingdom, limiting themselves to replacing the Lunda ruling 
aristocracy with their own. So, if early central African history remains confusing, tangled and at times quite 
simply obscure, the picture that emerges is one of constant movement for the earlier centuries and one of a 
complex mosaic of states with adaptable organisations and flexible interrelations for later ones. It is certainly 
not one of hegemonic domination by one dictatorial state. Neither is it that of a tight web of kingdoms united in 
their fight against intruders, as was promoted by Tshombe. 
But, in the meantime, elsewhere, the mechanisms of conquest were already working, ticking… in the 
shadowy corridors of a Berlin palace. While these developments were taking place in central Africa, and 
without the knowledge of its inhabitants, statesmen gathered in Berlin had partitioned a land which only a 
handful of white men had ever seen. And later, in the early twentieth century, when the Lunda were finally able 
to retrieve their homeland from the Cokwe invaders, the ‘splendour’ of the old Lunda kingdom could not be 
restored. For that part of central Africa had acquired new masters.  
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CHAPTER 2 
The Division 
 
Between November 15, 1884 and February 26, 1885, representatives of all the major European powers, 
the Ottoman Empire and the United States, attended a conference held in Berlin. The purpose of the Berlin 
Conference was to lay down the rules for European partition of the African continent, or the ‘gigantesque gâteau 
africain’ as King Leopold II of the Belgians colourfully put it.1 It was also where and when the contours of what 
would become the infamous Congo Free State were defined.
 
It was decided the territory should incorporate the 
entire Congo River basin, which made a territory of some two million square kilometres the property of one 
man: Leopold II.2 The Berlin Conference was immediately followed by a period of rapid invasion, occupation, 
and colonisation of African territories by European powers. Some thirty years after the end of the Conference, 
the final political boundaries of colonial Africa emerged while most pre-existing forms of African autonomy 
and self-governance had been eliminated. This period of heightened colonial activity became known as the 
‘scramble for Africa’. According to Andrew Roberts, this comparatively sudden desire for African colonies can 
be seen as ‘the result of two distinct but converging processes: growing rivalry among the major states of 
Europe as they became fully industrial powers, and their increasing need for cheap raw materials from the 
tropical worlds’.3 The partitioning of Africa therefore was to be dictated by the presence of resources and scant 
regard was paid to the continent itself or its inhabitants. This particular fact was often the object of ‘dinner 
jokes’ among European statesmen. Lord Salisbury, at the occasion of a lecture he gave in 1890 at the Royal 
African Society, observed in jest that:  
‘We are engaged in drawing up maps where no white man ever trod; we have been giving away 
mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by a small impediment that we never 
know exactly where the mountains and rivers were.’4 
And indeed, J.W. Donaldson argues in his comprehensive study of the demarcation of the Anglo-Belgian 
boundary that boundary demarcation, which was by no means a systematic or standardised process, was instead 
‘contingent on the way territory itself was perceived by the imperial powers who claimed sovereignty, most 
importantly through economic lenses’.5 As we saw in the previous chapter, Katanga and Zambia were being 
drawn, during the late nineteenth century, into a number of external spheres of influence: the Yeke, the Arabs 
and Swahili, the Portuguese, to name only a few. All of these ‘intruders’ had come to this area of the world in 
search for resources, mainly ivory and minerals. European interest in the same area was sparked for no other 
reason. In other words, to understand the motivation behind the drawing of the border between the Congo Free 
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the rumours that already existed on the subject. Arnot describes Msiri’s welcome as ‘hearty’,1 the sights of 
mountains and rivers in Katanga as ‘majestic’,2 the ‘amount of peace and quietness that reigns’ over the 
kingdom as ‘remarkable’3 and also notes that ‘copper, salt, ivory and slaves’ are available in abundance in 
Bunkeya.4 The publication of Arnot’s book fuelled growing interest for Katanga in Great Britain, where an 
image of Katanga as a new ‘El Dorado’, overflowing with ivory, copper and gold, was gaining momentum. As a 
result, many in governing circles were keen to see it integrated within the British sphere of influence.5 The 
General Act of the Berlin Conference and the ‘Declaration of Neutrality of the Independent State of Congo’ that 
followed, had made Katanga an integral part of the Congo Free State, which although it was recognised as a 
sovereign state, was ostensibly run by King Leopold II who privately funded its administration.6 The fact that 
Katanga was officially an integral part of Leopold’s territory did not dampen British enthusiasm since one of the 
principal stipulations of the Berlin Conference General Act was that sovereignty over an area of Africa could 
only be claimed through ‘effective occupation’. ‘Effective occupation’ meant the presence of government 
officials, missions, traders, settlers etc, none of which the Congo Free State could claim to have in Katanga in 
1885. Up to then any right claimed by the Congo Free State over Katanga existed mainly on paper. 
Consequently if some British adventurer was to plant the British flag in these regions, not only would his action 
be legal, it could also establish a title that it would have been no easy matter for Leopold II – or anyone else for 
that matter – to dispute.7  
In its quest for Katanga’s treasures, Great Britain found a powerful torchbearer in the person of Cecil 
Rhodes, a millionaire turned Empire-Builder. Rhodes, who had originally travelled to South Africa for his 
health, soon became aware of the profits that could be made from prolonging his stay in this part of the world. 
His rise was meteoric; by the 1880s, he dominated the South African diamond industry,8 and in 1890, he was 
prime minister of the Cape colony.9 The wealth that he accumulated thanks to his South African ventures soon 
allowed Rhodes to pursue still greater power, both financial and political. He had a vision of British expansion 
northward for which he had two main incentives. For one thing he was spurred by his infamous ‘Cape to Cairo’ 
dream: he wanted to contribute to the expansion of the British Empire by planting the British flag right across 
Africa, from the Cape to Cairo.10 For another he also wanted to extend his control of African mineral resources, 
which he knew to be present further north. In 1887 he invested heavily in gold mines on the Rand, which turned 
out badly, but he did succeed in securing access to the goldfields north of the Limpopo river, in what is now 
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Zimbabwe.1 In addition to the ‘second Rand’ he was hoping to find in that territory, Rhodes was rather keen to 
lay his hands on Katanga’s famed copper.2 In 1889 Rhodes created the British South Africa Company (BSAC) 
and was able to persuade the British government to grant a ‘Royal Charter of Incorporation’ to his newly formed 
company. By virtue of this charter, Rhodes was allowed to use the authority of the British government to stake 
out claims to territory in the interior at the expense of other European powers. Once these territories were 
secured, the BSAC was to undertake the supervision of their finance and administration on behalf of the British 
government in return for extensive economic privileges. This was to be achieved through the signing of treaties 
of ‘protection’ with African rulers, the stipulations of which would also determine the precise limits of the 
British ‘zone of influence’.3 In other words, the Charter of the British South Africa Company did not specify a 
northern limit to the Company’s area of operation.4 Within months of Rhodes obtaining the charter for his 
company, the Congo Free State and the chartered Company were engaged in a headlong race for Katanga. 
Rhodes, especially, had no time to lose. Not only was the mineral wealth of the country well known and 
coveted, but every delay increased the risk of the Belgians, Germans and Portuguese sealing off the British 
possessions from expansion to the north.5 If his ‘Cape to Cairo’ dream was ever to come true, Rhodes urgently 
needed to press his company’s claims as far north as possible. In 1890 Rhodes sent out a number of expeditions 
to forestall the advances of Leopold and the Portuguese. Three of these were concerned to secure territory north 
of the Zambezi as far as Katanga. In August 1890, Johnston, Rhodes’s ally and the British consul in 
Mozambique, entrusted a man named Alfred Sharpe with the task to travel to Katanga and make treaties with 
the principal African leaders whom he would come across along the way.6 Sharpe reached Bunkeya in 
November of the same year but failed to reach an agreement with Msiri, whom Arnot had warned, not without 
ground, against concession-hunters.7 Reportedly, the proposal to ‘sign papers (…) was the cause of a fit of anger 
on the part of Mshidi’.8  Despite his lack of success with the Yeke king, Sharpe did however establish 
satisfactory treaties over the whole of the districts between the lakes Nyasa, Tanganyika and Mweru, and had 
thus added to the British flag the major part of what would be North-Eastern Rhodesia.9 Most importantly 
Sharpe had secured the inclusion of the eastern half of the Kazembe Kingdom within the British sphere of 
influence by signing treaties with the then Kazembe Kanyembo Ntemena, who hoped for British support against 
Lunda rebels and their ally Msiri. Through the two treaties he signed with Sharpe, Kanyembo promised to 
remain at peace with ‘the subjects of the Queen of England’ and to respect their freedom of movement and 
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and to the north and west of the Portuguese Dominions’. See F.L. COLEMAN, The Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt, p.2; E. BUSTIN, 
Lunda under Belgian Rule, p.38. 
"!The Portuguese were active in Angola and Mozambique; the newly formed Congo Free State technically belonged to Leopold II; and 
the Germans were claiming East Africa. See A. ROBERTS, A History of Zambia, pp.156-159; F.L. COLEMAN, The Northern Rhodesia 
Copperbelt, p.1. 
6 G. MACOLA, The Kingdom of Kazembe, p.162. 
7 H.M. HOLE, The Making of Rhodesia, p.245. 
8 Sharpe to Johnston, March 4 1891, encl. in Johnston to FO, May 6 1891, PRO, FO 84/2114 as quoted in G. MACOLA, The Kingdom of 
Kazembe, p.162. 
9 H.M. HOLE, The Making of Rhodesia, p.246. 
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trade1 and pledged to acknowledge the British jurisdictional superiority.’2 In virtue of the agreement, the BSAC 
acquired exclusive mining rights within the king’s territory and a series of related economic prerogatives. In 
return, the Company undertook to ‘protect the said King and nation from all outside interference or attacks.’3 
Meanwhile, neither of the two envoys that Rhodes had sent to the upper Zambezi managed to reach Katanga but 
secured a series of other treaties. Frank Lochner signed a treaty with the Lozi king, Lewanika, thereby securing 
what would be North-Western Rhodesia. Rhodes’ third envoy, the explorer of East Africa Joseph Thomson, had 
to turn back before going anywhere near the Yeke king because of the bouts of smallpox he and his porters were 
plagued with. He collected instead treaties from various chiefs among the Bisa, Aushi, Lamba, Lenje and Lala.4 
In this way, Thomson’s expedition, which could be described as failed but by no means fruitless, had linked up 
the districts secured by Sharpe with outskirts of Lewanika’s possessions.5 
As for Leopold II, he too had been shocked into a sudden sense of urgency. The granting of a royal 
charter to the British South Africa Company with powers of government over a huge area and with a northern 
limit left undefined, had revealed the full scope of the threat to the Congo Free State’s southeastern portion. 
Leopold II was now aware he was facing a formidable opponent. In Edouard Bustin’s words: ‘The stakes were 
Katanga, the adversary was Cecil Rhodes – and behind Cecil Rhodes was Great Britain.’6 Therefore he made 
strenuous efforts to convert his paper sovereignty into a real one. Immediately after Sharpe’s departure, a strong 
expedition was despatched to Msiri from the Upper Congo under Lieutenant Paul Le Marinel. Le Marinel failed 
to sign a treaty.7 A second venture under the command of M. Delcommune early in 1891 suffered a similar fate. 
The third expedition, led by an officer of the British army, Captain William Grant Stairs, led to a violent 
argument at the end of which Msiri was shot dead by one of the expedition’s members.8 When Msiri died his 
tribute and trade empire disintegrated almost instantly,9 leaving a power vacuum that was seized on by 
Leopold’s men.10 In this way, after more than two years and six expeditions (three Belgian and three British), it 
became obvious that Rhodes had lost the race to the mineral wealth of Katanga. It had irrevocably fallen in the 
grip of King Leopold, and by extension the Belgian state to whom the Congo was eventually handed over in 
1908. Nonetheless the bickering over border issues however was far from over. 
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1 Treaty between Kanyembo Ntemena and the BSAC, Appendix to Sharpe to Johnston, March 4 1891, encl. in Johnston to FO, 6 May  
1891, PRO, FO84/2114 as quoted in G. MACOLA, The Kingdom of Kazembe, p.162. 
2 BSAC to FO, 5 August 1892, FO Print 6337, p. 342, as quoted in G. MACOLA, The Kingdom of Kazembe, p.163. 
3 Ibid. 
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Occupation of Katanga’, p.292. 
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altercation erupted between Msiri and Stairs’ envoy Captain Bodson ending with Bodson shooting Msiri and Bodson himself being 
mortally wounded by one of Msiri’s bodyguards. See R.I. ROTBERG, ‘Plymouth Brethren and the Occupation of Katanga’, pp.292-293. 
9 D.M. GORDON, ‘Owners of the Land and Lunda Lords’, p.320. 
10 H.M. HOLE, The Making of Rhodesia, pp.249-250; J.W. DONALDSON, Marking Territory, p.103; B. FETTER, The Creation of 
Elisabethville, p.17. 
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2. The Demarcation of the Border 
 
Once the British had staked out claims to exclusive rights over central Africa, they now had to secure the 
agreement of other European powers. This, they obtained between 1890 and 1894 through a series of 
international treaties which largely determined the present borders of present-day Zambia. In 1890 Britain and 
Germany, who then ruled what is today Tanzania, settled their various differences.1 In 1891 Britain concluded a 
treaty with the Portuguese, which gave birth to Mozambique and Angola.2 Negotiations for the border with 
Katanga proved considerably trickier. It also proved to be a considerably longer process. Negotiations over the 
Belgian-Congo/Northern Rhodesia border spanned three decades, and spurred the appointment of two 
international commissions, numerous survey teams, the signing of several agreements, while the proximity of an 
utterly artificial border generated constant tension between British and Belgian officials. 
1. THE 1894 AGREEMENT 
Although Kazembe continued to resist BSAC administration
 
occasionally until 1899,
 
by 1890 the BSAC 
and British government presumably felt that their claim to sovereignty over Kazembe’s Lunda kingdom was 
strong enough to negotiate a bilateral boundary treaty with the Congo Free State.3 In reality, at the time when 
these negotiations were taking place, the major kingdoms along the border of the BSAC’s newly acquired 
northern territories – including the Lozi, the Bemba and Kazembe – had not yet yielded to European authority.4 
Notwithstanding, in 1980 the BSAC made an informal agreement whereby their border with the Congo Free 
State was to run eastwards along the Zambezi-Congo watershed up to the exit of the Luapula from lake 
Bangweolu. This was given sanction by the Anglo-Belgian boundary settlement of May 12, 1894. This treaty 
defined the boundary as follows:  
 ‘The frontier between the Independent Congo Free State and the British sphere to the North of the 
Zambezi shall follow a line running direct from the extremity of Cape Akalunga on Lake Tanganyika, 
situated at the Northernmost point of Cameron bay at about 8° 15’ South Latitude, to the right bank of 
the river Luapula, where this river issues from lake Moero [Mweru]. This line shall then be drawn 
directly to the entrance of the river into the lake, being however deflected towards the South of the 
lake so as to give the Island of Kilwa to Great Britain. It shall then follow the thalweg of the Luapula 
up to its issue from lake Bangweolo [Bangweolu]. Thence it shall run southwards along the meridian 
of Longitude of the point where the river leaves the lake to the Watershed region between the Congo 
and the Zambezi, which it shall follow until it reaches the Portuguese frontier.’5 
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1 According to the treaty, the frontier between German East Africa and the British sphere ran more or less directly from the south end of 
lake Tanganyika to the north end of lake Malawi. The same treaty met the German request for access to the Zambezi from South-West 
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2. THE FIRST ANGLO-BELGIAN BOUNDARY COMMISSION (1911-1914) 
Once the border was positioned, there was little European activity or administrative control along the 
Anglo-Congolese boundary prior to 1900. Problems arising from both this lack of presence and the artificiality 
of the new territories’ delineation, though sporadically reported, did not gain much attention. A handful of 
reports in 1903 suggested there were administrative problems identifying villages along the boundary when 
Northern Rhodesian villages near the border were raided by Congo Free State Police.1 In April 1907 a local 
Congo Free State official accused the British assistant magistrate of the Serenji district south of Lake 
Bangweulu of harassing several local chiefs on the Congolese side of the boundary.2 In this way, uncertainty as 
to the actual boundary position became increasingly problematic for local administrators in the border areas, as 
each side accused the other of territorial violations. Yet, until the summer of 1910, government attention to this 
issue remained almost non-existent. On June 28, 1910 the BSAC made a dramatic appeal to the Colonial Office:   
‘Mr. [L.A.] Wallace [acting administrator of North Western Rhodesia and former surveyor general] 
states that it is particularly desirable that frontiers which are described as parallels of latitude and 
meridians, or as straight lines between known points, should be demarcated and beaconed since until 
this is done it is impossible for officials of the Administrations concerned to know with any accuracy 
the limits of their respective territories. Uncertainty as to boundaries is liable at any time to cause 
friction between neighbouring administrations, and the existence of considerable areas which must be 
regarded as debatable territory has a tendency to unsettle the minds of the natives who inhabit these 
districts.’3 
The British Foreign Office contacted the Belgian Foreign Ministry on July 26, 1910 and, after discussions, an 
Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission was appointed in 1911. The commission was composed of five officers 
and five non-commissioned officers on both sides and was given the task of surveying and demarcating as 
accurately as possible the parts of the Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia boundary that were subject to 
contention.4 The commission was instructed to survey a width of 10 km along the full length of the boundary, 
but only demarcate the watershed section (5) since the government were still negotiating potential adjustments 
in other places, particularly the meridian section (4) and the Mweru-Tanganyika section (1). Along the 
watershed, the commission was to erect ‘at such spots as the Commissioners shall deem necessary of beacons 
indicating the direction of the frontier line adopted.’5 By the time the commission’s work was interrupted by the 
outbreak of the First World War, the commission had conducted enough triangulation and survey work to 
produce maps covering much of the boundary. But they had failed to complete demarcation of the easternmost 
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1 Reports to R. Coddrington on raids by the Congo Free State Police, 1903, NRA 3/3/1 Vol. I (NAZ). as quoted in J.W. DONALDSON, 
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identified as the pinnacle of what John Pickles has called ‘cartographic hubris’ whereby maps facilitated the 
domination of the interests of a few over many.1  
3. THE SECOND ANGLO-BELGIAN BOUNDARY COMMISSION (1927-1933) 
Once the First World War was over, it became increasingly obvious that the vagueness of the border 
outline continued to create embarrassment on the ground. The pedicle was a particularly bothersome nuisance in 
that it impeded the increasing transport and communication between the eastern and western halves of Northern 
Rhodesia territory.2 As a result, the BSAC continued, largely unsuccessfully, to lobby the British government to 
make adjustments to the boundary. The all-powerful Belgian Company Union Minière du Haut-Katanga was 
similarly dissatisfied with the work of the first Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission. As a company expanding 
quickly, it was crucial for its directors to know the extent of the territory on which they could prospect. At the 
same time, the BSAC gave license to prospecting companies, such as the Rhodesia Congo Border Concession 
Limited (RCBC Ltd), to investigate the Northern Rhodesian side. As prospecting work progressed along the 
watershed section of the border (5), the RCBC Ltd found it increasingly difficult to locate the boundary between 
the Congo and Northern Rhodesia. The boundary line established by the 1911-1914 commission was overgrown 
with grass and trees and was therefore no longer recognisable.3 In August 1923, a RCBC spokesman brought the 
issue forward to the Northern Rhodesia survey department: ‘We cannot’, he said, ‘determine from any map or 
data in our possession the exact location of any boundary beacons of the Rhodesian-Congo boundary (…) There 
are some rich mines on the Congo side, apparently very close to the border and the importance, therefore, of 
knowing the actual location of the boundary opposite to them is self-evident.’4 It was then found that the only 
available map of the watershed boundary section was one produced by the Belgian contingent of the 1911-1914 
boundary commission since the British map had not been completed.5 This fact did not fail to raise a few 
eyebrows, especially as it appeared that ‘the Belgians had taken full advantage of the situation so as to place the 
Border Congo as far south as possible at points where minerals were known to exist.’6 Minerals Separation Ltd, 
of which the RCBC was a subsidiary, was particularly unimpressed with the situation, and its chairman Francis 
Gibbs sent a sternly worded letter to the Colonial Office on March 14, 1924. The relevant paragraphs of his 
letter are worth quoting:  
‘The whole question of the boundary between the two countries is one of greatest importance from an 
Imperial point of view as well as from the point of view of my Company holding as it does a 
Concession of all the mineral rights in Northern Rhodesia. (…) Several of the valuable mineral 
discoveries made on the Belgian Congo side undoubtedly run into Northern Rhodesia and now that my 
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6 H.C. Hawkins (Mineral Separation Ltd., Letter to the Colonial Office dated 29 November 1923 in A SEC3 291 (NAZ). 
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Company have fortunately been able to place before the Colonial Office our knowledge regarding the 
potential mineral resources of Northern Rhodesia, it seems very necessary that the boundary should be 
so definite that an absolutely fair division between the two countries should be arrived at (…) [to 
avoid] a dispute arising as to where the boundary between the two countries actually is.’1  
And indeed, the presence of copper outcrops along or close a boundary line that was not clearly marked was 
recognised by at least one Government official as a recipe for conflict. On April 6, 1926 the Director of Survey 
backed mining companies pleas for further delimitation work: 
‘I consider there is every likelihood of difficulties arising on the question of ownership of minerals 
owing to the lack of a well defined boundary between the territories. The question of restricting new 
mining development in the vicinity of the supposed watershed boundary defined by the existing pillars 
is a difficult one to decide and it would be most probably a serious matter for the Mineral Companies 
concerned if such a restriction were to be made over a tentative strip and for any length of time. (…) 
Steps should be taken at the earliest to have the border properly demarcated and beaconed.’2 
Accordingly, since the presence of huge copper deposits made every square inch of territory valuable, clear 
demarcation of the watershed line suddenly became a stringent priority. In late 1926, the British government 
approached its Belgian counterpart, whom agreed that a new arrangement regarding the frontier would be 
‘advantageous to both countries’.3 At a meeting held on March 16 and 17, 1927, Belgium and Great Britain 
agreed to appoint a joint Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission scheduled to begin work on July 15, 1927.4 The 
Commission was given two tasks. The first was to make the adjustments to the boundary line along the 
watershed ‘as are necessary to avoid the troubles that might arise from a literal interpretation of the treaty [of 
1894]’.5 And the second was to accept the position of the boundary pillar lying further than 200 metres from the 
ideal watershed and allow errors of position up to 500 metres in areas ‘of no particular known economic value’.6 
Wherever there was encroachment, the commissioners were to be guided by the following principles: 
(i)  Properties and enclosures which lie athwart the ideal watershed shall be left undivided as far as 
possible whether they be state, corporation, tribal or individual character and 
(ii) The good faith and economic importance of an encroachment shall be taken into account.7 
From 1927 to 1933 the second Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission undertook some of the most rigorous 
boundary demarcation in colonial Africa, and perhaps even worldwide, at the time. Not only did the boundary 
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4. CONTINUING BICKERING 
Despite the two commissions appointed to solve it, the complex dispute over the Northern 
Rhodesia/Congo boundary continued for many years. Difficulties that formed the bone of contention between 
the two colonial powers fell into two groups which, though often treated separately in correspondence, are 
connected to each other.1 First, there is what may be described as the general question of boundary adjustment, 
which mainly affected the stretch of frontier running from lake Tanganyika to lake Mweru (1). The borderland 
area along the Mweru-Tanganyika section had never been closely administered by Northern Rhodesia and in the 
autumn of 1929 the Northern Rhodesia district commissioner based in Chiengi, J.B. Thomson, travelled through 
the border area and found that numerous villages located within the British-claimed territory were being 
administered and taxed by Belgian authorities. At the same time,
 
Thomson revealed that the tribes inhabiting 
these villages were under the control of chiefs located in the Belgian Congo.2
 
Not wanting to upset the situation 
on the ground, and aware that the Anglo-Belgian boundary commission was to address this section in the near 
future, Governor Maxwell informed the Colonial Office at the end of 1929 ‘that the matter be left in obeyance 
until the boundary is definitely fixed.’3 Except, of course, that it was never fixed. As it happens, thirty years 
later this state of affairs had hardly changed at all. On February 14, 1961, H.V.G. Conybeare of the Office of the 
Prime Minister and External Affairs sent to the government of Rhodesia, several maps ‘marked to show the 
areas as at present administered by the local authorities on each side of the hypothetical border’. ‘It is realised’ 
he added, ‘that it must be extremely difficult to decide on the ground where a straight line boundary between the 
Lakes is supposed to exist since neither side is marked in any way. (…) I shall be grateful if you will (…) let me 
have your views on the situation from an administrative point of view in relation to the fact that no official 
boundary exists, and settlement being opened at the present time.’4 The answer he received from the acting 
Secretary to the government of Northern Rhodesia was the following: 
‘The population of the four enclaves carry Congo (Belgian) identity certificates and has for many 
years regarded itself as being subject to the Congo (Belgian). Congo Chiefs provide tribal control. (...) 
I confirm that at the moment, there are no administrative difficulties. (…) I note that there is no 
question of negotiation towards a definitive settlement of the boundary being opened at the present 
time. This is satisfactory as the de facto boundary is accepted by the people on both sides and presents 
no administrative problem.’5 
Perhaps for that reason, the problem of the Mweru-Tanganyika Section stagnated. On April 26, 1960, i.e. 
practically the eve of Congolese independence, Bob de Quehen, head of the Federal Intelligence and Security 
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Bureau (FISB) was still wondering whether ‘it might be wise to get agreement and a defined boundary before 
the new Congolese Government comes into power’,1 to which the Office of the Prime Minister and External 
Affairs replied that ‘the Lake Mweru-Lake Tanganyika boundary (…) remains undefined at the present time’.2  
The second part of the boundary problem concerned one small boundary adjustment on the south side of 
the Katanga Pedicle at a place called Mokambo. The Mokambo Strip was a small portion of Northern Rhodesia, 
only about 50 acres in extent, which jutted into the Belgian Congo in such a way that the Belgian railway line in 
that area had to follow an awkward alignment. Starting in 1927 the Belgians had repeatedly tried to gain 
possession of the area, ostensibly so that they might realign their railway. On various occasions, they had 
offered in exchange an area of the Belgian Congo in the region of Nkana where the Northern Rhodesian 
Railways was encroaching upon Belgian territory. However, although exchanging the two pieces of territory 
would have been a seemingly simple operation, the Northern Rhodesian government never agreed to it. The 
reason for this refusal is simple: the Mokambo Strip contained a considerable copper orebody whereas the 
region where the Rhodesia Railways had strayed into the Congo had, as far as anybody knew, no similar 
deposits of mineral wealth beneath its soil.3 Yet, at the same time, the minister for external Affairs feared that a 
‘blank refusal’ at Mokambo could make any negotiations over easing the traffic across the Katanga Pedicle, 
which was the source of much frustration on the part of Rhodesian travelers,4 more troublesome: ‘the Pedicle 
crossing is the subject of complaint now by private and commercial interests and we would wish to improve 
conditions. It seems logical that if we are uncooperative over Mokambo that the Belgians would have little 
desire to be co-operative over improvements in the crossing of the Pedicle’.5 As a result, the entire question of 
the border had reached a stalemate and no amount of negotiations was ever able to solve it. 
The Mweru-Tanganyika section and the Mokambo Strip spurred a great deal of discussion, 
correspondence, squabbling … and nothing else. No agreement was ever reached between the two colonial 
powers on the Mweru-Tanganyika nor, for that matter, any other contentious area. These lack of agreement 
meant that 1) travelling across the pedicle was painfully difficult and 2) many villages along the Mweru-
Tanganyika section were unsure of their nationality. The Mweru-Tanganyika boundary section, when compared 
with the other sections of the same boundary, highlights a complete disparity in purpose regarding border 
definition. The clear emphasis put on the boundary along the watershed and meridian sections was tied directly 
to economic resources. The border area between Lakes Mweru and Tanganyika did not possess any proven 
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mineral resources
 
and the only appeals for boundary demarcation came from the local administrators. Recalling 
the long history of negotiations going back before the 1911-14 boundary commission, the Colonial Office saw 
major territorial concessions in the Katanga pedicle as the primary goal in order to alleviate the transport issues 
between the two territorial ‘halves’ of Northern Rhodesia. The only perceived ‘value’ of the Mweru-Tanganyika 
borderland was as a bargaining chip for gaining the more ‘valuable’ area in the Pedicle.  
 
 
3. Local Attitudes to the Border 
 
1. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS 
 
Initial Administrative Neglect 
Once the border was positioned, there was little European activity or administrative control along the 
Anglo-Congolese boundary prior to 1900, as both the BSAC and the Congo Free State were then attempting to 
cement their control over local rulers. From 1891 to 1900, Katanga’s management was entrusted to the 
Compagnie du Katanga, a concession company that was founded for the purpose of dissuading any British 
claim to the territory, but otherwise left the territory largely unsupervised.1 No effective administration was set 
up until 19 June 1900, when the Compagnie du Katanga was renamed the Comité Spécial du Katanga, an 
administration separate from that of the Congo Free State.2 Until then, European occupation of Katanga 
remained so sparse as to be almost nonexistent. In the words of one of the very few officials stationed in the area 
before the turn of the century, ‘there never were more than six Free State agents at any one time in Katanga. In 
1896, there were three; in 1899-1900, only two (…) as for missionaries there were two (…) And when it comes 
to traders, they were so ‘elusive’ that none could ever be discovered in all of Katanga (…) until 1905.’3 This 
neglect – paradoxical though it might seem considering the haste and effort that were taken in acquiring 
Katanga – finds its origin in the fact that Leopold II was facing more immediate challenges. These were 
twofold.  First was the fact that Leopold’s obsession with colonies was regarded with high suspicion and dread 
by his country’s Parliament and citizens, who regarded Leopold’s grand design as ‘megalomaniac’ at best 
(prompting Leopold’s famous retort: “petit pays, petit esprit”).4 For that reason Leopold had to prove the 
profitableness of his venture, and do it fast. In the short term this was more easily achieved through the 
collection of readily commercialisable items such as ivory and rubber as both were in high demand and required 
much less infrastructure than mining did. All that was necessary to make sure there was no interruption in the 
flow of these goods and to maintain law and order was an armed force. To this end in 1885 the Congo Free State 
established the Force Publique, a force composed of Congolese mercenaries performing both military and 
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police functions.1 The harshness with which the Force Publique raided for ivory and enforced the compulsory 
collection of rubber has been widely documented, having famously triggered what is sometimes referred to as 
the first mass human rights movement: a lively propaganda campaign, led by British diplomat Roger Casement 
and former shipping clerk E.D. Morel and supported by such literary personalities as Mark Twain and Arthur 
Conan Doyle. The campaign eventually forced Leopold to relinquish control of the Congo in 1908.2 A more 
serious reason for this administrative neglect, however, was the outbreak of the hostilities between the Congo 
Free State and Arab traders active in the east of the territory in 1892. This conflict, which was to last for a 
decade, was prompted by Leopold’s decision to establish a state monopoly over ivory, thereby depriving the 
Arab traders of a major source of income. At the same time, starting in 1895, the Free State had to face a series 
of Luba, Bena Lulua and Tetela revolts, precipitating a state of general unrest in Katanga.3 In this way, 
Leopold’s single-minded preoccupation with the exploitation of immediately available resources as well as the 
conditions created by the uprisings were to keep the attention away from the Free State’s most southern border 
and populations. These two elements also explain why the Congo Free State’s concept of native administration, 
despite its harshness, was never systematic; rule was enforced solely in the places where it was needed, i.e. 
places that were either resource-rich or troublesome or both. Direct administration, rather than any sort of 
indirect rule, was the de facto policy – except of course where there was no administration at all. The treatment 
of the Lunda area is a case in point. Since there was no immediate incentive for Leopold’s agents to venture in 
the area, no contact was established between them and the Mwata Yamvo before 1896. Though the Lunda 
heartland was agitated by a liberation struggle against the Cokwe in the last decade of the nineteenth century, 
this hardly received any Belgian attention at all.4  
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succeeded in keeping the British at bay until 1899, when he was obliged to acknowledge his defeat. Instead of 
surrendering, however, he decided to take refuge on the Belgian bank of the river. Alfred Sharpe, the governor 
of Nyasaland who was leading the contingent sent to face Kazembe1 described how they ‘received news that 
during the night a number of the chief’s headmen having deserted him, and a large number of his warriors 
having followed them, Kazembe himself had suddenly decided to fly, and that in the early hours of the morning 
the whole population of the town had fled, and had made for the Luapula’.2 Once the two great powers of the 
north east, the Bemba and the Lunda, had submitted, no other Africans in the area were rash enough to 
challenge the white man’s firearms. 
Changes in Subordination Relationships 
The new Anglo-Belgian border not only cut straight through both the main Lunda Kingdom and the 
Kingdom of Kazembe but its awkward shape around the middle – the Katanga pedicle – effectively cut off 
Mwata Yamvo’s eastern Lunda from Kazembe’s western Lunda. Although the effects of the re-drawing of the 
African map were not immediately felt, for the Eastern Lunda, it eventually proved to be very much a deadly 
blow to their already battered ‘empire’. While the bulk of the old empire heartland was now part of the Congo 
Free State, the western sphere of Lunda influence was absorbed into Angola and most of the southern Lunda (or 
Ndembu) found themselves south of the Northern Rhodesian border. Of course, one could argue that the real 
loss was that of the Western dominions since the southern Lunda had already ceased to be Mwata Yamvo’s 
tributaries by the time of the Cokwe invasion. Similarly, direct contact between the heartland and Kazembe in 
the lower Luapula valley had already been severely impaired after the Yeke invaded the Mweru-Luapula in the 
early 1880s. Still the border unwittingly drawn by European cartographers had, by making communication more 
difficult, the effect of emphasising the heartland’s de facto separateness from its former minions. Crucially 
however, though pre-colonial links between the Mwata Yamvo’s state and the now Northern Rhodesian Lunda 
were never fully revived, the authority-enhancing connection with the Mwata Yamvo remained an essential and 
celebrated component of the historical and ethnic consciousness for both Kazembe’s Lunda and Ndembu.3  
If the effective separation with the Mwata Yamvo was not a source of excessive concern for the 
Kazembe, the fact that his territories above the Luapula River were now part of the Congo Free State was 
probably one. At the time of colonial conquest, the Luapula River already served as some sort of implicit border 
and the Kazembe’s authority was no longer thoroughly established on its West bank. With a colonial border 
turning the implicit border into an explicit one, Lunda authority on the West bank was made all the more 
tenuous.4 Notwithstanding, the then Kazembe Kanyembo made brave attempts at reaffirming the eastern Lunda 
sway over the western bank of the lower Luapula river, in areas that now belonged to the Congo Free State. But 
these attempts were bound to run against the stringent rules of the Congo Free State concerning territorial 
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sovereignty and trading monopoly. From the very start, the Congo Free State had ruled that ‘un chef étranger ne 
[pouvait] exercer aucune suzeraineté sur le sol congolais’.1 At the same time, they had embarked on a large 
program of appointment of ‘colonial chiefs’ as part of their direct rule policy. These colonial chiefs were 
carefully chosen native chiefs whose job was to control the areas that they were appointed to in the name of the 
Congo Free State. Since Msiri’s death had left a power vacuum, all former Yeke/Lunda chiefs along the banks 
of the Luapula were left with a choice: to submit to their former overlord in Northern Rhodesia or to become 
chiefs in their own right with the help of the new colonial power. Unsurprisingly, some of them were more than 
happy to take full advantage of the situation to claim their autonomy from their former suzerain. Kiba, a former 
follower of Msiri who refused to pay tribute to the eastern Lunda king, reportedly asked the Congo Free State 
for help. Kiba was duly allocated guns and powder accompanied by the promise that he would get immediate 
support in the event of an attack by Kazembe.2 Similarly, a few owners of the land and Shila clans rulers were 
able to escape Kazembe’s authority and become colonial chiefs. In this way, colonial structures of governance, 
even when fragile, undermined the links of subordination that were previously operating in the region.3 
However given the ‘ancientness’ of the relationship between the two banks of the Luapula, the impact of 
these ad hoc interventions was bound to be short-lived. Without a stable Belgian presence, the area could not be 
policed and Mwata Kazembe X could not be prevented from encroaching upon it. Throughout the mid- and late 
1890s, Kanyembo’s ascendency over the western bank of the Luapula endured, which did not fail to cause 
concern for Congo Free State officials in Katanga. However, from 1895, with the help of the newly formed 
Force Publique, the enforcement of the collection of ivory and rubber was enforced and the Luapula’s main 
passage ways were patrolled ‘empêchant le commerce de se porter vers Kasembe’.4 Kazembe’s final defeat by 
BSAC forces in 1899 signified the end of his efforts. More than a year after the event, the former inhabitant of 
the Lunda districts were still reported to be ‘scattered’ as a result of the BSAC ‘invasion’.5 Kanyembo’s 
humiliating defeat of 1899 must have convinced him that his own survival depended on his finding a modus 
vivendi with the Europeans, so he embarked on securing his political future in the new colonial state and 
convinced officials of the BSAC (including Alfred Sharpe) to choose members of the Royal Family as chiefs, 
thus allowing him not only to keep his network within Northern Rhodesia intact but even to strengthen it. This 
success in reconsolidating power and patronage networks was due to a combination of eastern Lunda’s 
historical roots in Luapula and the nature and dispersal of the British administrative presence. Unlike Msiri’s, 
Kazembe’s kingdom was old and enjoyed a high degree of historical legitimacy. It also enjoyed a resilient form 
of perpetual kinship which allowed him to reconstitute a network of subordinate chiefs and accord them offices 
within the ‘Lunda family’. These factors gave Kazembe leverage to negotiate his survival, and that of his 
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kingdom. In this way, not only did Kanyembo escape with his life, he, and his successors, succeeded in 
exploiting the structures and policies of the British colonial state and recreate a local network of client colonial 
chiefs. Yet there is no doubt that the Belgian resolve to keep the Mwata Kazembes out of Katanga became more 
and more effective as the century progressed. In fact as Giacomo Macola pointed out, ‘the erosion of their 
ascendency over the territory to the west of the lower Luapula may help to account for the determination with 
which Lunda royals pursued a policy of self-aggrandizement along the eastern bank of the river, the only region 
of which they remained officially in charge.’1 
2. PROTEST MIGRATIONS  
Though the artificial border was often ignored in its early years, the advantages of acting upon it became 
increasingly clear. The existence of two sovereign state side by side, neither of which had authority over the 
other, provided the people living along the boundary with new leverage. If a measure implemented on one side 
of the border was not to the liking of the inhabitant of one or the other country, they could easily cross the 
border into a territory over which their ‘formal’ colonial masters had no authority. This was made easier by the 
lack of colonial personnel along the border. From 1891 a phenomenon of ‘back and forth migrations’ across the 
Anglo-Belgian border appeared and gradually amplified as the effects of European penetration were 
increasingly felt. ‘On one side was tyranny, on the other was sanctuary’ as M.C. Musambachime put it.2 Which 
side was which fluctuated depending on circumstances. These ‘protest migrations’ were usually temporary in 
nature (though they did occasionally resulted in the permanent settlement of a people on one side or the other) 
since, in the words of Bruce Fetter, ‘flight, however pressing the stimulus, is a response rather than a permanent 
course of action.’3 As such they are a testimony to the way in which the border came to serve a new and 
innovative function, one of self-protection. 
The ‘Sentry System’ and its Abuses 
In 1895, a sentry system i.e. the posting of a sentry responsible for tax collection in every village,4 was 
put in place along the Anglo-Belgian boundary in order to control and limit cross-border linkages. Unfortunately 
for the colonisers, this measure had the unwitting effect of prompting massive movements of peoples across the 
very border they were trying to protect. Dugald Campbell, a missionary in charge at Johnston Falls-Mambilima 
on the Lower Luapula has left a graphic account of how Katangese sentries, inadequately supervised, had 
quickly developed into tyrants: 
‘I have made a journey myself to the copper hills in the west [and other places in Katanga] and found 
the sentries everywhere living like kings, plundering, killing and burning villages in the name of the 
State. (…) Every time I made representations they were declared impossible or the answer was “I shall 
ask my head sentry to make enquiries,” the head sentries being one of the worst blacks in the country. 
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Nothing was ever proved. He could not believe that his soldiers could be guilty of such misconduct or 
“well, they must have carte blanche or the natives would not respect the State.” Sometimes “Might is 
Right” would be the curt reply. What could one say? There were no judges or court of appeals, and the 
officer, often at his wit’s end, would say “What can I do? I must get ivory. I have no law or regulation 
book. I am the only law and only god in Katanga”’1 
Similar abuses were reported all along the border and in most cases generated the same response from those 
subjected to them: flight across the boundary. On August 14, 1895, Lt. Clément Brasseur, then in charge of the 
Force Publique in Katanga, recorded in his travel diary that ‘pas mal de gens du Katanga [avaient] filés jadis 
s’installer chez Kanyembo’.2 ‘Protest migrations’ continued, largely unchecked throughout the late 1890s. At 
the end of July 1896, the hunter and explorer Weatherley noted that the western bank of the Luapula river was 
‘gradually becoming a desert’.3 As late as 1904 E. Stephenson, the Native Commissioner for Ndola reported that 
‘many natives are crossing into this Territory (North West Rhodesia)’4 while Campbell was still reporting that:  
‘on the Luapula, similar abuses existed and women were raped and made to serve both white and 
black (soldiers) until many of the best and biggest villages crossed into British territory where they 
live in peace. The wholesale exodus is due to Belgian raiding, the sentry system and the maltreatment 
of natives.’5  
In 1908, the Belgian government took over Leopold II’s private colony and the ‘Congo Free State’ became the 
‘Belgian Congo’. Frontiersmen, and by extension their abuses, were unable to outlive the gradual stabilisation of 
colonial rule. In 1908, the Native Commissioner for Fort Rosebery was already reporting that:  
‘Large numbers of natives have left this district and gone across the Luapula to Belgian territory. The 
natives have not done this on account of any grievance against the administration, they simply 
returned to their own country from which they fled when the Belgian region was not as humane as 
present.’6 
The Hut Tax 
From about 1903 the direction of migration reversed as a result of new economic measures taken by the 
BSAC. In an effort to avoid depending on subventions from metropolitan treasuries, a three shillings hut tax, to 
be paid in kind or in coin, was gradually introduced in Northern Rhodesia in the first years of the twentieth 
century.7 In addition, the Company made a practice of calling on villagers to perform works of public utility, 
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such as building roads or carrying loads, in fulfillment of their tax obligations.1 These measures were not 
happily received, to say the least. Despite the BSAC’s protestations to the contrary, there is little doubt that the 
imposition of the tax was accompanied by brutality on the part of the European tax collectors, who reportedly 
resorted to such practices as the imprisonment of the uncooperative payer or the burning of his hut.2 A British 
Colonial Office official once privately observed that ‘Mr Beak [British Consul in the Congo Free State] in one 
of his reports said that the NWR administration was as bad as the Congo Free State (…) This officer appears to 
have flogged systematically, had several natives shot, and indulged in forced labour, all CFS methods.’3 To 
escape this, many inhabitants of the British-controlled territory crossed the border to take refuge in Katanga. 
Reports of tax evasion were recounted yearly in all the districts along the border. On the western section of the 
boundary, the Native Commissioner of Mwinilunga Sub-District received reports of a massive exodus of people 
from the district to Angola and the Belgian Congo: ‘Not a village at all has stayed (…) they have all fled in the 
night (…) There is no doubt that it is the tax that they revolt from.’4 On the eastern half, the situation was 
similar. Harrington, Native Commissioner for Fort Rosebery reported in 1906 that ‘whole villages decamped to 
the Belgian Congo to avoid payment’.5 Flights across the border were often carefully timed to coincide with 
tours by District officials. By 1908 the same Harrington was reporting that the people in the border area had 
‘huts on both sides of the Luapula River making it extremely difficult for him to collect taxes.’6 By 1906 the 
loss of inhabitants fleeing the rigours of the hut tax seems to have worried Mwata Kazembe XI Muonga 
Kapakata (1904-1919) to the point that he instituted an unofficial patrolling system along the lower Luapula in 
order to ‘appréhender et retenir de force les indigènes de la Rhodésie qui avaient l’intention de s’installer [au 
Congo].’7 This cannot have been entirely successful since, around the same time, the District Commissioner in 
charge of Mweru-Luapula, reported that more than half of the male population in Katanga was either fleeing 
from the hut tax or seeking employment to pay it.8 Even though tax evasion remained high throughout the first 
decade of the century, it is clear that growing numbers were eventually forced to come to terms with the new 
fiscal burdens. Those who could not find employment locally began to seek wage employment in the white 
farms of Southern Rhodesia and, to a much larger extent, the developing copper mines of southern Katanga. As 
early as 1905, many inhabitants on the eastern bank of the Luapula were reported to be travelling independently 
to the mines of Kambove and Ruwe in Katanga in order to earn ‘les quelques shillings dont ils [avaient] besoin 
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pour payer le nut taxe.’1 In 1921, seven sub-districts, all in the eastern half of Northern Rhodesia, had sex ratios 
of less than 70 men per 100 women: Feira, Serenje, Fort Rosebery, Abercorn, Lundazi, and Petauke. Since these 
were the areas of most intense tax collection, these statistics confirm the relationship between labour migration 
and tax collection.2 This is not to say that tax evasion stopped however. As late as 1934, one Native 
Commissioner reported that ‘there was a continued movement of Natives to and from the Belgian Congo (…) a 
large number of natives have migrated from this district into Congo, the reason seems to be Tax.’3 
Sleeping Sickness Regulations 
In the early twentieth century, a number of small pox and sleeping sickness epidemics hit both Katanga 
and Northern Rhodesia. The spread of these diseases was clearly aggravated by the important populations 
movements that took place at the time. In Northern Rhodesia, the Mweru-Luapula was especially badly hit, 
probably being exposed to an infectious strain stemming from northern Katanga.4 Starting in 1907-1908, every 
time an epidemic of sleeping sickness was detected, the BSAC implemented a series of ambitious and detested 
measures which consisted in ‘restricting the movement of natives in sleeping sickness area’.5 These new 
regulations stipulated that ‘all movements of natives from this [any North Rhodesian] territory into any part of 
the Congo state or from any part of the Congo State into the Territory are prohibited except under the permit 
signed by a magistrate or a native commissioner’.6 Any native contravening these regulations was ‘liable upon 
conviction to a penalty not exceeding one pound shilling or to imprisonment with or without hard labour’.7  Not 
only did these regulations aim to limit cross-border movement for health reasons, they also defined and 
quarantined ‘sleeping sickness areas’. In 1907, an area lying to the east of the Luapula and lake Mweru, and to 
the south of the North-Eastern Rhodesia/Katanga border and Lake Tanganyika was declared an ‘infected area’ 
from which no-one was permitted to emigrate.8 In addition, between 1908 and 1910, many villages were 
forcefully moved, which led to more people dying of ‘hunger and hardship than died of sleeping sickness’ as 
was reported by an eyewitness.9 Given the stringency of the regulations, not to mention their detrimental effect 
on economic matters, it is not surprising that they were not well received. These measures were moreover as 
useless as they were unpopular, since Northern Rhodesian efforts to contain epidemics were not reciprocated on 
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the part of the Belgian Congo.1 Since the Belgians had enforced no preventive regulation limiting the movement 
of peoples, many, in a way that had become usual, sought to evade the new regulations by engaging in mass 
migrations.2 In April 1909 the medical officer at Fort Rosebery noted:  
‘The opposite bank of the Luapula is thick with villages and more are being built (unfortunately it 
must be admitted that some of these at least are peopled with refugees form this side), and as long as 
these villages are allowed to remain on the river bank affording every facility for fishing and the like, 
they will be a continual temptation and a continual menace to our own people.’3 
The sleeping sickness regulations were only lifted in October 1922, allowing the last refugees to return to their 
original villages along the border.4 
 
 
Conclusion 
The partitioning of Africa into European colonies was largely the result of a large-scale diplomatic game 
between contending European nations. In 1929, the Commissioner of the Hilton Young Commission on the 
closer union in Eastern and Central Africa noted that: 
‘The boundaries separating territories [in Africa] are in effect historical accidents and not of any 
reasoned plan. They have grown up piecemeal as a result of the labours of early travellers who 
wandered at large, and of international diplomacy (…) with little knowledge of geographical 
conditions and less ethnographical [information].’5 
The reports on the presence of copper, mixtures of rumour and fact though they were, had developed as a result 
of the previous decades’ missionary and exploratory activities and fuelled a stiff competition for Katanga. It is 
in this light that the actions of Rhodes and Leopold II in the 1880s and 1890s must be judged. To a very large 
extent, it can be argued that the main factor determining the eventual shape of the border was the acquisition of 
valuable resources such as gold, copper, rubber and timber.  
The case of the two Anglo-Belgian boundary commissions reveals that the presence of economic 
resources in borderland areas was also a key-motivating factor in developing boundaries through localised 
demarcation. Although it would perhaps be too simplistic to contend, as some did, that the border ‘remained 
undemarcated until copper and tin mining made demarcation essential if major disputes were to be avoided’,6 
the pervasiveness of the influence of mineral deposits on boundary demarcation cannot be denied. There were 
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relatively few boundaries that garnered a second imperial boundary commission and fewer still that were 
demarcated with as much rigidity as the watershed section was. This is another clear illustration of how the 
economic value of African territory was an important catalyst in boundary development. Easing the 
administration of local ‘native’ borderland populations was not the priority for the commissions. Even though 
local administrators in Northern Rhodesia’s border areas continually implored their superiors to mark the 
boundary with Belgian Congo clearly on the ground, they were often left with just the opposite; at best, widely-
spaced pillars and a series of map sheets while many zones, like that along the meridian section, were left as 
tacitly understood zones of non-interference. No other commission was ever established after 1933 and neither 
were the beacons erected in 1927-1933 looked after,1 so that the border stayed forever vague, and therefore 
remained a source of administrative difficulty and international incidents. In 1968, i.e. after Zambia had become 
an independent state, the District Secretary of Mporokoso, reported that ‘there are 13 Congolese villages on the 
Zambian side of the border. This state of affairs is inevitably causing administrative problems’.2 On a diplomatic 
level therefore, the presence of copper ores as well as a poorly defined border (one deriving to a large extent 
from the other) was a definite recipe for conflict not only between nations, but also between administrators and 
administrated. 
The proximity to an utterly artificial international frontier did not only generate constant tension between 
British and Belgian officials, it also affected relationships between groups that found themselves arbitrarily 
bisected by an imaginary line. In the Belgian Congo and Northern Rhodesia, it was the Lunda especially who 
suffered from the outline of the Anglo-Belgian boundary. The western Lunda lost what was left of their control 
over the southern and western part of their original empire, while the eastern Lunda kingdom found itself 
divided in two by the River Luapula. Rather than ceasing, contacts between the butchered parts of Lunda areas 
changed in nature. The different ways in which colonialism affected the structure of the various Lunda groups 
depended largely on the relative styles of the colonial administrations. The Belgian administration was known 
for its harsh paternalism while the British doctrine of indirect rule encouraged rule by pre-colonial elites, such as 
the Lunda paramount, on the condition that they fully cooperated with the British authorities. So when the 
Belgians established their own network of state-appointed colonial chiefs, many chiefs, who had traditionally 
been Kazembe’s subordinates, were quick to take this opportunity to cut ties with their former overlord and 
become chiefs in their own right. On the Northern Rhodesian side, if some decentralised clan elders succeeded 
in escaping the rule of Eastern Lunda, the Kazembe was nevertheless able to rebuild a strong client network 
through collaboration with the colonial authorities. Opportunities for adaptation varied depending on what side 
of the border one stood, but these opportunities were duly identified and utilised. 
On both sides however, it took a while before there were noticeable effects on the ground. To many 
people in Northern Rhodesia and Katanga, the intrusion of European rule did not, at the time, seem an event of 
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great importance. The full significance of external rule did not become clear until it had set up a local 
administration and had begun collecting tax. When that happened, the artificial boundary, which until then had 
been acted upon as if it did not exist anywhere else than on paper (which arguably, until a rather late date, it did 
not), was turned into ‘leverage’. Cross-boundary movement was used as a form of political protest against 
governmental actions that were considered brutal, oppressive, or simply disadvantageous. In this way, local 
groups were able to adapt to their new situation and even capitalise on it through their creative use of the new 
border and the differences in colonial regimes on either sides of it. The border was artificial, contested and 
porous, and it is this what made such resourceful interaction possible. By the time the second boundary 
commission was sent to the field, the border was such an integral part of Northern Rhodesia’s political 
landscape that Governor Maxwell was able to justify his opposition to any adjustments along the meridian 
section on the ground that:  
‘I can see no advantage in disturbing a boundary, artificial though it may be, which has become known 
to the native population and is accepted by them’1 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Copper Industry 
 
Very often when Zambia is mentioned or looked at in any detail in academic literature, the focus is on the 
Copperbelt, or, at the very least, the latter figures prominently in the narrative. The Copperbelt has been an 
object of study from as early as the 1930s when the first miners’ strikes shocked the colonial government into 
creating a research centre endowed with the mission to investigate the impact of rapid industrialisation and 
urbanisation on the local populations: the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (RLI).1 The RLI’s wide-ranging studies 
and publications sparked the trend of Copperbelt- and labour-related literature, focusing on such topics as labour 
migration, the intermingling of people of different origins that it brought about, and the impact of the latter 
phenomenon – usually understood as negative – on the rural areas and traditional authorities. That the 
Copperbelt inspired such studies should not be surprising. In the mid-1920s, after forty years of colonial rule 
and relative obscurity, Northern Rhodesia became a major supplier of copper, leading to the very rapid 
development of this sparsely inhabited, narrow strip of land (about 130 kilometres long) that was the 
Copperbelt. By the time Northern Rhodesia became independent in 1964, the Copperbelt had five bustling 
industrial centres, three smaller mining towns, and a population of about 544,000 people.2 It hosted one of the 
most concentrated large-scale industries in Africa south of the Sahara, which, by 1960, employed 36,000 
Africans and 7,000 Europeans. The Africans in this changing society belonged to about 70 different Bantu 
groups, in 13 linguistics groups.3 In this way, although high rates of migration and mobility predate the onset of 
the copper industry, as has been argued in the previous chapters, colonial capitalism in south-central Africa 
created (often by force) new patterns of movements and residence. It is hardly a coincidence therefore, that 
mineworkers should occupy a prominent place in the “classical literature” on migration and urbanisation in 
Zambia.! 
This focus on labour migration, if justified, has had an unintended consequence: the creation of an 
archetype story of labour migration, or as James Ferguson puts it, a ‘conventional wisdom according to which 
(…) specific studies are fitted into a larger picture’.4 In his influential Expectations of Modernity, Ferguson 
shows how changes in the nature of migration and urbanisation in Zambia over the years have been described in 
terms of an overarching, progressive narrative in which a “classic” migrant labour system featuring short-term 
migration by lone, male, rurally based migrants gradually gave way to a permanently urbanised working class.5 
However, this linear developmentalist view has come under increased criticism as forty years of scholarship 
have shown that migrant miners tended to migrate from mine to mine, or from job to job, rather than alternating 
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1 For a detailed study of the work of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in the Twentieth Century, please see L. SCHUMAKER, 
Africanizing Anthropology: Fieldwork, Networks, and the Making of Cultural Knowledge in Central Africa (Durham, 2001). 
2 J. PARPART, Labor and Capital on the African Copperbelt, p.13. 
3 H. POWDERMAKER, Copper Town, pp.3-7. 
4 J. FERGUSON, Expectations of Modernity, p.41. 
5 Ibid. 
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periods of work with long periods not working at home. Ferguson himself strongly argued that ‘rural-urban 
mobility was not always so orderly’1 and that processes of mobility and urbanisation were more varied and more 
complex than was usually suggested. In addition, he argues, ‘already in the 1920s and 1930s, many Copperbelt 
mineworkers were much more used to long-term urban dwelling than the image of the cyclical migrant would 
suggest. Indeed (…) many of the early Copperbelt workers had long histories of urban employment at other 
labour centres in the region, especially the Katanga mines in the Belgian Congo and in the mining centres of 
Southern Rhodesia.’2 Interestingly, while the role of Southern Rhodesia in this process of economic 
development and population movement is both acknowledged and relatively well-known, Katanga’s role in the 
same processes is less so. Indeed, the history of the development of the copper industry in Katanga – which has 
itself received a considerable amount of attention, though still considerably less than the Northern Rhodesian 
Copperbelt – has been seen as separate and distinct from that of the mines on the British side of the border. This, 
Luise White contends, is partly due to the fact that ‘the two histories do not provide a good chronological or 
comparative fit’.3 Copper mining in Katanga had begun well before World War I, whereas on the Northern 
Rhodesia Copperbelt it only really took off in the late 1920s. Another thing that seems to set the two 
Copperbelts apart is the apparent disparity in labour policy. By 1926, before the first copper mine in Northern 
Rhodesia was fully operational, the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK) had begun to stabilise its labour 
force whereas copper mines in Northern Rhodesia did not yet encourage a family presence. This created the idea 
that labour was ‘stabilised’ in Katanga while the copper mines of Northern Rhodesia still relied on a migrant 
system.4 In this way, ‘with few exceptions, the threads that link the two copperbelts have been overlooked, and 
the fluidity with which African labour penetrated colonial and cultural borders has not been the source with 
which history was written.’5  
In this chapter, I will argue that, far from constituting two distinct economic entities, the two Copperbelts 
shared labour and managerial expertise from an early date. Looking at migration in and out of Northern 
Rhodesia, it will be shown that labourers from Northern Rhodesia crisscrossed the border between Katanga and 
Zambia well into the 1940s and that this had a series of corollaries on both human and economic levels. By 
shifting the terms of the debate on labour migration from the classical rural/urban opposition championed by the 
RLI to an oscillation between different centres of production, I contend not only that economic relations with 
Katanga played an important part in the history of Northern Rhodesia but also that the patterns of movements 
that the copper industry set into motion were as varied in form as they were important in volume. 
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1. The Katangese Copperbelt: A Joint Enterprise 
 
1.  A DISHEARTENING START FOR NORTHERN RHODESIA 
 
Once it had secured Northern Rhodesia, the BSAC found itself in the strange situation of not knowing 
what to do with it. Northern Rhodesia was, as Andrew Roberts put it, ‘an awkwardly shaped piece of debris 
resulting from Rhodes’s failure to obtain Katanga.’1 Ironically, considering the efforts that went into acquiring 
exclusive mineral rights over it, Northern Rhodesia’s economic prospects seemed dim as its soil was rocky and 
infertile and gold deposits soon turned out to be insignificant. Consequently, the BSAC did little with Northern 
Rhodesia. In 1891 the Company assigned responsibility for its northern territory to the Commissioner in 
Nyasaland, Harry Johnston and concentrated its attention on the search for a ‘second rand’ in its territories south 
of the Zambezi.2 In the words of Ian Henderson: ‘The gilt was (…) missing from the gingerbread – if indeed 
there was any gingerbread at all.’3 For it became increasingly clear that, worse than not being lucrative, there 
was a danger the colony might not even be self-sufficient. In1899, at the end of his lengthy confidential report 
on the Anglo-German boundary between Lakes Nyassa and Tanganyika, C.F. Close remarked that, though some 
parts of North East Rhodesia on the Lower Zambezi river (well south of the boundary with Belgian Congo) 
were fertile, the eastern plateau region between the lakes where the boundary ran was a ‘remote, unhealthy, 
unprofitable country’,4 adding that ‘it is unlikely, unless the native population largely increases in the next 
generation, that the country will be able to pay for its own administration’.5 Fifteen years later, in his official 
report on the Anglo-Belgian boundary commission, I. Walker made a similar point:  
‘One can only hope that when N.E. Rhodesia is fully opened up to prospectors and exploration, 
minerals (above all tin) will be discovered in workable quantities, for without this incentive to 
progress, this country will remain a backwater of empire for several years to come.’6 
Walker’s comment turned out to be exceptionally insightful. 
European prospecting in Northern Rhodesia began in the 1890s. Several prospecting companies were 
formed under the aegis of one of Rhodes’s associates: Edmund Davis. The Bechuanaland Exploration Company 
(registered on April 25 1888) came first and was followed by a series of offshoots: the Northern Territories 
(BSA) Exploring Company, the Rhodesia Copper Company, the Rhodesia Broken Hill Development Company 
and the Rhodesia Copper and General Exploration and Finance Company.7 Under the auspices of these 
companies, prospectors discovered small copper mines at the ‘Hook’ of the Kafue River, lead and zinc at 
Broken Hill (now Kabwe) just below the Copperbelt region, and staked copper claims called Roan Antelope, 
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Rietbok and Bwana Mkubwa further north in the area that was to become the Copperbelt. In 1898 Rhodes 
granted a former associate, the Scottish engineer Robert Williams, a prospecting area of 2,000 square miles in 
Northern Rhodesia for a period of two years. For this purpose, Williams launched the Tanganyika Concessions 
Limited (TCL) in January 1899.1 Persuaded that minerals would be found around the Congo-Zambezi 
watershed, the company sent its first expedition there. The expedition found copper deposits at Nkana, Kipushi 
and Kansanshi, just 12 miles south of the watershed, as well as some gold.2 Despite these discoveries, no 
substantial mining operations were started.3 The reason for this lack of enthusiasm lies in developments taking 
place in Katanga. 
2. THE KATANGESE ‘EL DORADO’ 
 
In 1900, Robert Williams, convinced that the copper deposits found near the watershed extended well into 
Katanga, obtained from King Leopold the opportunity to explore the Katangese Copperbelt.4 It may seem 
surprising that after the efforts poured into avoiding a British presence in Katanga, Leopold should so easily 
welcome into his territory those he had so fiercely competed against. Actually, Leopold had little choice but to 
tolerate British involvement. Not only was the Congo Free State coming under increased international scrutiny 
because of the brutal practices of its agents, resulting in economic difficulties, but no Belgian financial group 
was ready to invest capital in a region that was far from the homeland and difficult to access.5 In any case, 
letting the Tanganyika Concessions Ltd do the preliminary work could only be to the advantage of the Congo 
Free State, as Albert Ochs, a stockholder of the Compagnie du Katanga, remarked in a letter to the Compagnie’s 
administrator, Albert Thys: 
‘Le plan financier de cette compagnie vous fera plutôt sourire mais le groupe est actif et non sans 
influence. On suivra leur voie si ils trouvent quelque chose de vraiment bon. Je ne vois pas d’objection 
[à] accepter leur argent tout aussi bien que Rhodes le fait [dans sa] sphère.’6 
An agreement was consequently concluded between the Tanganyika Concessions Ltd and the newly formed 
Comité Spécial du Katanga (CSK), which had by now taken over the administration of the territory on behalf of 
both the state and the Compagnie du Katanga.7 Under this agreement the TCL was given exclusive prospecting 
rights over 60,000 square miles along the Katanga border for a period of five years, and the right to work any 
mine for a period of up to thirty years in return for a guarantee of 60 % of the profits of any minerals 
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sell copper below £38 a ton (…) Given the railway and efficient management, Katanga should control 
the world’s copper supply and be the brightest spot in Africa.’1 
Consequently, attention was duly diverted from Northern Rhodesia, where prospecting activities declined after 
1906,2 and from then on, copper production on either side of the border evolved much along the lines of what 
had been predicted. By the end of the 1920s the Belgian Congo was the world’s third largest exporter of copper 
with 5.8 % of world output of smelter production.3 Northern Rhodesia was not as successful. Though Broken 
Hill and Bwana Mkubwa (at Ndola) both expanded their operations when the railroad reached them in 1900 and 
1909 respectively, economic activity remained on a very small scale: Bwana Mkubwa produced copper from 
1916 to 1918, and from 1917 to 1925 the country’s principal export was lead, from the open-cast mine at 
Broken Hill.4  
Year 
 
 
Katanga 
 
 
 
Northern 
Rhodesia 
 
 
Average price 
per ton (£) 
 
1908 - 589 - 
1909 - 601 - 
1910 - 782 - 
1911 997 905 - 
1912 2,492 1,972 - 
1913 7,408 240 - 
1914 10,722 218 62.6 
1915 14,054 176 79.6 
1916 22,149 167 125.2 
1917 27,462 132 125.0 
1918 20,237 96 113.5 
1919 22,366 195 86.0 
1920 18,961 130 80.4 
1921 30,464 184 57.6 
1922 43,362 180 61.6 
1923 57,886 130 66.5 
 1924 85,379 89 60.0 
1925 90,110 74 64.7 
1926 80,639 708 63.6 
Table 1. Copper Production (long tons) between 1908 and 19265 
By 1924, Northern Rhodesia was a territory teetering on the edge of insolvency. Thus the BSAC negotiated and 
reached an agreement with the British government on September 29, 1923, by which the Crown agreed to take 
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Henceforward, the Katanga mines imported coal and coke from a colliery just south of Victoria Falls, while 
their copper along with the lead and zinc from Broken Hill, was exported via Rhodesia Railways to the 
Mozambican coast.1 Its traffic paid for the maintenance of the track and rolling stack, and provided jobs for 
Northern Rhodesians.2 As such, the railway seems to have been the means by which the British South Africa 
Company was able to survive at all. Writing to Owen Letcher in August 1931, Sir Robert Williams remarked: 
‘Dr Jameson, when he asked me after Rhodes’s death to try to get a connection for the Rhodesia 
Railways to the Katanga mines, told me that unless I got this, the Chartered Company would go into 
liquidation as that Company, of which Dr Jameson was then the president, was losing £300,000 per 
annum under its guarantee of interest to the Rhodesian Debenture Holders.’3 
This was not the full extent of British involvement for they were also able to worm their way into the highest 
sphere of decision-making in Katanga. In order to handle what promised to be an extremely important mining 
interest in Katanga, the TCL and CSK launched a new chartered company on October 28, 1906: the Union 
Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK).4 The UMHK took over all the CSK’s rights and obligations with regard to 
the exploitation of the mineral wealth of Katanga and, from 1906 onwards, became the real locus of power in 
Katanga.5 The fact that the UMHK was to be a joint venture between British and Belgian interests stemmed out 
of necessity. Katanga was a Belgian territory but, in practice, Belgium’s experience as a colonial power was 
highly limited. There was no one in Belgium familiar, let alone experienced, with the mineral industry. Nor was 
anyone in Belgium familiar with Africa and its population. It is in recognition of that fact that the technical 
direction of the UMHK and the responsibility of recruiting labour were entrusted to the TCL.6 In return, 
Leopold II obtained a few concessions from the TCL: that the UMHK would be known as a Belgian, and not 
British company; that at least half of the employees would be Belgian; that 60 % of the material necessary for 
the exploitation of copper should be imported from Belgium; and last but not least, that half of the mines’ 
produce would be exported to Belgium.7 Leopold also made sure that some prominent Belgian groups would be 
included in the shareholders so as to counterbalance British influence on the Katangese mining sector. 
Prominent among these was the Société Générale de Belgique, Belgium’s largest holding company. As a result, 
the first administrative council of the UMHK was composed of five British representatives, all of whom were 
attached to the TCL, and five Belgians.8 The Company was Belgian and its administrative direction was to be 
Belgian but the technical direction, a.k.a. the overseeing of operations on the ground, was to be entrusted to the 
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British. In practice therefore, the TCL continued to operate the mines, control the recruitment of labour and 
manage the native compounds1 and the British directors and engineers of the UMHK continued to dictate most 
of the company’s decisions, both short-term and long-term. Until World War I, the main language of 
communication in Elisabethville was English.2 Between 1907 and 1911, the Company even had two European 
headquarters: a head office in Brussels, where the Belgian senior management met, and a “technical committee” 
in London, where the real power lay since it was where Robert Williams’ office supervised African 
undertakings. The British possessed half of the capital and the expertise in terms of mining and metallurgy, they 
controlled the main means of access to Katanga, and they provided and controlled labour.3 They were, as far 
Katanga is concerned, everywhere. 
Given this context of imbalanced dual power, tension between Belgian and British staff quickly escalated 
within the UMHK. A report on the UMHK undertaken by Jules Jadot, brother of the then President of the 
Société Générale, Jean Jadot, gave a grim picture of Belgo-British relations in Katanga: 
 ‘L’Union Minière n’était qu’un mythe ou une formule vague dénuée de signification (…) Tout au 
plus considérait-on que les hasards de la politique ayant fait du Katanga un territoire belge, il fallait 
donner à l’affaire une étiquette belge et qu’on avait pour cela créé l’Union Minière, dont toutefois Mr. 
Williams était le maître comme de la Tanganyika. Les Belges qui commencèrent à arriver peu à peu 
devaient naturellement être considérés comme des intrus (…) Le résultat était forcé: tout devait 
marcher mal.’4 
On the Belgian side, on the other hand, there was a feeling that their company, and by extension their colony, 
was slowly being turned into a British dependency: ‘l’administration congolaise n’existait que de nom dans ces 
parages et cette partie du Haut-Katanga était sans aucun doute considérée comme une extension de la 
Rhodésie.’5 Crossing the Congo in 1909, Prince Albert (who was to succeed to Leopold II that year) noted how 
the railway, once finished, would be: 
‘un inappréciable moyen de pénétration économique dans la partie la plus riche de notre colonie. Nous 
ne disposons d’aucun moyen par le Congo même qui puisse nous permettre de leur faire concurrence 
et l’on se demande si nous avons été inspirés par le vrai souci de notre avenir colonial en aidant nos 
concurrents et leur chemin de fer. Le Katanga apparait à tous les Anglais occupés à la mise en valeur 
de l’Afrique du Sud comme une vraie terre promise, ils parlent déjà avec des noms séparés du 
« Congo » et du « Katanga ».’6 
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The British ‘threat’ led the Belgian government to hasten already projected changes in the administration of 
Katanga. In 1910, the CSK handed Katanga over to the Colonial Ministry, which set up a very hierarchal and 
well-staffed provincial government for Katanga, thereby increasing Belgian presence in Katanga and putting the 
latter more firmly under the authority of the Belgian state.1 Tensions came to a head when the mines were first 
opened for business in 1911. The Belgian managers of the UMHK accused their British counterparts, Robert 
Williams in particular, of not running the mines properly. An inquiry commission, headed by Jules Jadot, was 
sent in November of the same year to assess the state of operations and suggest measures to be taken in the near 
future. Their report was incendiary: nothing worked properly, a fact that they attributed to the duality of 
command and the inefficiency of British technical direction. Jules Jadot concludes: ‘L’Union Minière aurait-elle 
pu faire mieux si elle avait dirigé elle-même ses affaires? Oui, sans le moindre doute.’2 Unfortunately for the 
Belgians, the First World War made it impossible to take any step towards re-claiming absolute authority over 
Katanga. Worse, the demands of war led to a dramatic drop in the Belgian presence in Africa. In 1917 Belgians 
represented less than 25 % of the UMHK’s white employees, while the UMHK depended completely on the 
British and their control over southern Africa for the supply of provisions, labour and expertise.3 It was only 
after the war, by which time Anglophobia was rife in Elisabethville, that Belgium was able to pursue a policy of 
‘nationalisation’ of its industry. In 1918, the then Procureur du Roi Martin Rutten, who spearheaded Belgian 
opposition to British domination over Katanga, had P.K. Horner, local overseer of UMHK operations, fired on 
the ground of poor hygiene conditions in ‘native’ housing.4 Immediately afterwards, Rutten used the series of 
strikes undertaken by the South African employees in 1919 and 1920 to dismiss them and replace them by 
Belgians.5 Then, still in 1918, the Union Minière created its own native labour department and took over the 
management of the compounds from Robert Williams and Company.6 In this way, between 1917 and 1920 
many non-Belgians were successfully uprooted from their position of power in Katanga. This process was made 
all the easier by the fact that the Belgian franc declined in relation to the pound sterling after the war making 
London less keen to invest in Belgian ventures. By the early 1920s, Brussels had finally and definitively come 
to replace London as the source of capital for the development of the Katanga Copperbelt, the Tanganyika 
Concessions had become little more than a holding company and the combination of British entrepreneurship 
and British capital that had been so important in the early development of the Union Minière had lost its 
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industry had fallen under British leadership. See B. FETTER, The Creation of Elisabethville, p.64. 
5 Ibid, p.6. 
6 W.J. Schriviner (Compound Manager at Nkana), Report on Native Labour as Affecting the Copper Industry of Northern Rhodesia, 17 
August  1934, SEC1/1293, doc.1 (NAZ), p.3. 
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perform: to provide labour for the expanding, labour-intensive economies of southern Rhodesia and, to a lesser 
degree, South Africa.1 It is traditionally suggested that the principle aim of the hut tax was to manipulate the 
Northern Rhodesian population into engaging in migrant labour in a particular direction.2 Though Ian 
Henderson, in an attempt to nuance that statement, contends that ‘taxation was not a necessary or sole cause of 
labour migration, but rather that it was one stage (though perhaps the most important one) in the process of the 
imposition of European control’,3 there is little doubt that tax and labour were regarded by the administration as 
indispensable to one another. For most of the Northern Rhodesians, who numbered about one million at the 
time, engaging in wage labour outside the territory became the only possibility of paying their tax, since 
opportunities for employment within Northern Rhodesia were scarce. 4 
At the same time as these measures were being implemented in northern Rhodesia, Katangese mines went 
into function and were – rather conveniently – in dire need of labour.5 The labour policy in Katanga was to copy 
the South African model in which workers would typically stay for a period of 6 to 9 months, work until 
exhaustion, be replaced by new recruits until they too succumbed to fatigue. The success of such a scheme 
presupposed the comparative proximity of dense population clusters.6 There lay the rub, for not only was there 
no transportation network to carry potential recruits to the mines, but Katanga was also much less populated 
than South Africa.7 In 1912, at the time when the mining in Katanga was entering its industrial phase, Katanga 
was described as ‘[une terre] inhabitée, sans ressource aucune au point de vue main-d’œuvre et ravitaillement. 
(...) Entre Elisabethville et Kambove, sur 160 kilomètres, on ne rencontre que deux villages.’8 In addition, the 
few potential labour supply areas that Katanga did have were not the ecological traps of the Bemba plateau in 
North-Eastern Rhodesia, and labour recruiters had to contend not only with an ineffectual administration, but 
also with the comparative profitability of peasant production.9 In addition, the region was still bearing the scars 
left by the era of the Congo Free State, as was noted in 1928 by the Northern Rhodesian Department of Native 
affairs: 
‘In the Congo the main difficulties are (1) scarcity of native population (2) extreme difficulty 
experienced in persuading the male natives to come out as wage earners in industry. The reluctance to 
work for Europeans, it can safely be said, was caused by the ruthless methods practiced in the early 
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days of the Congo Free State to exploit the rubber trade (…) The rubber trade is also responsible to a 
great extent for the sparseness of the population.’1 
For want of any viable alternative, the Union Minière started to look towards Northern Rhodesia for the 
recruitment of its workforce.2 For the purpose of handling labour recruitment and management, a small 
subsidiary of the TCL was formed: Robert Williams & Co. Its recruiters, using Fort Rosebery (now Mansa) as a 
base, set up an efficient recruitment system, concentrated in the area in Northern Rhodesia within 200 miles of 
Elisabethville. In the early years, Robert Williams & Co. was the sole provider of labour in Katanga, supplying 
to all three centres of operations – Ruwe, Kambove and the Star of the Congo – as well as fulfilling a portion of 
the company’s porterage requirements.3 
Considering the BSAC’s stakes in Katanga, it was of interest to them that that the Robert Williams & Co. 
obtained a large measure of cheap labour. Yet initially there seems to have been some concern about the fact 
that Katanga was diverting some of the labour that would have been sent southwards to support the development 
of Southern Rhodesia.4 According to Charles Perrings the bans against outward migration and labour 
recruitment that were enforced in 1905 ostensibly in response to the sleeping sickness epidemic in the Luapula 
valley, were in fact part of an attempt to place an embargo on the shipment of all labour from North-Eastern 
Rhodesia to Katanga.5 ‘There is little doubt,’ Perrings argues, ‘but that the appearance of sleeping sickness 
caused widespread alarm along medical men in both the Rhodesias and Katanga, but there is equally little doubt 
that the curative and preventive measures taken by the BSA Company administration were not actuated by that 
concern alone.’6 Unfortunately for the BSAC however, even if the closure of the border prevented Katangese 
recruiters from crossing the river to search out either labour or food, it was less effective a check on African 
mobility than the BSAC would have liked.7 By December, the acting administrator was describing the closure of 
the river as a ‘dead letter’ and arguing that the ‘popularity’ of the Katanga mines was such that no system of 
patrol could be effective. ‘So long as the natives have no other lawful sphere of labour’, he went on, ‘they will 
evade the restrictions on their movements’.8 At the same time, in Katanga, though a new recruiting agency 
called the Bourse du Travail du Katanga (BTK) had been launched in 1910, it was unable to round up enough 
recruits to meet the stringent needs of a territory undergoing an industrial and commercial boom.9 These 
circumstances made it becoming increasingly obvious to both BSAC and UMHK that a compromise had to be 
found. A conference was consequently held at Fort Rosebery in October 1910 where North-Eastern Rhodesian 
administration agreed to permit the controlled flow of labour on the Luapula, on the condition that the Robert 
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Williams & Co. retained control of recruiting operations inside North-Eastern Rhodesia.1 Further agreements 
between the Northern Rhodesia Government and Robert Williams & Co. were clinched in May 1911, 
establishing that Northern Rhodesian workers had to return home at the end of their terms (six months 
renewable for six more). In a supplementary agreement reached in 1913 the Katanga government allowed the 
Northern Rhodesian government to appoint a permanent Inspector of Rhodesian Labour to be posted at the ‘Star 
of the Congo’ mine.2 In this way, because of economic necessities, two colonial strongholds acknowledged their 
economic interdependence and made the best of an awkward situation. The Union Minière obtained a reliable 
supply of labour albeit at an increased cost while the BSAC gained a source of revenue. The taxed Rhodesian 
mineworkers represented an important part of the territory’s meagre export earnings; in 1912, total domestic 
exports amounted to only £70,000, which was little more than the total value of mineworkers’ pay in Katanga.3  
The Enduring Popularity of Katanga 
 
From the moment the Robert Williams & Co. started recruiting extensively across the border in 1910, it 
was the Luapula area (the Awemba and Tanganyika Districts) in North-East Rhodesia that yielded most of the 
African labour for the newly formed UMHK. The Luapula supply areas, i.e. the great plateau of North-Eastern 
Rhodesia along the Luapula between lake Mweru and Bangweolu, comprised the Bemba, Bisa, Mambwe, Iwa, 
Namwanga, Lungu, Ushi, Chisinga, Ngumbo and Eastern Lunda peoples. All these groups had few options to 
earn the few shillings they needed to pay their taxes. Northeast Rhodesia had poor soils and was infested with 
tsetse flies, which hampered both agriculture and cattle husbandry. To make things worse, there were few 
employment opportunities in the area, apart from the small white settlement around Abercorn.4 As a result, the 
Katangese mines seem to have been quite popular with the Mweru-Luapula peoples. Not only were work 
conditions there believed to be slightly better than those of pre-1910 Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, but 
the mines of Katanga were also particularly advantageously located.5 It is not surprising therefore that, as soon 
as they got the opportunity, Luapulans flocked to Katanga to the point of forming the largest part of the 
Rhodesian workforce in Katanga. In December 1921, out of the 1,290 Rhodesian recruits that arrived that 
month, 1,069 came from North-East Rhodesia (158 came from Barotseland and 63 from other areas).6 Despite a 
short decrease towards the end of the First World War (when Northern Rhodesia closed its border temporarily to 
labour because of the pitiful quality of the labour camps in Katanga7) labour migration routes were well 
established by 1920 and the volume of the movements along them had increased. The Rhodesians had built 
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themselves a reputation in Katanga for their reliability and resilience and their accumulated experience was a 
growing asset.1 Their accommodation was better than that of the Katangese from the surrounding area, and since 
they were paid in sterling rather than depreciating francs, Northern Rhodesians enjoyed greater buying power 
than Congolese workers. In 1926 the salary that the UMHK paid to Northern Rhodesians was the equivalent of 
twice what the Congolese received in francs.2 The number of Northern Rhodesians in Katanga grew steadily 
over the years with a particularly dramatic and sudden increase in 1920 and 1921, which may be related to a rise 
in hut tax in 1920.3 In February 1919, there were 1,301 Northern Rhodesian natives employed by Union 
Minière.4 By January 1920 they were 5,752,5 and by January 1921, 5,983.6 In 1920-1921 Northern Rhodesians 
therefore represented 56 % of the Union Minière workforce. 
 
Year Number 
 
Percentages 
 
1917 (April 1) 1661 34 % 
1918 (March 31) - 23 % 
1919 (December 31) 5634 46 % 
1920 (April 30) 6836 52 % 
1921 (December) 5548 56 % 
1922 (September) 2177 33 % 
1923 (October) 4267 43 % 
* Does not include Rhodesians in domestic and other non-mine 
employment, who probably amounted to a similar number. 
 
 
Table 2. Numbers and percentages of Rhodesian labour in the Katanga mines of 
UMHK, 1917-1923 
2. THE RISE OF THE NORTHERN RHODESIAN COPPERBELT (1924-1931) 
 
A New Competitor 
 
Until the early 1920s, Britain’s main concern had been to see that the territory was made to pay for its 
own upkeep, mostly through the export of labour.7 However within a few years the situation changed 
unexpectedly and dramatically thanks to the growth of the automobile and electrical industries that followed the 
end of the First World War. These new industries engendered global demand for copper, considerably boosting 
copper prices. This, combined with the success of the mines developed over the border in the Belgian Congo, 
prompted a change of policy on the part of the British South Africa Company. Towards the end of 1922, instead 
of granting individual prospecting licenses as it had hitherto done, the BSAC began to grant exclusive 
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prospecting rights to large mining concerns over extensive areas.1 This change in BSAC’s mining policy was 
clearly specifically aimed at attracting larger well-financed concerns with technical expertise. Since the United 
States now led the world in copper production and technology, promotion of the Copperbelt as a potential 
important copper supplier was especially geared towards attracting American financiers.2 Two fish were 
hooked: A. Chester Beatty, a London-based mining financier whose holding company, Selection Trust Ltd 
provided some funds in 1920; and Sir Ernest Oppenheimer, founder of the Anglo American Corporation, who 
joined forces in 1924.3 New prospecting soon revealed large sulphide deposits containing copper at workable 
depths just below the topmost layers of oxide ore near Ndola close to the Belgian Congo border. Following the 
discovery in 1911 of a flotation method drastically lowering the cost of processing sulphide ores, the Copperbelt 
became a highly lucrative investment opportunity, and systematic mining followed suit.4 Bwana Mkubwa was 
relaunched in 1922 and employed some 1,400 men by the end of 1924.5 By 1930 four large new mines were 
being developed on the Copperbelt: Roan Antelope (now Luanshya), Nkana (Kitwe), Mufulira and Nchanga 
(Chingola). The Rhodesian branch of Oppenheimer’s Anglo American Corporation developed the Nchanga and 
Nkana mine, forming the Rhokana Corporation Ltd in 1931 to manage the latter. Beatty’s Selection Trust 
incorporated the Roan Antelope and Mufulira mines in 1927 and 1930 respectively.6 In 1931, despite the 
worldwide depression that led to the closure of the small Bwana Mkubwa mine, Roan Antelope and Nkana went 
into production. Mufulira began producing in 1933 and in 1934 a refinery was opened at Nkana. The growth of 
the Copperbelt had touched off a revolution for Northern Rhodesia. The value of exports increased five-fold 
between 1930 and 1933, and the contribution of copper rose from 30 % to 90 %.7 This made copper a welcome 
source of revenue for the country’s administration and it remained the most valuable product in the territory.  
Northern Rhodesia’s Introduction to the Migrant Labour System 
Despite this rapid growth, the newly formed Copperbelt companies were at first hard pressed to obtain 
sufficient African labour. In 1929, two shafts at Mufulira closed temporarily because of insufficient personnel. 
Part of the problem lay in the fact that no local labour was available.8 The Compound manager of Nkana noted 
the following: 
‘The Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt is a sparsely populated District, the supply of labour being totally 
inadequate to keep any large industry going and moreover the quality of the labour is very poor. It is 
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thereof necessary to import labour from districts further afield. This fact alone constitutes a greater 
part of the native labour problem of the copper mining companies.’1 
This lack of local labour source meant that the Copperbelt mines had little choice but to engage in the migrant 
labour system. When they did so, however, they encountered stiff competition. Labour-routes to other industrial 
centres were already well established, having been trodden for two decades. In 1928 it was reported that some 
15,7% of the male population of Northern Rhodesia was working outside the territory, in the mines of Katanga, 
Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and even Tanganyika.2 To counteract this trend, the Copperbelt companies 
adopted a series of strategies. In December 1925 they convinced the government of Northern Rhodesia to put an 
official limit on the number of Rhodesians allowed to work in Katanga.3 In May 1929 representatives of the two 
main Copperbelt Companies met together with governor of Ndola and agreed to establish a new labour bureau: 
the Native Labour Association and by 1931 the Association had 27 agents stationed at strategic points 
throughout the territory. In this way, the mines secured the major part of their labour force by recruiting in 
distant regions, usually east of the Fort Rosebery, the area favoured by Congo recruiters. To compete with them, 
Northern Rhodesian mines offered contracts for 180 days of work, and of course, wages were also forced up 
considerably, as each mine tried to outbid the other, as well as the Union Minière.4 These strategies had a 
measure of success. It was reported that the ‘habit of going abroad to work is already losing its hold’5 and that 
there was a relative decline in migration to the Katanga. At the same time foreign labour, mainly from 
Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia, was also increasingly attracted to the north. Early in 1927 there were about 
8,500 workers on all the mines and concessions in the territory. At the end of 1928 the figure had risen to 
16,073; to 22,341 at the end of 1929; to 29,689 at the end of 1930; and to a peak of 31,941 in September 1930.6 
However none of these measures succeeded in meeting the demands of the new mines and general labour 
scarcity endured. The companies struggled to offer conditions of employment comparable to those at 
neighbouring mines and there, as was noted by the Department of Native Affairs in 1928, lay the heart of the 
problem: 
‘Our greatest and most serious problem is that the best of our labourers proceed to Southern Rhodesia, 
Congo Belge and even Tanganyika Territory in quest of employment in preference to working in our 
own territory because of the better conditions of employment and the better terms of wages offered 
them in these places. There is no reason to believe that this state of affairs will alter until Employers in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Northern Rhodesia pay the same wages as can be obtained elsewhere and conditions in respect of 
housing, feeding, medical treatment etc are improved.’1 
In the report on Rhodesian natives in Katanga for October 1929 a similar statement was made: 
‘Doubtless many of the natives from the Mweru-Luapula districts who have been accustomed to work 
in the Katanga for a long time will continue to do so. Others will seek the work which is the most 
attractive, where their friends are working and where they receive fair treatment. (…) The only thing 
which might attract natives to the Rhodesian mines from those districts would be higher pay. The 
Belgian manager of Katanga cement company who visits some of the mines in Northern Rhodesia 
from time to time informs me that he thinks that the scale of rations in Northern Rhodesia compares 
unfavourable with the existing scale in the Katanga.’2 
Major G.St.J. Orde Browne, an expert on colonial labour policy, remarked in 1933 that the extent to which the 
African worker travelled and compared conditions of employment was not generally realised.3 Northern 
Rhodesians employed in Southern Africa had developed their own networks which conveyed information on 
labour conditions. News travelled rapidly along the established labour routes, and conditions in the mines of 
Katanga, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, as well as Tanganyika (a small but regular number of 
Northern Rhodesias worked in the Lupa gold fields of Tanganyika) were well-known. Most Northern 
Rhodesians understood the relative rewards available to them at various places of employment, and they made 
decisions based on that knowledge. The general labour shortage of the 1920s in central Africa put skilled 
workers in a relatively good bargaining position in the labour market: jobs were plentiful and experienced 
workers in short supply. Northern Rhodesians knew they could change jobs easily, which they did, sometimes 
even before the end of their contracts.4 The Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt, as the newcomer, found it 
particularly difficult to compete with industries that were better established and better ‘stocked’. 
It is no wonder therefore that, when the Copperbelt mines began construction in 1926, Northern 
Rhodesians did not flock to them. Katanga was a tough act to follow, the standards of living of its mines having 
been described as ‘positively amazing’ by Orde Browne in 1929.5 From 1926 on, to palliate the effects of the 
Northern Rhodesian government’s decision to restrict the number of Northern Rhodesians allowed to work in 
Katanga, the Union Minière had decided ‘on an attempt to settle a native population on their properties and thus 
provide themselves with a permanent resident labour supply’.6 This meant that the UMHK was now after two 
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things: new and more permanent sources of African labour, which would limit Katanga’s dependence on foreign 
labour on the one hand1 and on the other, a more stable and skilled workforce, since allowing workers to stay for 
longer periods of time meant reducing dependence on a constant large supply of unskilled workers.2 From 1927 
the UMHK began to enlist workers on three-year contracts and increasingly, though not exclusively, sought to 
attract men from within the Congo or Rwanda-Urundi.3 In order to attract settled labour, a dramatic upgrading 
of African living conditions had been achieved by the end of the decade; the company built better houses and 
hospitals for employees as well as granted small salary increases and better food.4 This made Katanga very 
attractive for Rhodesian workers and, despite the UMHK’s policy of lowering the mines’ dependence on 
Rhodesian labour, many Northern Rhodesians still went to Katanga on a voluntary basis and were still hired.5 
As late as 1929, the total number of Rhodesian male natives employed by the UMHK was ‘estimated 
approximately at 11,000 or 12,000’.6 Yet the total number of Rhodesians present in Katanga is likely to have 
been much larger than the number of UMHK employees may indicate. By 1924 J.P. McGregor, the British 
Vice-Consul in Elisabethville, estimated that his office looked after the interests of 10,000 Rhodesians when 
only half that number was reported to be working for the UMHK at the time.7 There are several reasons for this 
discrepancy. First was the fact the UMHK was not the sole employer in Katanga. The expansion of Katanga was 
paralleled in other industries and by 1924 industrial and commercial employment in Katanga outside the UMHK 
accounted for an average of 12,000 men. The majority were employed by the railways but others were also 
employed by more recent undertakings such as the Charbonnages de Luena, the Société Coloniale de 
Construction, the Société Belge Industrielle et Minière du Katanga and the Société Ciments du Katanga.8 In 
addition, Northern Rhodesians were also engaged in non-industrial wage labour. They worked as artisans, 
shopkeepers and, more importantly as “houseboys” as it was ‘a recognised fact that the Rhodesian natives are 
better servants. They are a pleasanter type and are bettermannered, though their manners soon deteriorate after 
they have been a little time in the Congo.’9 Another element that explains the sudden increase in Northern 
Rhodesian presence in Katanga was the fact that, in 1923 the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga decided to allow 
labour recruits to bring their wives and families to the mining townships, arguing that a man accompanied by his 
wife was more likely to be contented and consequently would both stay longer and be a better worker.10 As a 
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result, married Northern Rhodesian women also crossed the border with ease, and as it happens, so did 
unmarried ones: ‘Owing to the large number of men who flock to the mines both in Northern Rhodesia and the 
Katanga many of whom remain permanently or for long periods, the number of detribalised natives is 
increasing. The number of young men who remain in the villages is very small and the women are also flocking 
to the mines in search of husbands.’1 In 1929, therefore, despite restrictions enforced by both Katangese and 
Northern Rhodesian authorities, the Northern Rhodesian community in Katanga had remained large, 
representing 37.5 % of the population in the UMHK’s compounds of the Elisabethville area and 44 % of the 
population of the Elisabethville district as a whole.2 The most common language spoken in the mines of 
Katanga at the time was Bemba.3 
 
 
 
 
Men 
 
Women 
 
Children 
 
Total 
 
 
Place Elisabethville City: 
Union Miniere camps (Lubumbashi-Etoile-Ruashi) 
Northern Rhodesian 1,563 577 317 2,462 
Congolese 2,612 961 528 4,101 
Total 4,181 1,538 845 6,5631 
 
Place 
Elisabethville District: 
(Entire City-Kipushi-Rural) 
 
Northern Rhodesian 5,746 1,476 1,077 8,3012 
Congolese 7,283 3,149 2,341 12,7733 
1. The Northern Rhodesian and Congolese sub-totals are extrapolated from the overall totals at a ratio of 
37.5 % Northern Rhodesians, 62.5% Congolese. 
2. All men at work or seeking work 
3. That number includes rural population 
 
Table 3. African population statistics for greater Elisabethville, 1928-1929 
 
3. THE CHANGE IN THE DIRECTION OF LABOUR MIGRATION (1931-1940) 
 
The Depression of the Early 1930s 
By the time Northern Rhodesia copper entered the world market in 1931, the onset of a severe depression 
in 1931 dramatically reduced the price and demand for copper on the world market. In copper mining, the 
Depression years were 1929 to 1936, with copper prices starting to fall in mid 1930 and hitting bottom in 1932.4 
Mining companies in both southern Katanga and Northern Rhodesia reacted to the slump in copper prices by 
curtailing production and reducing the size of their labour force. Recruitment for the Katanga mines in Northern 
Rhodesia, which had already been decreasing for some years, came to a final end on July 31 1931. In addition 
more than two-thirds of the UMHK workforce was laid off – the African labour force was reduced from 16,000 
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1 Report on Rhodesian Natives in Katanga, 22 October 1929, SEC1/1472, doc. 6 (NAZ), p.7. 
2 B. FETTER, The Creation of Elisabethville, p.99. 
3 L. WHITE, ‘Class Struggle and Cannibalism’, p.275. 
4 Prices dropped precipitously from £112.635s per ton in 1929 to £27.25s per ton in February 1932. See L. WHITE, ‘Class Struggle and 
Cannibalism’, p.282; J. PARPART, Labor and Capital on the African Copperbelt, p.21. 
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to less than 5,000 between 1930 and 1932 – with the Northern Rhodesians being especially targeted.1 The 
number of Northern Rhodesians settled in Katanga drastically reduced from an approximated population of 
20,000 in 1929 to an approximated population of 7,200 in 1932.2 In the meantime, due to the combined effect of 
the Depression and the repatriation of Northern Rhodesia-born miners from the Congo in 1931, workers started 
to flock in the Copperbelt mines in such numbers that recruitment was no longer necessary and was disbanded 
in 1932.3 What had been the companies’ dearest hope just a year or two before, was now almost an 
inconvenience as there were more voluntary recruits than the Copperbelt mines could realistically 
accommodate. In addition the Depression was eventually to close all of the Copperbelt mines except the Roan 
Antelope and Nkana, and even these two remaining mines sharply scaled back production.4 Africans employees 
on the mines, which had hit a peak of 31,941 at the height of the construction boom in September 1930, dropped 
to 19,313 by the following September, and to 6,677 at the end of 1932.5 During 1931 and 1932, some 58 % of 
the workforce lost their job6 and unemployment on the mines was subsequently widespread. Dismissed Africans 
were simply supposed to go home to rural villages during the slump. But many, having worked for some years 
on the Copperbelt or in other urban centres in Katanga, Southern Rhodesia, or South Africa had been away from 
the villages for a long time and ‘felt so out of touch they refused to return’.7 
Gradually, however, the Depression lifted and the mines began to recover. Mufulira reopened in October 
1933 and production facilities expanded at all three major mines. By 1935, the mines were producing 153,790 
tons, or 10 % of the free world’s production.8 As the world moved towards war for the second time, the demand 
for copper rose briskly and prices followed accordingly.9 This ushered in an era of unparalleled prosperity for 
the Copperbelt, thanks to which Northern Rhodesia was firmly established as one of the world’s major copper 
producers by 1945.10 Between 1935 and 1941 employment on the mines rose from 13,734 to 27,602, which was 
still a few thousand less than at its peak in 1930 but reflected the vastly increased scale of operations at 
Mufulira, the reopening of Nchanga, and significant expansion at both Roan Antelope and Nchanga.11 At the 
same time, there were substantial improvements in underground conditions, so that in many mines the working 
conditions improved and remuneration for skilled labour increased, bringing about an era of increased 
stabilisation in the workforce.12 The Depression, despite the Copperbelt’s subsequent recovery, had rather 
profound effects on the African labourer. For, in just a matter of months, the latter had lost its leverage in the 
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labour market and the balance of power had shifted to the mining companies. As employment opportunities 
dried up throughout southern Africa, miners clung fiercely to their jobs, which contributed to breaking such 
migrating cycle from to mine to mine, as had previously been the norm, even if new opportunities opened up. 
The Volume of Cross-Border migrations 
 
Despite the seemingly clear-cut situation presented in the previous section, it is in fact difficult to 
ascertain the precise timing of changes in the direction of labour migration in this period. It is even more 
difficult to assess its significance. Blurring the picture is the fact that official data on migrant labour for that 
period is sorely lacking. The Northern Rhodesian government, who was only interested in labour in as much as 
it permitted the laws of supply and demand to operate freely, was insulated from the realities of labour 
conditions until the first Copperbelt strike broke out in 1935, and even then it took an additional few years 
before anything happened to change this state of affairs. There was no Labour Department in Northern Rhodesia 
until the late 1930s,1 and Orde Browne, attempting to analyse labour conditions in Northern Rhodesia in 1938, 
found that labour problems had been ignored in government annual reports: ‘statistics of the movement of 
natives, analyses of contract, records of court cases under industrial legislation and similar particulars, are not to 
be found: wider aspects of the problem are hardly mentioned.’2 This haze of ignorance is a major handicap in 
attempting to quantify and analyse African labour before 1940. Henderson summarises the labour movements of 
the 1930s as follows: 
‘If it is possible to generalise about the wage-labour activities of Africans in the 1920s and 1930s, one 
might say that labour migration continued unabated and uncontrolled by the government. The 
direction of the migration changed, but the volume continued unchanged except by the economic 
slump of 1931-33.’3 
Henderson adds however that the exact number of ex-Katanga mineworkers who went directly to the Copperbelt 
remains an ‘open question’.4 It is likely that the new market provided by the Copperbelt was seen as a potential 
life-belt by many of them, especially the inhabitants of the Mweru-Luapula, who depended heavily on copper 
mining. In 1930, only 1,620 (or 25 %) of the 6,420 voluntary mineworkers from Mweru-Luapula Province were 
estimated to have proceeded to southern Katanga while all the others were said to have proceeded to the 
Copperbelt.5 The fact that the Northern Rhodesian government stayed largely unconcerned with labour issues 
until 1935 also meant that the composition and provincial origins of the original Copperbelt labour force is 
obscure. It seems that the bulk of the unskilled labour force was indeed supplied by Africans from Northern 
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1 I. HENDERSON, Labour and Politics in Northern Rhodesia 1900-1953, p.68. 
2 G. St.J. Orde Browne, Labour Conditions, para. 6, as quoted in I. HENDERSON, Labour and Politics in Northern Rhodesia 1900-
1953, p.69. 
3 I. HENDERSON, Labour and Politics in Northern Rhodesia 1900-1953, p.60. 
4 Ibid, p.71. 
5 G. MACOLA, The Kingdom of Kazembe, p.215. 
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Rhodesia, especially the Bemba-speaking peoples of the northeast,1! while the rest mainly came from 
Nyasaland.2  
As for the Rhodesian presence in Katanga, it would be wrong to think that it was wiped out. Even when 
the effects of the Depression were the most acutely felt, and despite the fact that, in the words of the Inspector of 
Rhodesian Natives in Katanga ‘it is fairly obvious that the policy of the mines is to give preference to the 
natives of the Congo when engaging labour’, it was equally ‘obvious’ that ‘with a revival of trade and fresh 
undertakings in the Katanga Rhodesian natives will no doubt again be gladly welcomed’.3 And indeed in 1947 it 
was reported that most men from Luapula, even on the Northern Rhodesian side of the river, looked or were 
recruited for wage work in the Belgian Congo, which was nearer and more accessible than the Northern 
Rhodesian Copperbelt.4 What is more, many Northern Rhodesians remained in Katanga throughout the 1930s. 
In 1933, though their number in the UMHK workforce had decreased almost to insignificance (they were 230 
Rhodesian and Nyasaland natives employed by the UMHK at that time5), it was also reported that: 
‘There are some 3,000 male Rhodesian natives employed in the town itself, practically, if not all, 
domestic servants and office boys are Rhodesian. In addition there are between 350 and 450 
Rhodesian natives who have settled in the villages round the town as market gardeners. They rent the 
ground from the Comité spécial and sell their produce in Elisabethville at the market which is held 
twice a week.’6 
This said, it is undeniable that there was net decline in Northern Rhodesian population and that the lives of those 
who chose to remain was becoming increasingly difficult. The Rhodesians remaining on the mines – now 
representing only 5 % of the workforce – were reportedly ‘mainly skilled or trained workmen who have long 
periods of service with the Union Minière behind them and who have been retained for this reason’. 
Consequently they were considered to be ‘detribalised’ and to have ‘settled down’,7 and the legitimacy of their 
presence in Katanga was not called into question. For the rest, the Northern Rhodesians who were unemployed, 
independent workers, or who for one reason or another were not as immovable as the qualified miners, life in 
Katanga was markedly more uncertain. Belgian administrators attempted to pursue the same policy as the 
UMHK of reducing foreign presence in the native towns. Workers were expelled if they remained unemployed 
for more than a month. To cope with this situation, many jobless married men sent their families back to the 
villages, and many left Katanga altogether.8 Yet, the fact that there had been a Northern Rhodesian presence in 
Katanga for two decades ensured that (1) those who left would be likely to come back if given the chance and 
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(2) that a significant number of Northern Rhodesians ‘visitors’ would regularly come to gauge their working 
possibilities. In this way, the Depression served to make the border more porous than it had been before. In 
1930-31 alone the British Vice Consulate in Elisabethville registered 4,480 Northern Rhodesian men who left 
Katanga, while 3,652 new arrivals took their place.1 The exact fluctuation in volume of Northern Rhodesian 
‘visits’ is difficult to ascertain but their numbers reportedly went from 110 in 1,931 to 1,335 in 1932.2 Even 
where numbers are lacking, the evidence of cultural exchange attest to the volume of cross-border migration. 
Religious movements, witch-finding movements, and new dance fads crossed the border regularly.3 Particularly 
telling is the ease with which Kitawala (or Watchtower), a millenarian movement widespread in Southern 
Africa, penetrated Katangese circles to the dismay of the colonial administration. Conditions of insecurity and 
economic distress and the constant threat of expulsion made Northern Rhodesians particularly receptive to 
Kitawala teachings.4 Even more revealing is the ease with which rumours spread across borders. Luise White 
offers a detailed study of how one such rumour relating to vampire men (known as banyamas in Northern 
Rhodesia and as batumbula in the Congo) gained momentum in both Copperbelts between 1930 and 1964. 
Following stories of ‘mysterious’ disappearances, strangers, European doctors, corpulent administrators, 
prospectors, surveyors and tourists were all highly suspected of being banyamas. In her Speaking with 
Vampires, White not only shows how these stories were to a large extent a symptom of the ‘mood’ of 
dissatisfaction and confusion among the African population in a period of deep economic recession, but she also 
points out how these stories, which were widespread in an area encompassing Katanga and all of the former 
BSAC territories, were also extremely similar in the way they were told and the elements that they comprised.5 
The prevalence, pervasiveness and similarity of these stories are another indicator of the extent to which people 
penetrated colonial borders at the time. 
 
 
3. Copper’s Corollaries: Agriculture, Fishery and Markets 
 
1. FEEDING KATANGA: AN ALTERNATIVE TO MIGRANT LABOUR 
 
Nothing so far has been said about the development of secondary industries or other non-copper-based 
economic activities in Northern Rhodesia. Part of the reason is that there was little of that. It is almost a matter 
of course that an industry with such potential as the Copperbelt, implanted in a territory as poor as Northern 
Rhodesia, should come to dominate the economy from an early date. Many other industries, transport facilities, 
and power supplies were dependent on the mines. Even the government itself relied heavily on them for 
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revenues; they were the largest taxpayers in the country, incurred heavy custom duties on imported supplies and 
provided employment for a very large numbers of taxpayers. The mining industry did not however spark the 
growth of many secondary industries, nor did it lead to improved prospects in the rural areas.1 Instead, the entire 
economy of Northern Rhodesia was built around mineral extraction, whose highly technical nature and export 
orientation limited the growth of secondary industries. In a regional survey carried out in 1960, the Copperbelt 
was described as ‘a compact economic oasis with seven springs, surrounded by a most extensive economic 
desert.’2 Consequently no real alternative source of profit existed in Northern Rhodesia besides the copper 
industry, as was noted in the same 1960 survey: 
 ‘Apart from copper, cobalt and uranium, lime and perhaps a little citrus, not much is produced on the 
Copperbelt for markets outside of the Copperbelt. Our economy is still, broadly speaking, at the 
extractive stage. Secondary and light manufacturing industries are not established here (…) The local 
people are too few, and too poor. Transport charges are too high. There is no chance of economies of 
scale. There is an absence of specialised skills and equipment. The Copperbelt moreover has it own 
well-hackneyed reason for not being a mushroom bed of manufacturing industry. The region is 1,500 
miles from the coast. The real wages in the mining industry set a standard of living so high as to 
constitute a positive deterrent to any other. The region is so new that an entrepreneur must invest too 
large a part of his capital to provide houses and services for his workers.’3 
Even agriculture was limited. The tsetse flies, which covered large parts of the woodland area, the distance from 
markets, the poor soils and the competition from Southern Rhodesia were all factors militating against any 
large-scale venture. Only very few areas were arable enough to produce some international market-oriented 
crops; tobacco was grown in the east of the country, in the Fort Jameson (Chipata) area, and small amounts of 
coffee were produced by plantation agriculture in the Abercorn area (Mbala) in the north-east.4 So if Northern 
Rhodesia was used a labour reservoir, it seemed to have little chance of becoming a grain one. And yet, for a 
while, it came to play just that role for the mines of Katanga. 
Once copper mining was launched, Katanga faced the problem of feeding its large population of miners 
and urban workers. In order to satisfy Katanga’s growing foodstuff requirements, buying stations had been 
established at ever-increasing distances from the mines. By 1908 the UMHK was purchasing grain from African 
producers in an area extending over much of Katanga and well into North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia. 
In March 1911, with the purpose of extricating the company from a situation of dependence on African 
producers, Robert Williams & Co. concluded a major agreement with the firm of King and Werner in North-
Western Rhodesia, under which the latter contracted to supply the mines with the bulk of their requirements of 
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both grain and beef.1 These were raised by white immigrants, mainly Afrikaners from South Africa, who had 
begun to settle in Northern Rhodesia in the years that followed the Boer War. They were strung out along the 
along the railway that ran from Livingstone to Broken Hill, which happened to run through a tsetse-free and 
relatively fertile belt. The Katanga market expanded rapidly after the railway reached Elisabethville in 1910, 
and between 1911 and 1915, the white farmers of Northern Rhodesia were supplying most of the foodstuffs – 
cattle and maize – that fed the miners in Katanga. This continued until the early 1920s when Northern 
Rhodesian farmers, aware that they were rapidly losing this market to white farmers in southern Rhodesia, 
diverted their attention to the protected home market that the development of the Copperbelt offered them. 
However, if the maize-growing areas along the railway line in the Southern and Central provinces benefited 
from the expansion of mining, no other major crop was developed in the North beyond the requirements of the 
mines and agriculture was never turned into a large-scale profitable activity.2 
Only in one place did a viable potential alternative to wage labour develop for Africans: the Mweru-
Luapula. Labour was not the only Luapula commodity that was valued. The fish coming out of its large lakes 
was another. Fish, especially dried fish, was a convenience food much in demand on both Northern Rhodesian 
and Katangese Copperbelts, though the former was a much more important consumer than the latter.3 Fresh fish, 
fished by African fishermen and packed in ice by Greek traders, came from Lake Mweru and the Luapula River; 
dried fish came from the lower Kafue, the Lukanga swamps, Lake Tanganyika and Lake Bangweolu. Though 
unstable (it depended on the prosperity of urban markets) the fishing industry brought the lower Luapula valley 
a new relative prosperity in the late 1920s. In 1919, the urban population of southern Katanga – the main market 
for Luapulan fish throughout the colonial era – seems to have consumed no less than 130 tonnes of dried fish 
from Mweru-Luapula. By 1927, the lower Luapula valley alone was reported to be exporting ‘some 500 tons of 
fish worth £5,000 and nearly the same quantity of native flour valued at £600’.4 The Depression and the abrupt 
reduction in the demand for fish was to affect this business rather badly but World War II, increasing as it did 
the demand for copper and consequently for fish, allowed fish exports to southern Katanga to return to the same 
level as the late 1920s. The growing prosperity of the trade accounts in great part for the fact that the flow of 
migrant labourers from the Luapula Province declined in the 1940s. In fact, the relative flow of migrants from 
Luapula declined to half its former level during that period.5 In this way, fishing became an alternative to wage 
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employment for a growing percentage of the residents of the Mweru-Luapula and allowed them to vary the 
ways in which they could make a living.1  
2. A VIBRANT SUB-ECONOMIC CULTURE: THE MARKET 
 
Unsurprisingly markets in Katanga predate those of Northern Rhodesia since the existence of markets, in 
the Copperbelt at least, was intimately linked to the copper industry. When the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt 
became an economic power by its own right, the constant flow of travellers and the high concentration of 
population that this induced were followed by an automatic mushrooming of markets in every important mining 
town. In 1930 this led to the enforcement of proper regulations regarding ‘native markets’. These stipulated that 
‘(1) all markets established in a municipality or township shall be under the control and management of the local 
authority’ and that ‘(2) all markets established by a native authority shall be under the control and management 
of the native authority’.2 With these clauses, Northern Rhodesian authorities sanctioned the creation of markets 
on a more or less spontaneous basis, leaving local authorities to decide the shape these markets would take and 
how they would be organised. Copperbelt markets were copied on the Congo model in which inhabitants from 
the surrounding country could bring in dried fish, mealie, etc., for sale.3 In this way the growth of the Northern 
Rhodesian Copperbelt gave the impetus for the development of a lively market culture. By 1947 there were nine 
organised markets on the Copperbelt,4 each of them becoming a nest of economic activities as well as a social 
place. I.D.S. Mackigan, the District Officer for Chingola, gave a vivid description of the market in Bancroft in 
1954: 
 ‘African life at Bancroft centres round the market, which stands close by the largest of the 
Contractor’s Compounds. Many African Traders from Kasompe African township, Chingola bring 
their wares here; and fish traders from the North and West, peanut vendors, salad oil sellers, men who 
boil up old bones and meat. All these traders operate in the open air or from small thatched booths. On 
a market day the scene is gay, animated and noisy, against a background of bright clothes for sale 
hung out upon lines or spread upon the ground.’5 
The markets were the main, and for some the sole, source of food for the African population in the Copperbelt. 
In 1960 a regional survey of the Copperbelt revealed that there were 120,460 ‘natives’ in employment on the 
Copperbelt, that their total number in the Copperbelt was nearing 300,000 and that approximately the same 
number did their shopping ‘on the Copperbelt itself’.6 In the same regional survey it was added that: 
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 ‘No space need be wasted in expatiating upon the food and food-processing trades which serve this 
market – butcheries, creameries, grain and flour milling, bakeries, sugar refining, beverages soft drinks 
factories and the distributing business connected with them. Perhaps one may comment that these have 
been slower to establish themselves than might have been expected, perhaps because of a feeling that 
their market would not be a stable one. By now however they constitute substantial businesses.’1 
If markets were an important internal business, they were also very much an international one. In his social and 
economic study of the Copperbelt markets of 1947, V.W. Brelsford notes how the Copperbelt not only acted as 
a magnet to labour but also attracted ‘traders of all types, even from as far afield as Senegal, Gambia and 
Nigeria’.2 However, the most represented foreign group on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt was, 
unsurprisingly, the Congolese. On a day a random count was operated in the largest market of the Copperbelt, 
that of Mufulira, it appeared that fourteen out of the twenty-four sellers were Congo natives.3 In the same 
market, the Congo was also the main source of supply including many seasonal commodities such as 
mushrooms, maize, shallots, cassava root and leaves, potatoes of several types, and wild roots. It was calculated 
that the Copperbelt market absorbed in a normal year about 3,000 bags of cassava, practically all of which came 
from the Congo.4 This, Brelsford argues, is partly due to the fact that ‘Mufulira (…) is the nearest market to the 
Congo, so that most of the village produce comes from over the border. The tribe in the nearby area of Katanga 
Province of the Congo is also Lamba and among them are settled a number of Northern Province Rhodesian 
Natives such as Chisinga, Ushi and Bemba.’5 It seems therefore that if Northern Rhodesia originally acted as 
food supplier for the Katangese mines, Katanga later played a similar role for the Northern Rhodesia mines, in a 
local and indirect way. Northern Rhodesians too made use of the Katangese markets. It was noted in 1933 that 
the Solwezi people, who were a bit more isolated from the Copperbelt economic centres than other groups still 
found ‘a ready market for produce of all kinds at Kapushi Mine in the Congo where a large number of natives 
are employed by the Union Minière’.6 In the early 1930s Northern Rhodesian Africans also seem to have 
dominated petty trade, as well as artisan labour outside the mining sector in Katanga. As has been noted in the 
previous section, there was in Elisabethville a large number of Northern Rhodesians who earned their livelihood 
through the urban European economy without being directly independent on large companies for salaries. In 
addition to Northern Rhodesian shop assistants and servants, there were also many who were self-employed, i.e. 
artisans, itinerant merchants, and market gardeners. 7 
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This was considered a serious situation since it could gravely endanger the existing satisfactory trade 
relationship between Northern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo. This would be problematic since, as was 
pointed out by the Governor of Lusaka in 1950, Northern Rhodesia depended on the Belgian Congo: 
‘for essential imports of palm oil (for soap manufacture) and of timber estimated to value some 
£158,000 in 1949, and it was necessary to purchase some £232,000 of Belgian foodstuffs in 1949 
additional to normal requirements, to alleviate local food shortages due to drought. It can be said that 
the ability of this Territory to make these purchases has been, to a large extent, due to the goodwill of 
the Congo authorities.’1  
This comment highlights the extent to which cross-border trade was becoming both voluminous and 
geopolitically significant. It was virtually the only economic activity taking place on Northern Rhodesian soil 
not to be directly part of the copper industry, though it was triggered and sustained by the latter. It gave rise to a 
whole new level (both micro and macro) of cross-border economic and population interaction. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The new set of links that the copper industry created between Katanga and Northern Rhodesia are easy to 
overlook quite simply because they cannot be made to fit a structured timeline of events. Developments on 
either side happened at different pace, sometime separately, sometimes not. The overall picture is – to put it 
candidly – messy. Nevertheless I shall hazard a general sketch.  
Until the 1920s, development on both sides of the border stayed erratic and speculative. Prospects in 
Northern Rhodesia were initially unpromising especially when compared with those of neighbouring Katanga. 
The latter, however, despite being referred to as a ‘geological scandal’ in 1906, was left unattended by the 
Belgians for lack of funds, personnel and capital. Quick to jump on such an opportunity, British interests carried 
out the evaluation and initial development of copper deposits of the region, together with the development of the 
essential transport infrastructure. In return the UMHK provided jobs and freight traffic on the BSA controlled 
railroad linking Katanga with South Africa. In addition, throughout the late 1910s and the early 1920s, at the 
time when Northern Rhodesia’s industrial economy was relatively stagnant, Katanga relied almost exclusively 
on Northern Rhodesian labour and foodstuffs. From the very beginning, therefore Katanga and Northern 
Rhodesia were economically interdependent in terms of capital, investment, labour, trade and expertise. No less.  
It was only in the 1920s that the traditional direction of labour migration – upwards towards Katanga and 
southwards towards Southern Rhodesia and South Africa – was disturbed when Northern Rhodesia copper 
production finally received a fillip. Unfortunately, until the 1940s, the Northern Rhodesia government did not 
concern itself excessively with the numerical details of African migration as long as every mine got its 
necessary labour, and as a result, knowledge about the actual volume of labour migration in this period is 
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patchy. Yet we may venture two generalisations. First the overarching narrative of Copperbelt urbanisation, 
which posits a developmental process of transition from an initial migrant labour phase of short-term, cyclical 
male migration to a final phase of permanent urbanisation, does not seem to be supported by the evidence. 
Instead of simple evolutionary dualisms, we are faced with complex shifts over time in patterns of mobility 
between urban and rural areas and between countries. Second, the shifts in and volume of labour migration gave 
the Copperbelt towns a cosmopolitan flavour. Groups were drawn together that would not have otherwise met. 
After 1924, not only did individuals from all over Central Africa rub shoulders with each other in the Northern 
Rhodesian Copperbelt, but also all the Northern Rhodesian migrant labourers who had worked abroad were 
brought together in their own nation for the first time. This was to be very politically significant. 
What may be said with confidence therefore is that labour migration constituted, for a long period, 
Northern Rhodesia’s single most defining characteristic, hence its prevalence in scholarship. The entire 
apparatus of colonial administration – transport, labour bureaus, scientific surveys, etc. – was geared towards 
the creation of conditions favourable to the profitable operation of the state and the companies. African labour 
migrants however were by no means passive victims of the new cash economy. So far as possible, they chose 
their employer since both wages and working conditions varied considerably. This unwittingly caused African 
labourers, artisans and hangers-on to crisscross the border for many decades, which they did without following 
any set pattern. As Luise White put it: 
‘These movements must be added to the picture of African labor – the jigsaw puzzle again –  (…) in 
which African workers’ gossip passed on the latest information about the safest working conditions, 
the best living conditions, the best wages. Such talk sent African workers across cultural and colonial 
boundaries to work and to make money, where they found themselves in worlds and seams and stopes 
that had different safety records, different standards of living, and different rates of remuneration.’1 
Although the present narrative stopped around the middle of the twentieth century, it seems such interaction 
endured in later years, at least to some extent. In 1955, the Kitwe District Officer described how the Northern 
Rhodesian Copperbelt was ‘an enormous magnet drawing in not only Northern Rhodesian Africans but those 
from the Congo and Portuguese West Africa, in particular’.2 In April 30, 1965, at least 9,900 natives of what 
had by then become the Republic of Zambia were registered in Elisabethville alone. Out of these 9,900, 7,272 
came from the Luapula Province and 1,335 came from Northern Province.3 In 1967 the Zambian Consul 
General in Lubumbashi (as Elisabethville was known from 1966), mentioned a total figure of 250,000 Zambian 
nationals living in the Congo.4 This enduring Northern Rhodesian presence in Katanga was without doubt the 
result of several decades of Northern Rhodesians coming to work in Katanga. For lack of space and sources, the 
question of whether and how the copper industry continued to affect population movements in the later 
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1 L. WHITE, ‘Class Struggle and Cannibalism’, p.276. 
2 P.O. Bourne, Kitwe District Officer, Tour Report N.1, 1955, WP1/2/18, doc. 11 (NAZ). 
3 Zambian Consulate in Elisabethville to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 April 1965, FA/1/24, loc. 495, doc. 39 (NAZ). 
4 E.M. Mwamba (Consul General in Lubumbashi) to The Chief Immigration Officer  and Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 20 April 1967, FA/1/67, loc. 503, doc. 127 (NAZ). 
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twentieth century will have to be the object of another study. This chapter served to point to the fact that, 
although the region of the Copperbelt had already been the scene of many population movements in pre-colonial 
times, the allied effect of an artificial border and the implantation of two powerful, neighbouring and competing 
mining industries changed the nature and patterns of these movements. This new type of migration had, before 
anything else, an economic raison d’être and therefore transcended cultural boundaries. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The Politics 
 
 
The Republic of Zambia was born on October 24 1964 as Africa 35th independent state. Like most of its 
sister nations, Zambia’s transition to independence was rapid, sudden and at times dramatic. For the ten years 
preceding independence Northern Rhodesia was part of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, a Federation 
created and governed by European men. During that time, it functioned as an extension (and a subordinate) of 
British power in southern Africa: its communications all ran south while both policies and social attitudes 
continued to be much influenced by the white-dominated South. Consequently, there was little doubt in the early 
1950s that Northern Rhodesia was destined to be a ‘white’ country. Yet, as the decade advanced, the all-
pervasiveness of white rule in Africa was increasingly being challenged from all sides. Starting in 1957 with the 
independence of Ghana, the unstoppable nature of decolonisation was made palpable by Harold Macmillan’s 
famous ‘Wind of Change’ speech of February 3 1960. This historic address made to the Parliament of South 
Africa must have indeed sent a chill down the spines of many an African white settler: 
‘In the twentieth century, and especially since the end of the war, the processes which gave birth to the 
nation states of Europe have been repeated all over the world. We have seen the awakening of national 
consciousness in peoples who have for centuries lived in dependence upon some other power. (…) In 
different places it takes different forms, but it is happening everywhere. The wind of change is 
blowing through this continent, and whether we like it or not, this growth of national 
consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact, and our national policies must 
take account of it.’
1
 
The speech signalled unmistakably the British Government’s intention to grant independence to many of its 
territories, which indeed happened subsequently, with most British possessions in Africa becoming independent 
nations in the early 1960s. Northern Rhodesia, for all the settlers’ efforts, was not spared by the wind of change. 
As late as 1958 only 11 Africans were registered as voters in Northern Rhodesia but within five years that 
number exceeded a million. Northern Rhodesia went to the polls three times between 1958 and 1964. These 
were the years during which Northern Rhodesian nationalism was most militant.2 The history of the period of 
‘freedom struggle’ has often been portrayed as a time of spontaneous unity of all Zambians against colonialism. 
A traditional account of the growth of Zambian nationalism reads very much like D.C. Mulford’s:  
‘Half a century of white rule and all which that implied – contact with Christian education, the 
undermining of traditional authority and values, new opportunities for travel and exchange of ideas, 
racial discrimination, and exposure to the harsh realities of government administration and the 
workings of a cash economy – had given Northern Rhodesia’s Africans a measure of unity hitherto 
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1 H. MACMILLAN, Pointing the Way, pp. 473-482, Appendix I.  
2 D.C. MULFORD, Zambia, The Politics of Independence, p.1. 
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unknown. Reinforced by the colour bar, by dissatisfaction among Africans with their new position and 
above all by the threat of permanent white domination, this unity took root, producing among those 
diverse groups the beginnings of a common identity.’1  
This unity, as Ian Henderson candidly put it, ‘independent Zambia might well envy, if it had existed’.2 The 
genuine enthusiasm generated by national independence led to the production of a history that championed the 
nationalist movement as a ‘convergence into a united front of a number of heterogeneous organisations and 
areas of discontent spearheaded by the political party’.3 The party under which Zambia achieved independence – 
Kenneth Kaunda’s United National Independence Party (UNIP) – and which was to be Zambia’s sole ruling 
party until 1991, promoted a militant type of history that staged a ‘United Nation’ in the face of adversity and 
left little room for other interpretations or the acknowledgement of the existence of dissident voices. Giacomo 
Macola, the biographer of one such dissident voice – Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, head of the opposition party – 
noted that: 
‘Feeding upon one another, the discourses of academics and party thinkers reached the same 
conclusion: UNIP did not merely serve the interests of the young nation; it was its embodiment. The 
existence of dissenting voices within the nationalist landscape (…) was conveniently forgotten or 
treated as a minor “tribal” irritant destined to be swept away along the path toward full-blown 
nationhood.’4   
In reality, throughout most of the colonial period the political destiny of Northern Rhodesia was far from clear. 
Even its very geographical position was politically ambiguous: it was situated between the territories of 
Southern Africa, dominated by Europeans, and those to the north, such as the Belgian Congo and East Africa, 
where the colonial governments largely denied white settlers political power and did envisage, however dimly, 
an eventual transfer of power to Africans. Northern Rhodesia’s traditional association with Southern Rhodesia 
often overshadows the influence of these territories. Interestingly the dates the Belgian Congo and Tanganyika 
obtained their independence – in 1960 and 1961 respectively – coincided with a period of more aggressive 
nationalism in Northern Rhodesia. In fact there are many such ‘coincidences’ in the timelines of Congo and 
Zambia in the 1960s. 1960 was the year the Congo achieved independence as well as the year the copper-rich 
province of Katanga embarked on an ephemeral, though momentous, secession.5 It was also the year when the 
first ‘violent’ nationalist outbursts took place in Northern Rhodesia. 1963 was the year the Katanga secession 
ended. It was also the year the Federation effectively collapsed. In 1967, Mobutu, President of Independent 
Congo from 1965 to 1997, launched his notorious ‘zairianisation’ campaign, which, as an effort to rid the 
country of the lingering vestiges of colonialism, entailed the creation of a strong centralised state and the 
nationalisation of the economy. By 1974, the Congo, now re-baptised ‘Zaïre’ was a nationalised single-party 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 D.C. MULFORD, Zambia, The Politics of Independence, pp.3-4. 
2 I. HENDERSON, Labour and Politics in Northern Rhodesia, p.247. 
3 Ibid, p.233. 
4 G. MACOLA, Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa, p.23. 
5 R. LEMARCHAND, ‘The Limits of Self-Determination: The Case of the Katanga Secession’, pp.404-416. 
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state. In April 1968, Kenneth Kaunda launched the Mulungushi Reforms by which he declared his intention to 
acquire an equity holding (usually 51 % or more) in a number of key foreign-owned firms. By 1973 the 
Republic of Zambia was a single-party nationalised state. Coincidence? I wager that it is not entirely. In this 
chapter it will be shown that the ‘Katangese factor’ is perceptible in Zambian nationalist development from its 
very beginning. By covering the entire period between the first spark of nationalist development in 1935 – when 
African miners rioted on the Copperbelt for the first time – to the establishment of the UNIP-dominated 
nationalised state in 1973, this chapter will explore Katanga’s contribution to the development of Zambia as an 
independent political entity. 
 
 
1. The Rise of Nationalism 
 
1. THE STRIKES OF 1935 AND 1940 
 
First African Disturbances 
On May 29, 1935 six African mineworkers were killed, and a further 17 were wounded, when the local 
police opened fire on a crowd of strikers at Roan Antelope mine (Luanshya). The strike, whose immediate 
trigger had been the implementation of a new supposedly more ‘equitable’ taxation regime which entailed that 
tax levels on the Copperbelt should be considerably raised,1 was the first African-led disturbance of any kind to 
take place in Northern Rhodesia. Not only did the strike, which started in Mufulira, spread to every other mine 
of the Copperbelt like wildfire, but in addition, its instigators were able to find some ad hoc leadership by 
making use of the ready-made structure of the Mbeni Dance Society: a Bemba-based group with an active 
network in all three producing mines. Although the strike, which had started on May 21, 1935 had been put 
down by force by the end of the month, with no tangible result in terms of either tax reduction or rise in wages,2 
the scale and shock of the disturbances prompted the colonial state to appoint a Commission of Inquiry. The 
Commission set out to list the workers’ numerous complaints. These included insufficient wages and rations, the 
deductions from wages for mining material such as boots and lamps, high levels of unemployment and the 
condescending manner in which they were generally treated.3 The report also concluded that ‘an important 
predisposing cause of the recent disturbances’ was the propaganda by the Watch Tower movement described as 
‘dangerously subversive’,4 and further noted the manner in which traditional tribal custom and authority 
appeared to have collapsed because of industrialisation: 
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1 Whereas previously Africans had been taxed according to their area of origin, under the new system, tax levels would be based on one’s 
current place of residence. In addition, in order to encourage part of the swelling urban population to return to the countryside as well as 
to relieve the distress in the rural areas caused by the Depression, it was decided to reduce the tax rates there and to increase the rate in 
the Copperbelt towns from 12/6 to 15/-. This meant that taxation levels for Copperbelt workers were increased by an average of 50 %. 
See L.J. BUTLER, Copper Empire, p.52; A. ROBERTS, A History of Zambia, p.202; C. PERRINGS, ‘Consciousness, Conflict and 
Proletarianization’, p.32. 
2 I. HENDERSON, Labour and Politics in Northern Rhodesia, pp.146-147; M. LARMER, Mineworkers in Zambia, p.31. 
3 Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the disturbances in the Copperbelt, October 1935, para.10, p.4. 
4 Ibid, para.114, p.51. 
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‘Here [in the Copperbelt] there are considerable numbers of natives concentrated in the compounds; 
without chiefs; with their tribal organisations being broken down by disintegrating influences; 
becoming accustomed to machinery and modern methods; feeling an increasing desire for luxuries.’1 
This latter point triggered particular alarm in the colonial government.2 Not only did the strikes decisively 
expose the colonial neglect of the African labour question, they were also the first sign that African society had 
changed and that the government still went by outdated views of both African lifestyle and aspirations. As a 
result the colonial government was completely taken aback not only by the strikes themselves but by the level of 
organisation and unity displayed by the strikers, and was ill-equipped to deal with the novelty of the situation.3  
Colonial anxieties regarding the emergence of such ‘detribalised’ urban Africans prompted the government to 
open up channels of communication with this unknown African community through the Native Industrial 
Labour Advisory Board (NILAB) and the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, both set up in 1935 in the wake of the 
strike. This trickle of information was not enough, however, to enable the government to head off a second 
strike, which started on March 28 1940. The 1940 strike, was like the 1935 strike, a mass protest against the rise 
in the African cost of living in the first year of the war, but this time demands for higher wages were framed in a 
larger protest against Africans’ low position in industrial hierarchy.4 The strike lasted for a week and like its 
predecessor, came to a bloody end, when on April 3, 1940 16 African mineworkers were killed at Nkana mine.5 
The demands made by African miners in 1940 – which once again were not met6 – were strikingly similar to 
those of 1935: higher wages, better housing and better welfare facilities in order to enjoy similar standards of 
living as those of European employees’.7 The 1940 Commission of Inquiry duly acknowledged the way in 
which the strike formed a protest against inequality in terms of pay and possibility of advancement: 
‘The African strike and our subsequent inquiry brought to the surface a number of grievances in 
addition to that which had relation to their rates of pay (...) The African workers contended that they 
were doing a class of work which justified them in expecting higher wages, and indeed claimed that 
they were qualified to do the work normally done by the Europeans.’8 
In that sense, this strike was a political challenge as it was an implicit protest against the de facto colour bar that 
was in effect in all the mines.9 In fact 1940 was the start of a continuous struggle for African advancement 
which would last for a quarter of century. 
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1 Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the disturbances in the Copperbelt, October 1935, para.144, p.61. 
2 M.J. MURPHY, ‘The 1935 Copperbelt Disturbances Commission: A Critical Assessment’, p.36. 
3 L.J. BUTLER, Copper Empire, p.51. 
4 The initial spark was provided by another strike, which had taken place from 18 to 27 March and had been organised by the white 
mineworkers at Mufulira and Nkana. The success of this strike – white demands for higher wages were largely conceded – at once 
stimulated Africans at these mines to stage a strike of their own. See I. HENDERSON, Labour and Politics in Northern Rhodesia, p.156; 
A. ROBERTS, A History of Zambia, p.203. 
5 I. HENDERSON, Labour and Politics in Northern Rhodesia, p.137; L.J. BUTLER, Copper Empire, p.52. 
6 I. HENDERSON, ‘Early African Leadership’, p.91-p.94; M. LARMER, Mineworkers in Zambia, p.30. 
7 Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into the disturbances in the Copperbelt, July 1940, p.12. 
8 Ibid, paras.109-114-121-122, pp.25-30. 
9 In the 1930s, global depression led to reductions in the wages of both whites and Africans. As demand for copper revived, particularly 
in the years before World War II, white miners were able to secure a de facto colour bar separating ‘White’ and ‘African’ jobs. By 1940 
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The Bemba Factor 
If the findings of the Commissions are to be believed, the 1935 strike had all the bearings of a tax revolt 
while the 1940 strike was a general protest about the industrial colour bar. Yet, in reality, little is known about 
the process about which they came about and the commissions did little to shed light on the issue. Instead, 
according to Perrings, ‘under a flood of accusations and counter accusations by industry and state’, they 
‘succeeded in thoroughly obscuring the fundamental causes of the actions’.1 Prominent among the elements 
overlooked by the commissions is ‘the dominant part played by the Bemba’.2 The ‘Bemba’ – an all-
encompassing term used by the employers to denote the peoples from the Northern and Luapula Provinces – 
were not only the largest single grouping among the labourers of the Copperbelt (the next biggest group being 
the ‘Ngoni’ from Eastern Province, Nyasaland and Mozambique),3 they were also, in the opinion of the 
authorities, the most troublesome and coherent group in the Copperbelt labour force.4 It was the Bemba 
language, in the form of ‘Town Bemba’ that was the lingua franca of the Copperbelt5 and it was a Bemba dance 
association, the Mbeni, that was the principal organ in the transmission of news, rumours and instructions. The 
1935 Commission did touch upon the fact that ‘the Wemba-speaking tribes took lead in the disturbances’ while 
the Mbeni organisation, a Bemba/Bisa-dominated entity, ‘was made use of to some extent for the purpose of 
furthering [the disturbances]’.6 Yet why this should have been so was not explored, although it was sufficiently 
alarming to the Government for them to bring in a number of traditional Bemba leaders from the rural areas to 
inquire into the grievances of the Bemba on the compounds.7 The Bemba had been experiencing important 
changes in their economic situation just prior to 1935. Perrings notes that it is ‘a point of immense significance 
that the 1926 Line of Rail Reserves Commission had deliberately taken the decision to isolate African producers 
from the main markets in the territory’.8 Although the commission’s recommendations on the establishment of 
reserves were not immediately implemented, by 1930 the viability of African commercial agriculture had been 
very seriously compromised. In 1930, despite an increase in overall demand, the prices paid for ‘native grown 
grain’ were falling and a growing proportion of the requirements of the large companies was being supplied by 
the large-scale white farmers. To make matters worse still, between 1934 and 1936, the Belgian Congo border 
was closed to all African produce in support of a campaign against foot and mouth disease.9 Although Africans 
could cross the pedicle, they could do so as workers only. An annual report for the Native Affairs Department 
mentioned that: 
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the industrial colour bar was all but institutionalised. See I. HENDERSON, Labour and Politics in Northern Rhodesia, p.156; A. 
ROBERTS, A History of Zambia, p.203. 
1 C. PERRINGS, ‘Consciousness, Conflict and Proletarianization’, p.34. 
2 Ibid, p.35. 
3 A.L. EPSTEIN, Politics in an Urban African Community, pp.5-6. 
4 I. HENDERSON, ‘Early African Leadership’, p.89. 
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‘restrictions imposed by the Government of the Belgian Congo on the transit of produce of every 
description across the Pedicle have for the time being practically killed the former flourishing fish 
trade conducted by natives of the Northern Province with the copper mines and the Congo. At Fort 
Rosebery, where it used to be a common thing to see large numbers of natives on bicycles laden with 
fish making for the copper mines, not a single permit was issued during the year.’1 
Under these circumstances the pressure on individuals to enter the labour market was intense and their 
dependence on wage labour all but absolute. The room for manoeuvre for Bemba and related peoples in 1935 
was less than it had been at any stage since the First World War. As Perrings argues, ‘it would thus seem 
reasonable to suggest that what occurred in 1935 was indicative of the cumulative resentment of those who had 
experienced not one, but a series of major blows to their capacity for economic survival within a comparatively 
short space of time’.2 This, according to Perrings, was ‘a development of absolutely crucial importance’,3 one 
that never occurred to the Commission. 
In 1940 disturbances were also understood to be emanating mainly from the Bemba-speakers. T.F. 
Sandford, Secretary for Native Affairs, reported that: ‘I and the officials concerned felt that the main impetus 
came from Mufulira and that the main support came from the hot-headed natives of the Bangweolu and Luapula 
areas.’4 The 1940 Commission found that the ‘natives of the Fort Rosebery and Kawambwa districts’ were 
indeed ‘prominent in disturbances throughout the strikes’.5 Max Gluckman (head of the RLI from 1941 to 1947) 
argued that what was significant about the Bemba was no so much their ‘tribal’ overrepresentation but rather the 
fact that while the Bemba filled many minor authoritative posts on the mines, the elite jobs requiring education 
had been taken by Nyasa and Lozi.6 In this reading, the de facto Bemba leadership was less the direct result of 
their numerical preponderance than the result of the calculation on the part of men in top and middle range 
positions on the mines that the allegiance of the mass and unskilled would be more easily obtained by 
identifying their cause as that of the Bemba.7 But there is another reason for Bemba leadership. Many Bemba 
had worked in the Katangese mines in large numbers from 1910 onwards,8 and, according to Sandford, ‘knew of 
the different [read: more liberal] attitude in that territory towards the colour bar restrictions’.9 The Bemba could 
therefore offer experience and leadership to those people who either, like the Lunda and Luvale, had not worked 
in mines before, or like the Ngoni, had worked in the Southern Rhodesia mines, where labour policies were 
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2 C. PERRINGS, ‘Consciousness, Conflict and Proletarianization’, p.49. 
3 Ibid, p.40. 
4 T.F. Sandford’s report, SEC/LAB/137 as quoted in I. HENDERSON, ‘Early African Leadership’, p.94. 
5 Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into the disturbances in the Copperbelt, July 1940, para. 61, p.16. 
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8 See Chapter 3. 
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severely restrictive.1 ‘In other words’, as Henderson put it, ‘the Bemba speakers were likely to be more 
politically conscious than the other groups, because of their history as migrant workers. This political 
consciousness was to be the basis of the Bemba’s claim to leadership on the Copperbelt, and later in Zambia. It 
cannot entirely be explained by their occupation as miners, or by the fact that they constituted a simple majority 
on the vital Copperbelt.’2 
The Significance of the Strikes 
At first glance, the strikes of 1935 and 1940 are not that remarkable in terms of scale and outcome. The 
death toll was not high, compared with other similar occurrences, and in both cases Africans largely failed to 
obtain what they had protested for. In addition there were to be many more strikes on the Copperbelt in the 
following three decades. Still, these two stand out in Zambian history as landmarks in the development of 
African political consciousness, constituting, as they do, the first surfacing of African organised industrial 
agitation as well as the first overt action of any kind against colonial rule in the territory. As such, in the words 
of Henderson, they are ‘firmly embedded in Zambian political consciousness and form the conventional starting 
point for the popular history of the nationalist movement.’3 Their romanticisation put aside, the strikes were 
undeniable political. Or at least they had political effects. First of all, the strikes, which predated political 
nationalism by ten years, highlighted the Copperbelt as the future scene of nationalist struggle. Whoever led the 
later political movement was unlikely to achieve success without the support of the Copperbelt miners. Another 
future aspect of Northern Rhodesian politics that was hinted at in 1935 and 1940 was the political militancy of 
the Bemba. The strikes did not result in the creation of a common front among the workers but they made it 
obvious that where firm and decisive (and sometimes violent) action was required, Bemba speakers took the 
lead. In spite of this the strikes did not lead to the emergence of a permanent institutionalised African leadership 
on the mines. Nor did they lead to the immediate politicisation of its workforce. Yet the very fact that the 
underlying grievances – the colour bar and differences in wages – were not made obsolete for a long time yet, 
ensured that discontent would always be brewing not far below the surface. Up to 1953, despite some wage rises 
for Africans, practically no progress was made in breaking the colour bar down.4 So long as the Africans were 
unable to exert political pressure on the Government, this situation was unlikely to alter and as a result African 
advancement question found itself at the heart of the nationalist ‘struggle for independence and freedom’. In that 
sense, the disturbances that rocked the Copperbelt in 1935 and 1940 were among the most significant episodes 
of violent unrest to affect the inter-war colonial empire. 
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2. TRADE UNIONS AND POLITICAL PARTIES 
The Run-Up to Federation 
The rise of African trade unions and political agitation, which has attracted a fair body of literature, is a 
process that is generally described as conjoined. Yet, if the fact that the crisis of control over the urban labour 
force was closely paralleled by the development of African political parties is undeniable, the popular vision of 
the trade union as vanguard of revolution quite simply does not square with the facts in the case of Northern 
Rhodesia. If the mine companies did initially, in 1941-2, prefer to appoint committees of Tribal Representatives 
(TR’s) as an alternative to unions,1 neither they nor the colonial government opposed their formation. Quite the 
contrary in fact: they encouraged it. Henderson argued that, following the strikes, ‘far from being mistrusted as 
subversive institutions, trade unions for colonial peoples were now regarded as something to be encouraged, 
which could help to develop an interest in local self-government and development. Not only paternal guidance 
from governments was to be available, but also fraternal encouragement from the labour movement in the 
United Kingdom.’2 Early in 1947, William Comrie, a Scottish unionist, was sent out to Northern Rhodesia by 
the British Trade Union Congress to help establish African Unions along ‘British’ lines, i.e. non-political bodies 
which would negotiate over wages and conditions. Within a year of Comrie’s arrival, shop assistants formed the 
first African trade union in Northern Rhodesia, and by 1948 there were African unions in all four mines. In 
1949, the same year that the legal basis of trade unions was firmly placed on a colour-blind footing,3 these early 
trade unions were amalgamated in the Northern Rhodesia African Mineworkers’ Union (AMWU), which was 
followed by the creation of the Trade Union Congress (TUC) in 1951. Both were headed by Lawrence 
Katilungu, a senior interpreter at Nkana and a favourite with the Bemba.4 AMWU membership rose from 50% 
(19,000 members) of the 37,000-strong labour force in 1949 to 80% in 1953 and, between 1949 and 1953, 30 
disputes and 12 strikes occurred, culminating in a well-conducted and peaceful three-weeks strike in October-
November 1952 which succeeded in bringing massive wage increases.5  
The growing strength and efficiency of African labour on the Copperbelt and the fear that African 
economic and social advance generated, stimulated Europeans to make new efforts to obtain more political 
power in the 1930s and 1940s. As the European presence, in terms of human resources, was negligible in 
Northern Rhodesia, it was felt that the preservation of white hegemony could be more easily achieved if 
Northern Rhodesia joined forces with its Southern sister state and broke away from Great Britain. With 
amalgamation the white settlers would kill two birds with one stone: it would allow them to redirect both 
political power and copper revenues into their hands. A fierce campaign was then waged in favour of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 M. LARMER, Mineworkers in Zambia, p.32. 
2 I. HENDERSON, Labour and Politics in Northern Rhodesia, p.207. 
3 A. D. ROBERTS, ‘Northern Rhodesia: The Post-War Background, 1945-1953’ in J.B. GEWALD, M. HINFELAAR & G. MACOLA, 
Living the End of Empire, p.16. 
4 Lawrence Katilungu enjoyed great influence among the Bemba. He was one of the few Bemba clerks on the mines and he was the 
grandson of the Bemba minor chief Chipalo. A.L. EPSTEIN, Politics in an Urban African Community, p.92. 
5 Other African unions were soon formed on the roads and railways and in the building trade but none reached the power, scope and level 
of efficiency that the AMWU was able to achieve. M. LARMER, Mineworkers in Zambia, p.33; A. ROBERTS, A History of Zambia, 
p.205; I. HENDERSON, Labour and Politics in Northern Rhodesia, pp.207-229. 
! 108!
amalgamation, led by Roy Welensky (later Sir Roy Welensky), an ex-professional boxer who had been elected 
to the Legislative Council in 1938. The Europeans’ drive towards political supremacy had largely been 
prompted by fears of African advance; but their campaign for amalgamation or federation had the unwitting 
effect to give the first stimulus to an African political awakening throughout the territory.1 In 1948, at its annual 
meeting at Munali school, Lusaka, the Federation of African Societies, which had been created in 1946 for the 
purpose of bringing together various groups such as shop assistant groups, work associations etc, was 
transformed into an expressly political body: the Northern Rhodesia Congress.2 In August 1951 Congress was 
renamed the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress on the same day as Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, a 
London-educated teacher from Southern Province, was elected to take over its presidency.3 Nkumbula had built 
himself a reputation as a fearless advocate of African rights and, from the early 1940s, had been lobbying 
fiercely against the prospect of amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia. In 1942 he had written an “explosive” 
letter to the editor of the newspaper Mutende4 to express, in no uncertain terms, his opposition to white 
domination: 
‘We in Northern Rhodesia loathe the idea of amalgamating Northern Rhodesia with Southern 
Rhodesia which is dominated by Europeans. (…) The policy of the Prime Minister of Southern 
Rhodesia is to make Southern Rhodesia a WHITE MAN’S COUNTRY.’5 
With Nkumbula’s accession to the presidency the Congress increasingly took the bearings of a mass movement. 
Nkumbula and his fellow congressmen, drawing on the idea of interethnic unity and solidarity, worked hard to 
unite the whole territory in a sense of common purpose: opposition to the Federation.6 The replacement of the 
party’s Secretary-General, the southerner Nabulyato, with the northerner Kenneth Kaunda, along with the 
election of three new politicians from Bemba-speaking regions to the executive of the ANC in August 1953, 
were in all probability undertaken to support the image of ‘national party’ that the ANC was striving to create.7  
The ANC, however, failed to establish an effective working relationship with the African trade-union 
movement. This ultimately was probably its fatal flaw. Though Katilungu was himself against Federation and 
eventually joined Congress, African trade unions were by no means secure in their independence from the state 
on whose assistance they had come to depend more and more. So if no official barrier prevented trade unionists 
from maintaining personal political affiliations, there were strong reasons for them not to introduce politics into 
trade-union affairs.8 In addition, as Henderson argues, ‘there was a genuine miners’ consciousness which did not 
necessarily rule out a wider political consciousness, but which was keenly aware that the miners owed nothing 
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to the political elite.’1 In other words, the Copperbelt’s politics were not necessarily to be in harmony with so-
called ‘national’ politics if it was felt there was no advantage to be drawn from it. The conflict came to a head 
when Nkumbula as a climax to Congress’s campaign against federation, organised two days of national prayer 
which were to be supported by industrial action. However the AMWU refused to use the strike weapon in 
support of political objectives.2 Protests fell through and in March 1953, the House of Commons approved the 
proposals for Federation. For the next ten years, Northern Rhodesia was consequently part of a Federation that 
tied it to Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia. Its capital was Salisbury, its president from 1956, Roy Welensky 
and its economic and political dominant minority group was the white settlers.3  
Developments during the Years of Federation 
1953 certainly marked the end of a period in the growth of African nationalism. Discredited to some 
extent by its failure to prevent Federation, the ANC quickly lost much of the popular enthusiasm it had been 
able to kindle. Lacking a sound political agenda, the ANC was in need of a new raison d’être, i.e. new 
objectives and strategies, and these were slow to emerge.4 As a result the movement entered what Mulford 
refers to as ‘a period of disintegration and decline characterised by inconsistent policies, petty bickering 
amongst officials, poor relations with the African trade-union movement, and apathy among the African 
public’.5 By 1958, however, Congress had revived. This resurgence was partly a response to economic stress – 
copper prices fell sharply in 1956 and stayed low for two years after that – and partly a result of the ANC’s 
growing popularity within the ranks of the AMWU’s executives, which led to more active militancy on the 
Copperbelt.6 In January 1955, ANC-friendly leaders within the AMWU pressured Katilungu to call a strike with 
political and economic aims: the pay rate demanded (10s 8d) would have qualified many African mineworkers 
for the income-related electoral franchise for the first time. The strike lasted nearly two months and was 
followed by twelve months of heightened tensions over wages, advancement and union representation, 
culminating in the ‘rolling strikes’ of June 1956: a series of strikes whose magnitude was such that it led to the 
declaration of a State of Emergency in the colony’s industrial heartland in September and the arrest of numerous 
local AMWU and Congress officials.7 Despite the fact that direct AMWU participation in nationalistic politics 
dwindled after these events,8 this was enough renew the ANC’s visibility, and therefore spark renewed interest 
in its activities. In turn, this growing labour unrest on the Copperbelt caused a profound ideological crisis within 
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the ANC. Throughout the 1950s, some elements within ANC had been growing increasingly committed to the 
idea of creating an independent African state, an aim which, in their opinion, could only be reached by refusing 
to compromise in any way with the Federal Political system. This newly popular ‘policy of activism’ was most 
vocally endorsed by Kenneth Kaunda. Nkumbula, on the other hand, was less clearly committed to this 
approach. In the summer of 1955, he had launched what came to be known as the ‘New Look Policy’, which 
promoted negotiation with the colonial authorities so as to obtain their ‘official recognition and respect’. The 
first tangible expressions of the ‘New Look Policy’ were the decision to call off an ongoing boycott in Lusaka 
late in April 1956 and the choice to take part in semiofficial talks with MLC John Roberts, Welensky’s right-
hand man in Northern Rhodesia and the leader of European settlers in the country. This eventually resulted in a 
disgruntled Kaunda, accompanied by his friend Simon Kapwepwe, Secretary of the Kitwe branch of ANC, and 
a few others, forming a new party: the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC).1 For many observers of the 
time, the split had a strong ‘ethnic’ flavour. Looking at where, or rather between whom, the ZANC/ANC 
division line was drawn, it is indeed tempting to interpret the split as a showdown between the party’s southern 
‘Bantu Botatwe’ elements (Nkumbula) and its northern ‘Bemba’ elements (Kaunda and Kapwepwe both of 
whom were born in Chinsali, Northern Province). The chain of events that led up to the split certainly give a 
measure of credence to this interpretation of events. Nkumbula seems to have interpreted the continuing 
opposition from the ‘Kaunda group’ as an indicator that he was being challenged by an ethnic and urban core 
that was fast gaining ground. When Nkumbula undertook the reshuffling of his party in the summer of 1958, 
more than one Bemba-speaking member were crossed out the party’s list.2 With the Copperbelt and its ethnic 
hinterland, the Northern Province, seeing its ‘favourites’ being shunned by Nkumbula, it was not long before 
Nkumbula was likened to a ‘second-hand suit which the nation does not intend to resew or patch’ by the 
Kasama-based provincial secretary of the Congress, J.C.M. Ng’andu.3 Yet this should not obscure the nuances 
of the split’s circumstances. Macola noted that: 
 ‘Of course, it would be disingenuous simply to portray (as much of the European press did at the 
time) the split within the ANC as the result of a Bemba tribal onslaught. For what Northern Rhodesia 
witnessed in 1957–58 was rather the clash between two ill-defined and ill-definable interest blocs 
structured around both ethno-linguistic criteria (Bemba-speakers vs. Bantu Botatwe) and different 
regional modes of incorporation in the colonial economy (roughly: waged work-force in the 
Copperbelt and its vast Northern hinterland vs. rural-based agricultural producers in the Southern and 
Central Provinces). In this latter respect at least, the militant—if, given the prominence of nationalist 
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discourses and claims, always subterranean—ethnic ideologies that underlay the ZANC/UNIP split 
were closely interwoven with contemporary politico-economic circumstances.’1 
The last two years of the 1950s witnessed increased confusion and frenzy in the Northern Rhodesian political 
scene. By this time the British Government realised that there would have to be rapid constitutional evolution in 
Northern Rhodesia, and it also seemed increasingly doubtful whether the Federation could realistically be held 
together. This led to concessions in the form of a new constitution and elections, both implemented to increase 
African representation in the Legislative Council. In an attempt to eradicate the most subversive elements of its 
opponents, the colonial government banned ZANC in March 1959, less than five months after its inception and 
imprisoned its leader, Kaunda. Consequently a new party, integrating former ZANC member and a few other 
ANC split-away groups, was formed in the later part of 1959: the United National Independence Party (UNIP). 
In January 1960, Kaunda was released from gaol, was greeted as a hero and was made the leader of the newly 
formed UNIP.2 UNIP strived to assert its image as a national party and to tighten its grip over a large part of the 
population, especially the miners and their unions. Mineworkers joined UNIP in their thousands as did many 
younger AMWU members.3 This was another crippling blow to the ANC, which had already suffered the loss of 
the bulk of its Bemba-speaking leadership. This is the backdrop against which events unfolding in the newly 
independent Congo started to play an increasing and more direct role in the Zambian political struggle. 
 
 
2. The Katanga Secession (1960-1963) 
 
‘The Katanga story is not a pleasant one to tell. It is a tale of savagery, 
deceit, false morality, power politics, smugness and plain incompetence.’ 
-  Smith Hempstone, Katanga Report, opening statement. 
On July 5, a mere five days after King Baudouin of Belgium presided over the independence ceremony 
that transformed the Belgian Congo into the Republic of the Congo, the Congolese army – the Force Publique – 
mutinied against their white officers. Despite Prime Minister Patrice Emery Lumumba’s efforts, the mutiny 
soon spread to the entire country. Before long, a substantial portion of the 100,000 Belgian citizens living in the 
Congo, terror-stricken by reported incidents involving the looting of European properties, the beating of 
European officers and civilians, and the rape of European women,4 had fled the country. This exodus robbed the 
Congo of the experienced people who had planned to remain as advisers or technical experts and sent the 
country into a spiral of unrest and political chaos that would last until 1966.5 In this context of generalised 
unrest and anarchy, Moïse Tshombe, provincial president of Katanga, declared his province independent on July 
11, 1960. Although its independence was never officially recognised internationally, the secessionist state of 
Katanga existed and functioned autonomously for exactly 30 months and three days, and received, at least in the 
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beginning, significant military and technical assistance from powerful Belgian financial and government 
circles.1 Lumumba immediately accused the Belgian government of having ‘minutieusement préparé [la] 
sécession du Katanga dans le but de garder la mainmise sur notre pays’,2 and called on the United Nations to 
intervene. By the early hours of Thursday July 14, exactly two weeks after independence day, the United 
Nations Security Council had launched the United Nations on what the Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, 
soon described as ‘the biggest single effort under United Nations colours organised and directed by the United 
Nations itself’.3 Still, frustrated by the way the situation stagnated, Lumumba turned to the Soviet Union for 
assistance, attracting the attention of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the process. Though the Soviet 
Union only sent a few planes and some material to the Congo,4 the ‘communist threat’ was considered real 
enough for President J.F. Kennedy to back the UN fully and on January 14, 1963, the United Nations troops, 
with substantial assistance from the United States, called the secession to an abrupt halt.5 The repercussions of 
this period of extended turmoil, known as the Congo Crisis, cannot be overstated. It brought about the downfall 
of Congo’s first elected government, caused the death of some 100,000 people, led to the assassination of Prime 
Minister Patrice Lumumba as well as the death of United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, and 
culminated in Mobutu seizing power on November 25, 1965. It is hardly surprising therefore that it should have 
attracted a fair amount of literature, most of which is French-speaking and contemporary to the events that it 
describes.6 And yet, as Matthew Hughes noted in an article entitled ‘Fighting for White Rule in Africa’, in all 
this voluminous literature, very little is said about the Federation.7 Most of the relevant works, such as J.R.T. 
Wood’s edition of Roy Welensky’s papers, focus primarily on events within the Federation, while Alan James’ 
Britain and the Congo Crisis, though it touches indirectly upon the subject, focuses primarily on Britain. The 
exception is the interest shown in the death of Hammarskjöld. His out-of-the-ordinary death in September 1961 
in an aeroplane crash near Ndola while en route to cease-fire negotiations, did a great deal to arouse suspicions 
about the possible implication of Roy Welensky and his henchmen in the event.8 Some years later, Welensky 
would describe how ‘the wildest accusations were flung at the Federation and at me personally. In Léopoldville 
there was an immediate demand for war against Rhodesia as a punishment for the “murder” of the Secretary-
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Federation. We had a long common frontier, and the economy of the nearest neighbouring province, 
Katanga, was to be to a considerable extent complementary to our own: it too produced copper; it 
bought our coal and coke, and an increasing quantity of Southern Rhodesia’s consumer goods; and it 
used our railways for export.’1 
Despite the fact that British hegemony over the Union Minière had been significantly diminished in the 
aftermath of World War I, the Tanganyika Concessions Ltd still owned a 40 % ownership in the Union Minière, 
and the two companies shared reports, correspondence, directors, dividends and shares, letterheads and auditors. 
British directors still sat on the board.2 Moreover, important British firms such as Unilever, the British-
American Tobacco Company, and Shell Oil had large holdings in Katanga.3 On July 25 1960, while trying to 
convince the British Government to give Tshombe ‘sub rosa encouragement’, Captain Charles Waterhouse, a 
former Conservative member of the British parliament who was both the chairman of the Tanganyika 
Concessions Ltd and a director of the Union Minière, said the extent of the British interest in Katanga was of the 
order of £180 million.4 The links between the British and Belgian governments, the TCL, the Union Minière and 
the Federation led to the formation of a ‘Katanga lobby’ within British governing circles. The ‘Katanga lobby’ 
was, according to Alan James, an ‘important and sometimes influential’ shadowy group of businessmen and 
politicians keen to keep control of the wealth they derived from white rule in Africa. With the growing 
uncertainty about the future of the Federation, these wealthy men began to consider how they could best protect 
their interests in that part of the world. Secessionist Katanga, with its white-friendly tendencies, increasingly 
looked like the best option to achieve this aim.5 
The advantages of a closer association with Katanga were not lost on the settlers of the Federation either. 
Katanga was after all also inhabited by a large number of settlers and had a provincial government that openly 
professed ‘white-friendliness’.6 Like their colleagues in the Federation, the Katangese settlers desired autonomy. 
This was to a large part prompted by the feeling of hostility that they harboured towards the draining of their 
resources by another entity, in their case Léopoldville. The British ambassador in Léopoldville noted that there 
was: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Sir R. WELENSKY, Welensky’s 4000 Days, p.209. 
2 At the time of the Congo crisis, British member of the Union Minière’s board of directors included Captain Charles Waterhouse, who 
was also chairman of the Tanganyika Concessions Ltd, Sir Ulick Alexander and Lord Selborne. See S. HEMPSTONE, Katanga Report, 
p.50. 
3 A. JAMES, Britain and the Congo Crisis, p.31. 
4 Minute of M. Waterhouse visit to Brussels, 25 July 1960, FO 371/146640, doc. JB1015/228, para. 4 (NAUK). 
5 The Katanga Lobby counted as members Waterhouse and the Marquess of Salisbury, one of the most influential members of the 
Conservative Party. A. JAMES, Britain and the Congo Crisis, p.xii-p.134. 
6 Founded on October 30, 1958 as a merger of the majority of Katangese ethnic and tribal organisations, the Confédération des 
Associations Tribales au Katanga (Conakat) had originally been constituted with the aim of forming an alliance between ‘Katangais 
authentiques’ against what they felt to be an invasion of Baluba Kasai, who, since the 1920s, had constituted the bulk of the UMHK’s 
African main d’oeuvre. The idea of decentralisation and the constitution of a Belgo-Congolese community came from a perceived need 
of a state in charge of its own immigration affairs on the one hand, and the Conakat’s short-lived alliance with the white settlers’ party, 
the Union Katangaise, on the other. For more details about the origins of Katanga particularism, see R. YAKEMTCHOUK, Aux origines 
du séparatisme katangais (Brussels, 1988) and J. GÉRARD-LIBOIS, Sécession au Katanga (Brussels, 1963). 
! 115!
‘a strong feeling, equally current among the Belgians (of whom there are some 30,000) and Africans 
in the province, that Léopoldville should not be the future capital of the Congo. It suffers in their 
minds from being the distant (over 1,400 miles) seat of an authority which has been felt in the past to 
be both unsympathetic and out of touch (…) Additional force is given to the general desire in the 
Katanga for strong provincial powers by the fear of both Africans and Belgians of seeing their 
province continue to be milked for the benefit of the rest of the Congo.’1 
There was therefore almost a de facto connivance between Katangese and Rhodesian settlers. Conor Cruise 
O’Brien, an Irish diplomat whom the United Nations posted in Katanga, wrote in 1962: ‘In Katanga, I came to 
feel that I was living at the point where the “wind of change” begins to veer: that is the point where it encounters 
the escarpment of a relatively old area of European settlement and rule. The 30,000 or so Europeans of Katanga 
felt themselves to be backed by the 300,000 or so of the Rhodesias and by more than 3,000,000 in South 
Africa.’2 
Rumours of Association between the Federation and Katanga 
In 1958, long before the Belgian government announced its plans to withdraw from the Congo, the 
settlers in Katanga had already suggested a merger with the Federation.3 Then, in March 1960 Welensky 
claimed in an interview with Rene MacColl, a reporter with the Daily Express, that the Katanga might well join 
the Federation: 
‘I suppose there is going to be a hell of a row for my having told you this (…) Suggestions have been 
made to me (…) that the federation should “hold out the hand of friendship” to Katanga when the 
Congo gains its independence.’4 
When the Belgian ambassador in Salisbury Jacques Houdart asked him on behalf of his government to confirm 
or deny the terms of the interview, Welensky confirmed ‘that he had been approached by ‘certain circles’ from 
the Congo’s Eastern Katanga Province on the subject of a prospective merger with the Federation’ but ‘did not 
specify whether this concerned Katanga whites or Africans.’5 According to Jules Gérard-Libois, ‘le Daily 
Express a laissé entendre que les approches n’ont pas été opérées par des représentants des 30,000 Européens de 
la province, ni de la puissante Union Minière, mais par M. Moïse Tshombe’.6 Whomever it was Welensky was 
in touch with, Welensky’s policy of overture towards Katanga certainly did not receive universal acclaim. It was 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 From Scott, Léopoldville to CO, current events in Katanga, 29 April 1960, FO 371/146633, doc. JB1015/82, para. 4 (NAUK). 
2 Introduction by C.C. O’Brien to R. Ainslie, The Unholy Alliance: Salazar-Verwoerd-Welensly (London, 1962), p.3 as quoted in M. 
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welcomed neither by Britain who, being ‘popularly believed’ to be responsible for Sir Roy Welensky,1 resented 
being finger-pointed because of Welensky’s imprudent statements, nor, predictably, by Belgium whose reply to 
Welensky was summarised by Northern News as meaning: ‘Hands off the Congo’.2 But neither was it welcomed 
in Katanga itself. The interview drew violent protest from the local press with the Essor du Congo noting that 
‘L’invraisemblance de cette nouvelle est telle que l’on se demande comment on peut la prendre au sérieux.’3 In 
addition, Katanga’s ruling party, the Conakat, ridiculed the idea of Katanga joining Rhodesia and issued a 
statement to that effect, stressing that the racial segregation practiced by the Rhodesias and South Africa was 
incompatible with their dignity and mentality.4 This led the Foreign Office to conclude that ‘though important 
tribes straddle the Katanga/Northern Rhodesia border’, the only possible circumstances in which a real demand 
for association could be conceivable would be ‘if it were thought that the new country would be run entirely by 
Africans, i.e. if U.N.I.P. ever came to power in Northern Rhodesia. Some sort of African union might then be 
put forward’.5 The British ambassador in Léopoldville made a similar point: 
‘I am convinced that such a development is out of the question: the Congo Africans do not want it and 
have no desire to exchange one colonial regime for another; and while superficially it might seem 
attractive to the Belgian mining interests and settlers, the former realise that such a possible union 
would not work out in practice (…) The Katanga will, therefore, remain in the Belgian Congo, perhaps 
even more closely united with the rest of the country as a result of Sir Roy Welensky’s statements, the 
echoes of which still reverberate.’6 
Whoever was in contact with Welensky, it was therefore obvious that the extension of white power to Katanga 
was not to materialise. In any case, the Federation was increasingly faced with both external and internal 
pressures. Following serious rioting erupting in Nyasaland, and further disturbances in Northern Rhodesia, the 
British government, and more particularly Ian Macleod, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, was pushing for 
independence for Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. With the Federation collapsing, it made little sense for 
Welensky to clamour for an amalgamation with a secessionist state that all the major powers and international 
organisations opposed.7  
The Federation Supports Tshombe’s Secessionist State 
If secessionist Katanga was not to be Rhodesian, it still constituted a pro-Western breakaway state and a 
buffer zone against the African nationalist states to the north.8 Consequently, Welensky did all that he could to 
support the secessionist state. From the moment Katanga seceded from the Congo in July 1960, Welensky 
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provided continuous assistance to the flood of Belgian refugees escaping the war in Katanga,1 and urged Britain 
to recognise Tshombe’s state or, at least, to sanction the deployment of Federation troops to buoy it up. Britain, 
however, though Macmillan did write to Welensky that if the Central Government collapsed, some kind of ‘ad 
hoc recognition’ could be considered, decided that neither Britain nor the Federation should give the impression 
that they were trying to break up the Congo.2 Despite this, the Federation (and South Africa) became not only a 
conduit for supplies and material going to and from Katanga but also the recruiting ground and forward base for 
a largely white mercenary force that was deployed in Katanga as Tshombe’s private army: the infamous 
Katangese “gendarmerie” that continually thwarted the efforts of the UN forces. The local press commented on 
the recruitment drives for the mercenaries in Northern and Southern Rhodesia. Some articles almost read like 
job advertisements: ‘The man who is recruiting Rhodesians and South Africans for President Tshombe’s 
Katanga Army and Air Force is Mr. Stuart Finley-Bisset, a 58-year-old Scotsman who runs a labour agency in 
Lusaka. He wants 100 recruits – mostly technicians etc.’3 It was not long before the United Nations carried out 
investigation of its own and in December 1961, Welensky was urged to invite the United Nations to station 
observers in frontier zones and airports. Addressing himself to the UN Advisory Committee on January 9, 1962, 
U Thant, Hammarskjöld’s successor as UN Secretary-General, claimed that he had ‘concrete evidence’ that 
illicit traffic was taking place: 
‘I wish to consult you about the replies I have received to my request (…) that observers be stationed 
along the frontiers of Rhodesia and Angola for the purpose of controlling illicit traffic with Katanga 
(…) Here I might say that this approach was made because we finally had some concrete evidence of 
illicit assistance to Katanga from the Rhodesian side, which we immediately presented to the British 
government and which Sir Roy Welensky has promptly denied in phraseology that could not be 
described as gracious.’4 
Welensky called the suggestion to post observers in the Federation ‘one of the most objectionable proposals’ 
ever made to him,5 and negotiations on the subject subsequently fell through.6 In addition to making his 
disapproval of the United Nations abundantly clear, Welensky launched a diplomatic offensive in support of 
Tshombe’s Katanga, protesting against what he referred to as the ‘calculated UN policy of grinding Mr. 
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Tshombe into the ground.’1 Late 1961 had indeed seen a series of offensives on the part of the UN2 and on 
September 13, 1961, in a climate of great latent tension, the UN special representative in Katanga, Conor Cruise 
O’Brien, set the green light for what would be the UN’s most controversial operation: operation Morthor. This 
operation, supposed to be a bloodless coup, lasted a total of 8 days and resulted in the deaths of 11 UN Soldiers, 
about 50 gendarmes, and a handful of civilians.3 In legal, political, and military terms, operation Morthor had 
become a great embarrassment to Hammarskjöld, the Secretariat and the countries supporting UN action.4 How 
then did Hammarskjöld justify this embarrassing operation? According to O’Brien, by allowing ‘the world to be 
given an official version which was so phrased as to make what had been an active intervention by the United 
Nations look like a defensive action.’5  The relevant section of the UN report issued on September 14 (S/4940) 
was worded as follows: 
‘Paragraph 15: In the early hours of September 13th, (…) an alert was set since arson was discovered 
at the UN garage. As the UN troops were proceeding towards the garage premises, fire was opened on 
them from the building where a number of foreign officers are known to be staying.’6 
About this report, O’ Brien candidly admitted: ‘If this is an accurate account of what took place in Elisabethville 
on the morning of September 13th, my name is Titus Oates’7, adding that: 
‘Whatever high-level agnosticism now prevails about what we had been instructed to do and – as I 
found later in Léopoldville and New York, there is a veritable ‘Cloud of unknowing’ surrounding the 
whole subject – it is hard to see how he [Hammarskjöld] and Linner can altogether have escaped 
knowing the essentials (...) Morthor is a Hindi word. It does not mean ‘Sound the alarm; there is arson 
in the garage’ or ‘Let us now assist the provincial authorities to maintain order’. It means ‘Smash’. 8 
This gave Welensky plenty of material to launch an important propaganda campaign against the United Nations. 
On the day operation Morthor was launched, Welensky issued a solemn warning in the Federal parliament: ‘Let 
other countries take warning. What has happened in Elisabethville today is the law of the jungle.’9 Welensky 
also had UN ‘atrocities’ against civilians in Katanga described in a vitriolic pamphlet that was published at the 
government’s expense. This pamphlet’s conclusion read as follows: ‘There have been other reports of the tragic 
events of September and December, 1961. All refer to the lawlessness, horror, savagery and brutality of the 
United Nations forces and show clearly the need for a public inquiry into these matters which are of the gravest 
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acceptance amongst the Territory’s nationalist power, and African opposition was both effectively organised 
and militant under the UNIP banner.1 Crippled by increasingly fragile administrative structures, severe 
shortages of funds and lack of ideological cohesion, the ANC was no match for UNIP’s rejuvenated brand of 
nationalism. Yet, by the end of 1962, Nkumbula, the man who was increasingly being stigmatised as ‘pleasure-
loving’, ‘internationally finished’, and an ‘alcoholic wreck’,2 had managed to reconstitute his party as a force to 
reckon with in Northern Rhodesia. As it will be seen, Katanga was instrumental in dictating the terms of the 
showdown between Kaunda’s UNIP and Nkumbula’s ANC. 
Ideological Redefinition 
After a comparatively long period of stagnation,3 some signs of greater ideological cohesion became 
detectable from April 1961 when Kaunda’s party was, for the first time, accused of hostility toward ‘the 
Western World’. The context for this accusation was the new Constitution for Northern Rhodesia that the 
Colonial Office proposed to pass in 1961. This Constitution, which was originally meant to make an African 
majority in the legislature possible, was subsequently revised after much lobbying by Welensky, in favour of the 
Europeans.4 This provoked UNIP to stage a ‘positive action campaign which would manifest the people’s 
displeasure and induce the British Government to reconsider and modify the scheme’.5 This ‘positive action 
campaign’ spanned four months (from July 15 to October 31) and involved a good deal of violence despite 
Kaunda’s claimed belief in non-violence. The report on the disturbances stated that: 
‘All provinces except Barotseland, were affected in varying degree; worst affected were the Northern 
and Luapula Provinces where gangs roamed the bush, communications were interrupted, attacks were 
prepared and launched against Government servants, and widespread destruction of schools, bridges, 
and other property by fire occurred. In these areas there was widespread violence, intimidation and 
violence. (…) There can be no doubt of the responsibility of officials and members of the United 
National Independence Party for the disorder.’6 
Perhaps more importantly, the same report noted: 
‘He [Kaunda] had claimed that the party controlled the mines, the railways and the kitchens. This 
suggested that the essence of the plan was to be a general strike. In fact the party controlled none of 
these activities and have so far failed to harness to their cause the two most powerful African trade 
unions in the Territory – the African Mineworkers’ Trade Union and the African Railway Worker’s 
Union. The U.N.I.P. was therefore compelled to fall back on other methods to embarrass 
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Government.’1 
In this way the disturbances of 1961 made it apparent that not only UNIP did not receive the quasi-universal 
support it claimed to have, but it also made the ANC look like a ‘moderate’, ‘responsible’ party in comparison 
to the impetuous UNIP. Thereafter, to sustain this new status and make sure to dissociate itself from the ongoing 
“disturbances,” the Congress took its sharpest yet turn to the right of the political spectrum. Throughout 1962, 
open professions of a more explicit and informed liberal-democratic agenda, as well as ridiculing of UNIP’s 
supposedly ‘non-violent’ policy, became more frequent. In an important interview, Nkumbula accused UNIP of 
believing in a ‘totalitarian form of government’ while his party, on the contrary, was committed to ‘private 
enterprise’ and the ‘complete freedom of the individual.’ In the same interview Nkumbula claimed that ‘UNIP 
has aligned itself with the Casablanca Group of countries, which are Communist inclined. We in the ANC to the 
Monrovia Group which is democratically inclined (...) Kaunda is not carrying out his own policies. They are 
Nkrumah’s ideas.’2 These declarations had an unmistakable ‘Tshombeist’ connotation. After all, anti-
communism and the continued pursuance of liberalism had been both the cause and the justification for the 
secession as was openly declared in the Katangese declaration of independence of July 11 1960: 
‘L’indépendance du Congo est un fait depuis le 30 juin 1960. 
Que Constatons-nous à présent ? 
[…] Un gouvernement central à majorité extrémiste s’est constitué. […] 
Des troubles ont éclaté partout […]. 
Dans ces circonstances, et devant les menaces que ferait peser sur nous une plus longue soumission à 
l’arbitraire et à la volonté communisante du gouvernement central, le gouvernement katangais a décidé 
de proclamer l’indépendance du Katanga. 
[…] Cette Indépendance est TOTALE. Cependant, conscient de la nécessité impérieuse d’une 
collaboration économique avec la Belgique, le gouvernement du Katanga […] demande à la Belgique 
de s’unir avec le Katanga en une étroite communauté économique.’3  
That this similarity was not deliberate seems unlikely. It was no secret that Kaunda and Tshombe had no love 
for each other. As early as July 1960, within days of the beginning of the Katanga secession, M. Mainza Chona, 
UNIP deputy president and United Kingdom representative, had made a public statement to the effect that, 
although the two parties had previously been very friendly towards each other, ‘His [Tshombe’s] open links 
with Union Minière, which have come to the surface, the fact that he appealed to the settlers of Central Africa 
for help, and the way he is being boosted by the Press is proving embarrassing to most of us in the U.N.I.P.’4 By 
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January 1962, Tshombe was referred to as a ‘primitive clumsy looking man-eater’1 in a UNIP pamphlet 
published by the divisional headquarters in the Southern Province. He was also referred to as ‘Welensky’s 
stooge’ in the resolutions passed by the UNIP National Council in March 1962:  
‘This council endorses the stand adopted by the party in the past namely that no balkanisation of the 
Congo, or any other part of Africa, shall ever be tolerated; that we affirm our stand that neither the 
West nor the East has any right to choose leaders for the Congo and that the danger of balkanisation 
hamply [sic] demonstrated during the recent gun-running periods when Welensky used Tshombe as a 
stooge. This council, therefore, appeals to all Congolese leaders to get together for the sake of national 
unity, and appeals to Moïse Tshombe to avoid, by breaking away from the Congo and join Rhodesia, 
jumping from the flying pan into the fire.’2 
Not to be outdone, Tshombe had let it known that he considered Kenneth Kaunda to be ‘the Lumumba of 
Northern Rhodesia.’ ‘And, like Lumumba’, he said, ‘Kaunda would never achieve real power.’3 He added, 
‘wiping the anger from his face with a smile’: ‘I think the moderates, the men with the philosophy like us, men 
like Nkumbula and Katilungu, are the ones who will lead the Africans in Northern Rhodesia.’4 Whether this 
rapprochement between Katanga and the ANC, which the clear bearing of Tshombe’s ideas on the ideological 
re-positioning of the ANC made obvious, was ideological or practical can be debated. There was in any case at 
least one commodity that Katanga possessed in abundance and that the ANC sorely needed: cash.   
Alliance with Katanga 
Marginalisation, at both national and international levels, and financial crisis were certainly determining 
factors in strengthening Nkumbula’s resolve to seek new allies across the Katangese border. It is not certain 
when Nkumbula started to meet with Tshombe but by May 1961, Ronald John Japau, the ANC’s provincial 
general secretary in the North-Western Province and Tshombe’s fellow Lunda, paid the first of a series of visits 
to Elisabethville where, between 1961 and 1962, he managed to secure five vehicles and an unknown sum of 
money for the ANC.5 The precise volume of Katangese financial assistance to the ANC is difficult to gauge. 
Mulford found that the ANC accounts for the year up to 30 June 1961 showed a contribution of £10,000 from 
Katanga, most of which was used for the purchase of vehicles.6 Thanks to the Congress’ ever more open 
professions of support for the secession, the flow of Katangese aid continued unabated and may well have 
reached £25,000 by February 1962.7 The governor of Northern Rhodesia suggested a figure of £40,000 in 
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August 1962.1 There is little doubt in any case, that the sums involved were considerable. By mid 1962, the 
(in)formal ‘alliance’ that existed between Tshombe and the ANC was not much more than an open secret. On 
July 29, 1962, the British Newspaper The Observer published an article, which, because of its direct relevance 
to this argument, is worth quoting in full: 
‘The evidence is increasing that, in a last bid to save Sir Roy Welensky’s Federation, powerful 
interests in Katanga are intervening in the affairs of Northern Rhodesia. If Kenneth Kaunda’s United 
National Independence Party wins a majority in the elections next October everyone knows it will 
insist on following Nyasaland out of the Federation. To avert this, President Tshombe of Katanga and 
the moneyed interests behind him are backing, not Welensky’s United Federal Party – that would be 
too obvious and ineffective – but the small African Opposition Party, Harry Nkumbula’s African 
National Congress. 
For a long time there have been links between Nkumbula and Tshombe. Nkumbula has been visiting 
Elisabethville at least once a fortnight. Senior members of his Congress have been based there for long 
periods. The Congress has its party literature printed in Elisabethville. Last April Nkumbula received 
£24,000 from the National Bank of Katanga in Elisabethville and it is known that this was not the first 
subvention from those quarters (…). 
But this collaboration between the two goes further. Last August a Northern Rhodesian delegation 
went to Elisabethville to ‘thank President Tshombe for his aid to certain moderate leaders’ – according 
to the Bulletin des Renseignements No.261 of the Katangese security service. In the last few months 
this aid has taken the form of the military training of Northern Rhodesians, mainly from the Tonga and 
Lozi tribes, to serve as the nucleus for an “army” for Nkumbula’s A.N.C. 
‘What is Tshombe’s motive in all this? The money he has dished out to Nkumbula was given on the 
understanding that the ANC was to put his case in Northern Rhodesia, but not surprisingly Congress 
has shown little enthusiasm for this unpopular activity. Tshombe himself has often underlined the fact 
that before the Europeans came, Katanga and Rhodesia formed one great territory. Some Congress 
leaders rather than accept rule by Kaunda’s U.N.I.P., are believed to be prepared to partition Northern 
Rhodesia and join parts of Katanga.2 
The Observer article garnered immediate interest from the British government, which demanded clarifications 
from the Northern Rhodesia governor in Lusaka. The latter’s comments on the points made by the article were 
the following:  
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(i) Although Nkumbula is known to have visited Elisabethville on several occasions, his visits are 
not at regular intervals and are far less frequent than fortnightly. 
Congress have a well-equipped office in Elisabethville which is run by an official named 
Bellings LOMBE, who is known to have entrée to the Minister of the Interior and to other 
senior Katanga ministers. (…) 
(ii) It is known that Nkumbula has received payments of £40,000 through the Katanga National 
Bank during the last six months and it is thought likely that the money has come from the 
Katanga authorities. 
(iii) I have no knowledge of a Northern Rhodesia Congress delegation travelling to Elisabethville in 
August of last year to “thank Tshombe for his aid to certain moderate leaders”. 
(iv) No confirmation has been obtained of the allegations that Congress members are being given 
military training at Karavia near Elisabethville. 
(v) It is understood from information obtained from the Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau 
that the basis of the Agreement between Tshombe and Congress is that, in the event of Congress 
forming the future government of Northern Rhodesia, a federation between Katanga and 
Northern Rhodesia would be arranged.1 
Kaunda himself interpreted Tshombe’s intention as including the annexation of Northern Rhodesia to Katanga 
and said so to the National Council: ‘Tshombe wants Angola and Northern Rhodesia to join him. This is his 
dream. He does not want any copper competition. Welensky is using Nkumbula to get Tshombe in order to 
swallow both. He wants both Northern Rhodesia and Katanga.’2 If there is little doubt that the ANC benefited 
from Katangese financial support, other claims sound rather fanciful. Whether and how many Northern 
Rhodesians train in Katanga was never ascertained.3 Nor does it seem likely that Tshombe and Nkumbula could 
(or even would) realistically envisage the formation of a Federation between their two countries. In all 
likelihood, theirs was a pragmatic alliance which was to yield immediate results: cash for Nkumbula; the 
installation of a friendly government in neighbouring Northern Rhodesia and the easing of Katanga’s diplomatic 
isolation for Tshombe. But the fact that such rumours existed and the way they brought about the production of 
considerable correspondence is revealing in itself of the fear that their alliance occasioned. 
Nkumbula’s Gamble: The 1962 Elections 
By mid-1962 therefore, thanks to Katangese cash, the ANC was no longer a party in decline. This 
happened just in time for the country’s first national elections, which were to be held in October and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Governor in Lusaka to First Secretary of State in London, 28 August 1962, FO 371/161512, doc. JB1105/5-21 (NAUK). 
2 Minutes of the meeting of the National Council held on 10 November 1962, UNIP/1/1/2, doc.4. 
3  Analysis of the Allegations that Members of the African National Congress are receiving Military training in Katanga, annexure to 
Savingram from Governor in Lusaka to First Secretary of State, central African Office in London, 24 August 1962, FO 371/161512, doc. 
JB1105/5-21 (NAUK). 

! 126!
and if he goes with UFP, he will be finished politically’,1 Nkumbula did not seem to have too many qualms 
making his choice. Asked why he had suddenly changed his mind about a link with UNIP, Nkumbula 
immediately answered with a ready-made justification: ‘Two of the main reasons behind my decision were that 
Mr. Kaunda assured me his party is not committed to communism and he is more favourably inclined towards 
Katanga.’2 Despite having nearly twice as many parliamentarians as the ANC, UNIP eventually allocated his 
party half of the six full ministerial posts reserved for elected representatives in the new cabinet3 so that the final 
result of the elections was the following: 
Legislative Council 
Party Composition of Elected members 
 U.N.I.P. U.F.P. A.N.C. Total 
Europeans - 15 2 17 
Africans 12 1 5 18 
Asians 1 - - 1 
Euro-Africans 1 - - 1 
State of Parties 14 16 7 37 
 
The Disaggregation 
On November 16, 1962, three days before nomination day, Kaunda and Nkumbula issued a joint 
statement confirming their intention to form a coalition and calling on their respective supporters to cease 
hostilities. By November 29 they were announcing their intention to co-operate in the formation of a new 
government and their wish for early home-rule.4 Despite this optimistic statement, it grew quickly obvious that 
the Coalition Government was ‘ridden by political manoeuvring and rent with internal dissent’5 and that the 
position of Nkumbula himself, despite his seemingly resounding victory, was far from secure. To start with, 
some ANC officials were far from happy with this alliance with their former enemies. ANC officials on the 
Copperbelt in particular called the pact ‘unwanted and unwarranted’ and called for Nkumbula’s resignation as 
party leader.6 Welensky and the UFP (which became the National Progress Party in April 1963) were – it goes 
without saying – similarly disgruntled. Though resigned to the impending dissolution of Federation, federal 
politicians were not ready to forgive what Welensky called Nkumbula’s ‘breach of faith,’7 and they began 
actively to plot his demise by supporting the activities of a rebel faction grouped around national secretary Job 
Michello: the ephemeral People’s Democratic Congress (PDC) founded in August 1963.8 But least happy was 
probably Nkumbula’s sponsors. When Nkumbula agreed to cooperate with UNIP, one of his chief concerns had 
been the maintenance of his profitable Katanga connection. Nkumbula had explicitly sought Tshombe’s blessing 
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1 Minutes of the meeting of the National Council held on 10 November 1962, UNIP/1/1/2, Doc..4. 
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before signing his pact with “Lumumbist” UNIP in December 1962. Twice in early November Nkumbula 
visited Elisabethville before confronting UNIP with his Katanga demand: an assurance against hostile Katanga 
politics and a tripartite meeting with Tshombe before the coalition was formed. While ANC’s first demand 
could have been quietly satisfied, UNIP’s panafricanist affiliations and previous Katanga policies ruled out 
consideration of the second. At the time of the joint ANC-UNIP declaration however, Nkumbula forced the 
issue by informing the Press, in Kaunda’s presence, that a meeting with Tshombe had been arranged. Kaunda 
however, took the initiative of immediately arranging a secret meeting with Tshombe at Kitwe on November 
18.1 This quickly leaked to the press and soon there was speculation as to whether the two leaders were 
discussing ‘the possibility of a new federation of Central African countries, including a link between Northern 
Rhodesia and Katanga’ and the ‘tribal ties between Katangese and Northern Rhodesian Africans’.2 This rumour 
was refuted the next day by Kaunda in a press release in which he stated that ‘reports in the papers about Mr. 
Tshombe and himself discussing the possibility of a new federation of Central African countries, including a 
link between Northern Rhodesia and Katanga and reports of ‘a vast new confederation of states’ were all utter 
and malicious concoctions created by the Press which was unable to obtain access to the talks (...) The talks (…) 
were among other things intended to create more understandings among Africans and eventually bring Mr. 
Tshombe into line with the Leopoldville Government.’3 The ANC had been caught by surprise and, though 
Nkumbula rushed to Kitwe to meet Tshombe the following day,4 Kaunda’s coup had succeeded in undermining 
Nkumbula’s special relationship with Tshombe. He was no longer Tshombe’s sole interlocutor in Northern 
Rhodesia and there was little that he could do to reclaim his erstwhile stature among Katangese leaders. With 
the ending of Katangese support, the ANC was plunged back into a state of serious financial difficulty. Late in 
the summer of 1963, the party’s debts were already in the region of £25,000.5  
In addition, despite their convenience alliance, relationships between ANC and UNIP members remained 
tense and unfriendly both within and outside the cabinet. By January 1963, the coalition was unambiguously at 
an end. In the course of two days Nkumbula and Kaunda issued public statements that were vitriolic enough as 
to leave little doubt as to the coalition’s chance of survival. Once, more the bone of contention, at least publicly, 
was Katanga. On January 3 Northern News reported that: 
‘“Mr. Nkumbula accused Mr. Kaunda of breaking promises he made in London recently that he would 
end his hostile attitude to Katanga and that Congolese Premier Adoula and President Tshombe should 
be left to settle the crisis themselves. 
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Mr. Nkumbula claimed that one of the conditions of the coalition Government had been that UNIP 
would adopt a friendly attitude towards Katanga. Mr. Kaunda’s actions at the Leopoldville conference 
showed he had no intention of doing so.”’1 
Thereupon, Kaunda replied with a blistering attack: 
‘He [Kaunda] accused the ANC leader of putting Katanga’s interests before Northern Rhodesia’s and 
revealed they had already clashed twice on this issue. (…) 
Mr. Kaunda called a Press conference today to refute the charges made by Mr. Nkumbula yesterday 
that he had broken promises to end his hostile attitude to Katanga. 
“If the African National Congress agreed to enter a coalition government in Northern Rhodesia to 
serve Katanga interests – which seems to be the case – then the coalition is finished,” he said. (…) 
“our first duty was to the Central Government in the Congo and we made that point very clear 
indeed.”2 
On January 23 1963, a mere five days after the secession of Katanga was finally brought to an end, so was the 
coalition.3 Unsurprisingly the parties competed head-on in the 1964 election. There was to be no repeat of 
Nkumbula’s coup of 1962 in the run-up to the general elections of January 1964. The ANC with its 10 seats was 
cut down to size by UNIP’s 55. On October 24 1964, the Republic of Zambia was born. Its President was 
Kenneth Kaunda.4 
 
 
3. The Rise of the One-Party-State 
 
1. DISAPPOINTED EXPECTATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE 
In the same way that the ‘freedom struggle’ has been portrayed as that of a nation united against a 
common foe, Zambia’s First Republic has generally been understood as a period of relative political harmony, 
coinciding with a ‘honeymoon period’ of economic growth.5 The common assumption which is often made or 
alluded to in the specialist literature is that the Zambian post-colonial state encountered little or no challenge in 
the 1960s until the economic stagnation of the early 1970s created widespread popular disenchantment and 
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the general feelings of this province’.1 This, he did in the name of the ‘Lunda empire, one of the most important 
demographic groups in Katanga whose sphere of customary authority extends beyond the boundaries of the 
Congo [into] Angola and [Northern] Rhodesia.’2 On February 25, 1960, Mwata Yamvo Ditende, striving to 
prove the enduring vitality of the Lunda, produced a list of ‘no fewer than thirty-two tribes and sixty major 
chiefs claimed as traditional subordinates of the Mwaant Yaav’. The list included every group that had ever had 
a Lunda chief or migrated over the previous 400 years from the Imbangala to the Babemba,3 including the 
Lunda of Kazembe.4 This boasting had a pragmatic purpose as well an ideological one. On the eve of the 
secession of Katanga, the construction of an inflated representation of the pre-colonial Lunda ‘Empire’ served 
the purpose of rallying masses by providing a rationale for Katangese particularism and a ‘common ground’ 
between Tshombe’s Conakat party and the Mwata Yamvo’s royal circles. The Conakat, although 17 tribes in 
total were grouped under its banner,5 had as its hard core Moïse Tshombe’s own tribe: the Lunda.6 Tshombe 
himself was a nephew and the son-in-law of the Mwata Yamvo.7 In this way, the term “Lunda Empire”, which 
had scarcely if ever been mentioned in public prior to January 1959, had rapidly become a household word 
among militant Lunda circles.  Nor did the end of the secession call time on the process of Lunda revitalisation. 
On the very eve of Zambian independence, Kaunda supposedly received a message from Tshombe, who had 
come back in power as the Prime Minister of a government of national reconciliation in July 1964, indicating 
that ‘Tshombe could, if he chose, make trouble for Kaunda through his influence with the Lunda.’8 This did not 
stop Kaunda from excluding Tshombe from Zambia Independence celebrations.9 
For the Kanongesha Ndembi in particular, ‘Zambia’ was much less enticing a concept than that of ‘Lunda 
Empire’ as had been revamped by the Katanga secession. Since Kanongesha Ndembi was based in the District 
of Mwinilunga, a part of a larger Lunda area that was wedged between Congo and Angola, the promise of an 
ethnically-inspired redrawing of the geopolitical map of central Africa must have seemed particularly 
attractive.10 From the beginning of the secession, Katangese dignitaries, seeking to rally support for the 
secession, seem to have been in touch with Ndembi and a number of his subchiefs. The Mwata Yamvo himself, 
with whom the Kanongeshas had maintained close relationships for almost two centuries, was a regular visitor 
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of the North-Western Province.1 Kanongesha Ndembi was not the only resident of Mwinilunga with a vested 
interest in events across the Katangese frontier however. Ronald John Japau, the local ANC’s provincial general 
secretary in the North-Western Province also visited Katanga a number of times, starting in May 1961 (see point 
2.3 above) to promote the ANC’s cause and collect the fruit of the Tshombe-Nkumbula alliance.2 Their common 
alliance with Tshombe caused supporters to the ANC in Mwinilunga to make common cause with the Lunda of 
Kanongesha.3 Japau’s ‘New Plan for North Western Rhodesia To Join Lunda and Angola’, which he wrote in 
1964, leaves little doubt as to how ‘Lunda’ and opposition to UNIP had become synonymous in his mind: 
‘To all Lunda people (…) Lunda Empire is strongly opposing to the Zambia Government (…) which 
is being run by a foreign Prime Minister (…) [and] is predominantly communist (…) We are to join 
together with the people of Angola and Katanga to form up a great force but we don’t want fighting 
but we want peace.’4 
Thanks to Tshombe’s resources, Kanongesha Ndembi’s partisanship and Japau’s organisational skills, 
Mwinilunga remained one of the few Northern Rhodesian localities not to be won over at any point by the 
radical version of nationalism espoused by Kaunda’s UNIP. In the general elections of 1964 January 20, despite 
the ANC’s overall defeat, Japau defeated Peter Matoka, the UNIP candidate and was returned to Parliament 
with a comfortable majority. This caused the ANC branch of Mwinilunga to be the victim of an aggressive 
campaign of intimidation on the part of UNIP to the point that sometime in November 1965, having been openly 
threatened with deposition on several occasions, Ndembi and a sizeable group of his followers crossed the 
border into neighbouring Angola where they began to be trained by the Portuguese military as a counter-guerilla 
force.5  
Meanwhile, on the other side of the Katanga pedicle, the Luapula Province, also started to agitate. In 
contrast to the Mwinilunga District, the Luapula Province had always traditionally been a centre of UNIP 
support, but after independence, the Luapulans grew disaffected with UNIP remarkably rapidly. The Luapula 
Province had been characterised by an early and intense political mobilisation from the 1950s due to its 
economic importance as a source of labour and fish. As a result in this province, the feeling that Independence 
was to bring forth immediate and tangible rewards in the form of meteoric development was particularly felt. 
When this failed to materialise, clashes between Mwata Kazembe XVII Paul Kanyembo Lutaba and UNIP 
became increasingly common.6 Tensions came to a head in 1965 when the government announced that chiefs 
would soon be removed from presiding over local courts. In July of that year, Paul Kanyembo paid a long visit 
to the Congolese bank of the Luapula River. Kanyembo, though all the while professing his attachment to 
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UNIP, had been a fervent supporter of the secession of Katanga.1 The Lunda of Kazembe had been included in 
Ditende’s list of the Mwata Yamvo’s ‘traditional subordinates’, and though it did not result in the in the 
resumption of formal contacts between the two Mwatas, the secession certainly did much to revive the old 
Lunda ‘imperial mystique’ in the breast of the Eastern Lunda king.2 Kanyembo had reportedly declared that: ‘he 
[had been] paving way for his final action [unknown]. He [had] confirmed (…) that he [had] no confidence in 
the Government of Zambia, except Congolese one, from where he came.’3 With such anti-UNIP statements 
becoming increasingly common in the Luapula Province, the local regional publicity and youth secretary of 
UNIP reported that the ‘situation was very bad indeed. We cannot tolerate Katanga people to come and 
influence our people.’4 Paul Kanyembo is unlikely to have seriously considered a political union between the 
Luapula valley and the Congo however. His sustained appeal to past ethnic greatness and Lunda unity must be 
placed in the context of an attempt to offer the Luapulans an alternative political community, one that would be 
more attractive than the frustrating post-independence Zambia, and a channel in which to express grievances as 
well as justify them. His policy, in any case, undeniably led to an intensification of ethnic feeling in the valley. 
Tshombe’s final fall from power in October 1965 when he was dismissed by president Joseph Kasavubu, 
represented an obvious setback for both Japau’s and Paul Kanyembo’s seditious campaigns. Throughout 1966, 
MP Japau – who appears to have become increasingly convinced that only military action could unseat UNIP 
from power – kept in touch with Ndembi’s successor as leader of the Lunda exiles, John Samawino and did his 
best to provide him with new recruits.5 Despite Kaunda’s warning that he would keep trouble-makers in the 
district ‘under very careful watch’ and dismiss any chief that would flaunt government authority,6 this 
eventually led to the only significant internal armed rebellion against the Zambian state in history, known as the 
‘Mushala rebellion’ (after its leader Adamson Mushala), which took place between 1976 to 1982 in North-
Western Province.7 In the Luapula, though the Kazembe’s campaign was brought to an abrupt end in 1965, 
frustration with the government’s failure to meet ‘expectations of independence’ continued.8 As Macola put it: 
‘Over the next few years calls for a more authoritarian political dispensation became more frequent 
and raucous both in the Luapula province and the country as a whole. When seen in the light of the 
long history of popular discontent which predated its inception in 1973, the one-party state was less a 
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response to increased factional competition for fast-shrinking public resources (the standard 
explanation of political science) than the means to ensure the survival of a besieged political elite, 
whose erstwhile credibility had all but melted away in the heat of unfulfilled expectations.’1  
It is evident therefore that frustration with the UNIP state predated the fall of copper prices from 1970. Before 
bringing the argument to a close, a word should be said about the final developments that led to the inception of 
the one-party state and how growing opposition due to disappointed ‘expectations of Independence’ had a great 
part to play in it. 
2. THE FINAL SHOWDOWN 
 The 1968 Elections  
In the summer of 1967, due to the chronic inability on the part of the headquarters to raise enough money, 
the ANC was close to disappearing from the political map of Zambia. Thanks to the renewed enthusiasm for 
ANC in Mwinilunga and its unwavering support, however, the ANC was able to become a major player in the 
Zambian chessboard once more. Within little more than a year, to the surprise of UNIP as well as of many 
foreign observers, the ANC had not only managed to avert complete debacle, but it had also regained a position 
of comparative strength that it had not enjoyed since the beginning of the decade.2 Nkumbula staked everything 
on the outcome of the by-elections of March 1, 1968 in Southern Province, – which was an important risk since 
the ANC would not have survived a comprehensive defeat – and was rewarded with victory: all UNIP 
candidates were all soundly beaten by their ANC colleagues.3 Then another development that eventually played 
in the ANC’s favour was the ban of the United Party (UP). The United Party had originally been launched at 
the beginning of 1966 by ANC dissidents Mumbuna and Lombe, and had been able to attract a number of UNIP 
officials who were unhappy with what they characterised as their party’s neglect of Barotseland and the North-
Western Provinces and its more general inability to meet popular expectations of independence.4 The UP’s 
attempt to gain a foothold in the Copperbelt in the early part of 1968 had plunged the industrial heartland of the 
country into a vicious spiral of interparty violence and prompted Kaunda to bring the party’s life to a premature 
end.5 The UP ban, which Nkumbula had openly condemned, now enabled the Congress president to orchestrate 
the fusion between the two organisations from a clear position of strength. The merger between the two parties 
accounts for the comparative success of the ANC in the general elections of December 19, 1968, when 
Nkumbula’s party, despite being made the target of systematic intimidation and official harassment, managed to 
double its 1964 parliamentary contingent by supplementing its traditionally safe constituencies in the Southern 
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and Central Provinces with as many as eight out of the eleven Barotseland seats.1 The results, gloated ANC’s 
national secretary Liso, showed that it was ‘not possible to have a one-party state in Zambia’, at least not 
through electoral means.2  
‘One Zambia, One Nation’ 
In the years that followed the election of 1968, there were more and more signs of UNIP radicalisation. 
Already in April 1968, Kaunda had announced to the UNIP National Council the launching of the so-called 
‘Mulungushi reforms’, in virtue of which the government bought a 51 percent (i.e. a controlling) share in 
twenty-six major companies.3 Yet, as Nkumbula and others had predicted, the Mulungushi reforms had merely 
been a harbinger of more radical economic measures to come. In August 1969, Kaunda announced the 
nationalisation of the copper industry.4 Even more momentous, or so it was felt, was the total ban on the ANC 
imposed in February 1970 in the Livingstone district, following interparty clashes in that region. This perhaps 
more than anything, convinced the ANC leaders that UNIP’s limited toleration for internal dissent was 
definitely a thing of the past and that the ruling party had now resolved to move in the direction of a one-party 
state.5 The real extent of UNIP’s authoritarian inclinations was made evident by its reaction to the formation of 
the United Progressive Party (UPP), led by his former associate Simon Kapwepwe. Kapwepwe’s election as 
UNIP and Zambia’s vice President in 1967 had sparked opposition, particularly among Easterners, who feared 
the ‘Bemba dominance’ of UNIP. Bemba politicians from Northern and Copperbelt Provinces, on the other 
hand, expected their numerical dominance in the nationalist struggle to be reflected in central Government 
representation and the regional distribution of state expenditure. Kaunda, who claimed neutrality but was in 
reality increasingly aligned with the Eastern group, reduced Bemba representation in the cabinet in 1969. Simon 
Kapwepwe himself, though Vice President, was increasingly marginalised. As a result, he eventually resigned 
from government in 1970 and, in a context of growing Bemba discontent, established the UPP in 1971.6 The 
UPP was a formidable opponent for UNIP. Not only was the UPP very popular – its supporters included the 
Bemba of the Northern and Luapula Provinces, the organised workers and small businessmen of the strategic 
Copperbelt, and the intelligentsia and radical students of Lusaka – but Kapwepwe also made common cause 
with Nkumbula, with whose party the UPP was sharing its offices. Unsurprisingly, the prospect of an electoral 
alliance between Kapwepwe and Nkumbula’s organisations struck fear into UNIP. The potential for an alliance 
between the two opposition parties meant that UNIP could find itself a minority party for the first time, raising 
the prospects of its defeat in the next following general elections of 1973.7 Violent clashes between UNIP and 
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UPP supporters provided the excuse for Kaunda to ban the party in February 1972, heralding the declaration of 
the one-party state which, despite Nkumbula’s last desperate diatribe in the parliament and the walkout of his 
MP’s, was promulgated on December 13, 1972. The next day, The Times of Zambia was able to publish an 
article entitled ‘One Zambia One Nation One Party!’.1 
 
 
Conclusion 
Not at any point was the history of Zambian political awakening, from the first disturbances of 1935 to 
the establishment of the full-blown single-party state in late 1972, that of a ‘united nation’. If the anti-Federation 
protests of the early 1950s indeed had some of the aspects of a ‘national’ movement, it all but disintegrated as 
soon as its raison d’être – opposition to the Federation – ceased to exist. Even the strikes of 1935 and 1940, 
though considered the traditional starting point of Zambian political history, were meant as an industrial protest 
rather than a political one. Though they tackled ‘race’ related issues, they did not openly question the colonial 
system in place. Similarly labour Unions, though traditionally regarded as the vanguard of political revolution, 
were first and foremost established to protect the interests of the Copperbelt – which usually consisted in 
improvements in pay or working conditions. This is not to say that the strikes and the developments that 
followed did not have a political effect in the long term. For one thing they certainly played a great part in 
starting off the decolonisation process. For another they highlighted the Bemba, whose political success on the 
Copperbelt can be partly explained by their experiences in Katanga, as the future frontrunners of political 
agitation. It is no coincidence that Bemba-dominated areas such as the Luapula and Northern Provinces were 
among those that consistently gave the Federal state the most trouble.  
The secession of Katanga was the backdrop against which some of the major antagonisms of the previous 
decade found their resolution. From the moment Harold Macmillan announced the beginning of the ‘winds of 
change’ to the fall of the UDI state of Rhodesia some twenty later, white settlers in central Africa fought a fierce 
battle against Black rule. The most famous episode of this struggle is its last: the protracted ‘Zimbabwe War of 
Liberation’ (also known as second Chimurenga), which eventually led to the end of white minority rule in 
Rhodesia in March 1980. In the early 1960s, however, the focus of this battle was on the Federation’s neighbour 
to the north: Katanga. The settlers of the Federation started by working towards the creation of a White 
Federation that would embrace Katanga. When it became clear that such an association would not materialise, 
the settlers fought desperately for the preservation of a white-friendly – for want of a white-dominated one – 
regime in their vicinity. Alas they were unsuccessful. The would-be independent Katanga state fell in 1963, and 
soon afterwards both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland obtained their independence. This can hardly be a 
coincidence. In many ways, the Katanga affair had cost the Federation what little was left of its credibility on 
the international level, and more than anything else could have, brought home to Welensky and his peers their 
increased irrelevance in an Africa that was fast decolonising. In that sense Katanga represented the last-ditch 
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attempt by increasingly outdated power structures to assert their authority and legitimacy not only in the face of 
other powers abroad but also in their own territory.  
If the secession sounded the death knell for white rule in that particular region of the world, it also to a 
large extent determined the nature of competing nationalism within Zambia. Tshombe’s support to the African 
National Congress went a long way in dictating the terms of its programme. The nearly bankrupt ANC was 
quick to identify Tshombe as a potential ally in its uphill struggle against the now stronger, richer and better-
organised UNIP. Given the latter party’s explicit Lumumbist sympathies, anti-secessionist stance, and appraisal 
of Tshombe and his ‘murderous ministers’ as ‘imperialist puppets’, it is hardly surprising that Katangese 
authorities felt favourably inclined towards the ANC’s overtures. In turn, UNIP’s accentuation of the ‘national’ 
nature of his party was made all the more stringent by the potentially disastrous effect a precedent of 
‘balkanisation’ in the Congo would have on his party. UNIP therefore opposed the secession wholeheartedly on 
both ideological and instrumental grounds since Tshombe was one of the ANC’s main sponsors. This dichotomy 
was commented on by the then Congo premier: 
‘Mr. Adoula likened the relationship between the Congo and Northern Rhodesia to a double tennis 
game, with himself and Dr. Kaunda on one side of the net and Mr. Nkumbula and Mr. Tshombe, ex-
Katangese leader, on the other, “having picked up the racket thrown down by Welensky.”1 
In any case, the constant opposition of the Katanga-supported ANC allied to the effects of Lunda militancy in 
Mwinilunga Districts and Luapula province threatened to unmask the fragility of the edifice of UNIP 
nationalism. Despite UNIP’s countrywide electoral success, the existence of a growing core of opposition in 
those areas ‘militated against the party’s sustained efforts to present itself as the sole legitimate embodiment of 
the blossoming nation and to portray the ANC as a moribund tribal organisation, limited to the Tonga-speaking 
areas of the Central and Southern Provinces.’2 It is only when the full extent of the challenge faced by UNIP is 
realised, therefore, that it becomes possible to account for the inception of the Zambian one-party state. As 
Nkumbula’s survival against the odds forced UNIP to face the uncomfortable truth that a significant proportion 
of the future electorate did not subscribe to its nationalist vision and project, the party leadership reacted by 
blurring the distinction between party and nation. This also explains why there are similarities between Mobutu 
and Kaunda’s states: economic troubles combined with dwindling popularity and diminishing internal 
legitimacy, logically led the government suffering from these woes to resort to nationalisation and one-party-
rule.  
!
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Conclusion 
Copper, Migration and Politics 
Long live the friendship between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
the Republic of Zambia.’1 
- President Kaunda to Mobutu at the occasion of the anniversary of the 
Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR), 19 May 1971 
 
1. Cultural Identities and Political Development 
As set out at the outset, the aim of the present work was twofold: to put forward the commonalities 
between a range of factors in the history of the Copperbelt(s) and to examine how the development of these 
distinct but linked regions has shaped political ideas, consciousness, people movements and organisations. The 
four chapters in which this thesis is divided have aimed to highlight the places where the history of the two 
regions converged, or influenced each other, and why they did so. 
The first point of convergence is also the longest one. In the late nineteenth century, although that area of 
Katanga and Zambia that was crudely divided by the colonial border was not, strictly speaking, a tightly-knit 
homogeneous whole, virtually all its inhabitants shared long-standing cultural ties. Several larger ‘kingdoms’ 
had existed for centuries, most prominent among which were the Luba kingdom, the Lunda kingdom of Mwata 
Yamvo, and the kingdom of Kazembe. Though they could not be described as ‘kingdom’ in the medieval sense 
of the term, their cultural aura spread far and wide. Not only were they linked together by a complex network of 
tributary and trading relationships, but they also sparked a series of population movements, mostly oriented 
southwards. As a result many groups in Zambia’s Northern, North-Western, Copperbelt and Luapula provinces 
traditionally trace their ancestry to Katanga. The outline of the colonial border, entirely determined as it was by 
the presence of resources, cut right through these groups and consequently significantly affected the way they 
interacted. Yet, two assumptions should be carefully avoided. The first is the idea that the appearance of the 
colonial border was the one single event that unsettled a hitherto undisturbed region. In fact colonisation, of 
which border-drawing is the first and most powerful expression, was only the last phase of a long process of 
destabilisation. By 1900, i.e. before colonialism could be implemented in full force in any part of central Africa, 
all the old ‘kingdoms’ had already fallen. Throughout the nineteenth century Katanga had come to be 
pressurised by a series of intruding forces. The Cokwe, the Yeke, the Arab traders – all contributed to affect 
previous networks of interactions and all were symptomatic of the growth of one particular phenomenon: long-
distance trade. Under the influence of the latter, groupings became wider and, in the case of the Yeke, more 
authoritarian and conquering in nature. Thus, by the time cartographers drew an arbitrary line on the map of 
central Africa, the Lunda had already lost control over their southern minions and the kingdom of Kazembe had 
already lost control over the west side of the Luapula as well as over most of its smaller tributaries to the south. 
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One could argue however that, to an extent, the appearance of the colonial border served to confirm those 
divisions and make them long-lasting. Yet – this is where the second mistaken assumption comes in – it would 
be wrong to think that all form of relations between these groups were severed, though they were certainly 
transformed. Though the colonial border separated the Luba and Lunda heartland from former subsidiaries, 
traditional allegiances were still recognised and were still invoked at times, as happened with the Lunda in the 
1960s. At the same time, in the early years of the twentieth century, local populations put the colonial border to 
good use. Some chiefs, eager to cut ties with their former overlord, utilised the fact that the latter now lived in a 
different country to become chiefs in their own right, asserting their authority by collaborating with the newly 
established colonial administration. The Mwata Kazembe, on the other hand, though he was never able to 
reclaim his western territories was similarly able to rebuild a strong client network through collaboration with 
the colonial authorities. In addition border-crossing became a common activity as a way of escaping all sorts of 
plights, such as an overbearing tax-system or brutal administration practices. To sum up, the Copperbelt and its 
environs developed as an interconnected whole, the border was disruptive but not overpoweringly so, and it was 
on occasions turned into ‘leverage’ by those who lived alongside it.  
The second major point of convergence in the history of the two regions is probably the best-known one: 
the parallel development of the almighty copper industry. From the moment mining was developed in the early 
years of the twentieth century, it had become a joint affair. Belgium had no experience in African ventures and 
lacked the capital and personnel to realise the potential of the copper province. As a result it was British 
interests that carried out the evaluation and initial development of copper deposits in the region, together with 
the development of the essential transport infrastructure. In return the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga provided 
jobs and freight traffic on the BSA controlled railroad and offered a 40 % ownership of its shares to British 
interests. In addition, throughout the late 1910s and the early 1920s, Katanga relied almost exclusively on 
Northern Rhodesian labour and foodstuffs. From the very beginning, therefore Katanga and Northern Rhodesia 
were economically interdependent in terms of capital, investment, labour, trade and expertise. Due to this 
interdependence, the copper industry induced new patterns of movements as labourers and traders crossed the 
borders in both directions to make a living. Attracted by the employment opportunities that Katanga offered, 
many Zambians lived and worked in Katanga for a while, sometimes a very long while, sometimes permanently. 
This, perhaps more than any sort of interaction that took place beforehand, contributed to bringing the two 
regions closer. These migrations were of a different nature than those that preceded them in that they took place 
outside of any ‘cultural’ or ‘traditional’ framework. People, goods, wealth and culture flowed between villages, 
mining towns and countries, creating hybrid cultures and communities. Of this process, the Bemba are a case in 
point. The agricultural poverty of the Bemba-speaking areas of Northern Rhodesia meant that it emerged as an 
early labour reservoir, first to the mines of Katanga, and then to the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt. From the 
1940s a new Bemba-speaking but relatively cosmopolitan urban African community began to establish itself on 
the Copperbelt, a process which would have many political implications. Another aspect of the mining 
companies of Katanga and the Copperbelt that had clear political implications was their all-pervasiveness allied 
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to their interdependence. Given their long history of interaction and economic interdependence, from an early 
date, events in Katanga could profoundly affect Northern Rhodesia and vice-versa. The omnipotence and 
overbearing nature of the mining industries in both countries not only inevitably linked the financial status of 
the Northern Rhodesian and Katangese governments with the prosperity of the copper industry but also made 
sure that the effects of such an event would be magnified. This made the copper mines a monstrous presence in 
the territories that hosted them.  
Finally all of the above had a profound impact on the development of Zambia as a political entity. To 
begin with, the experiences of the Zambians – the Bemba in particular – in Katanga was instrumental in the 
staging of the first protests against colonial inequalities. The Katangese experience of the Bemba further 
contributed greatly to making them one of the most politically militant group in Zambia, a tendency that 
endured in later years. But it was the secession of Katanga that had the most dramatic effect on Northern 
Rhodesia. Not only did it play a major role in the ideological positioning of the various Zambian parties in the 
early 1960s but it also contributed to a great extent to determining who would win the political battle in Zambia. 
Secessionist Katanga was the object of a last-ditch attempt on the part of the settlers of the Federation to cling 
on to their prominent position. This settler hegemony did not survive long after the secession was brought to an 
abrupt halt. As for the role of the secession in the showdown between UNIP and the ANC, it was both rhetorical 
and practical. The alliance between Tshombe and Nkumbula certainly stemmed out of opportunism more than 
ideological affinity, but it is also arguable that this alliance would have gained such momentum in certain areas 
of Northern Rhodesia had it not been for cross-border Lunda identities. The memory of a ‘glorious’ Lunda past 
did a great deal to provide the necessary gel between potential allies. Even after the short-lived alliance between 
the ANC and Tshombe was broken, the revamping of the Lunda ‘aura’ continued to provide a useful framework 
in which to express popular frustration with stalled post-colonial transformation. In both Zambia and Congo, the 
immediate response to such popular dissatisfaction was the nationalisation of the mining sector and the 
establishment of one-party states. Therefore, dangerous as it is to indulge in suppositions, it is possible that 
Zambia would have known a different process of political development had it not been for the influence of its 
neighbour to the north. Without Katangese support, the ANC might not have survived the hardships of the early 
1960s. Without the strength of the Katangese ‘aura’, the Kanongesha and the Kazembe might not have so easily 
joined the early chorus of protests against UNIP. Without the added support of these provinces, the ANC might 
not have succeeded in constituting as much as a constant and ‘general’ threat to the UNIP state. Without 
Katanga therefore, UNIP might perhaps not have rushed the nation on the path to one-partyism at such a speed. 
It goes without saying that this is entirely speculative but it is undeniable that Katanga played a role, indirect or 
not, in all these processes. 
Thus I have distinguished three poles of ‘interconnection’ between southern Katanga and northern 
Zambia: a cultural pole – identities are not limited to bounded geographic entities –; an economic pole – the 
Copperbelt, because of its economic value, remained a nexus of ideas and people between the two countries –; 
and a political pole – because the allied effects of the first two poles affected the direction that Zambian history 
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took in the 1960s. Would the history of these two countries be different had there not been any copper in their 
soils? That is a truism. The rise of the Luba, Lunda and Kazembe kingdoms, the outline of the colonial border, 
the development of the copper industry, migrant labour, industrial and political activism…  copper is the thread 
that holds it all together. In that sense, copper was a critical factor in determining the fate of the territories 
beneath whose ground it lay. 
 
 
2. The Copperbelt and ‘Nation-Statism’ 
The ‘nation-state’ and the various ways in which its boundaries are undermined or ‘eroded’ are the broad 
concepts which underwrote the whole narrative of this thesis. It has been stated in the introduction that the 
‘nation-state’ is traditionally seen as an ‘old’ grounding principle, which is supposedly coming increasingly 
under threat because of the effects of such ‘modern’ phenomena as globalisation.1 Yet, in the case of central 
Africa, globalisation penetrated and affected local populations long before any nation-state was set up. Thanks 
to the long-distance trade, Katanga was fully integrated into the world economy by the nineteenth century. In 
fact one could say that it is globalisation that brought about the nation-state, complete with immovable borders, 
national institutions, and export-oriented economies. It is the long-distance trade that made that region of Africa 
known to European observers, and this in turn stimulated a particularly ferocious scramble. So the idea that, as 
is posited by the globalisation paradigm, that there is an opposition between ‘a past of territorial boundedness 
and a present of interconnection and fragmentation’2 should actually be reversed in the case of central Africa. It 
is because globalisation reached central Africa that is was divided into bounded entities.  
The importance of the nation-state is not as easily disowned. In Zambia, like virtually everywhere else in 
Africa, ‘Nation-statism’ was adopted as a channel in which to express grievances and aspirations for 
independence. It was in the name of the integrity of the Northern Rhodesian territory that amalgamation with 
southern Rhodesia was fought, and in the name of the sovereignty of the same territory that the independence 
battle was fought. Given the utter artificiality of the border and the way it cut right into homogeneous entities, it 
is paradoxical that it should have been so. Paradoxical yet not surprising. A strong border was an essential 
prerequisite for any would-be independent country to be introduced into the community of recognised modern 
states. As a result, redrawing the map of central Africa was not an option. Before Zambia became independent 
in 1964, 34 states had preceded it. Of all these 34 states, only in one had an actual attempt at redrawing the map 
occurred: the Republic of the Congo. The way in which the secession of Katanga was crushed after not even 
three years of existence was a strong warning to any other state contemplating to do the same. In only one other 
place was the same feat attempted – the eastern province of Biafra in Nigeria whose independence was declared 
in 1967 but was put to an end with as little mercy as Katanga’s was in 1970.3 The example of what happened to 
Tshombe’s Katanga made the leader of the party under which Zambia became independent very aware of the 
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risk of letting any particularist complaint be advertised too loudly, hence the energy put in silencing them. 
Therefore, if the nation-state, with all its emphasis on self-governance and sovereignty, was a useful framework 
for the protest against colonialism, it also implied that its integrity was not be questioned, not even by the 
peoples who live within it. In this sense, Davidson has more than a point when he argues that nation-statism 
‘looked like a liberation, and really began as one. But it did not continue as a liberation.’1 
It would be disingenuous therefore to argue that the nation-state is non-important or that it is simply a 
concept with no bearings on reality. Nothing could be further from the truth. Artificial or not, colonial borders –
like borders elsewhere – were real and were acted upon as such. What is criticised here is not the validity of the 
concept of nation-statism, but rather the fact that, though the artificiality of the African borders is a well-known 
fact, phenomena happening across them or overlapping memberships are often overlooked precisely because 
they overlie supposedly territorially separated and independent polities. In the introduction, mention was made 
of the concept of ‘transnationalism’ which broadly refers to multiple ties and interactions linking people or 
institutions across the borders of nation-states. It is argued that ‘transnationalism’ is imbued with an ‘inherently 
transgressive quality’2 since ‘transnational’ ties develop across borders that are considered inconvenient,3 while 
at the same time such interconnections change conceptions of membership as well as the institutions of each 
interconnected country.4 In many ways, the Katango-Zambian boundary is the embodiment of such processes. 
The movement patterns that the copper industry set into motion certainly ‘eroded’ the border, even more 
efficiently than previous ‘protest migrations’ were able to do. If the mining companies and the colonial state 
worked hard to channel labour into a certain direction, they could not control every single individual, especially 
when there were virtually no checkpoints along the border. Movements of traders and labourers proved to be 
both a necessity and at times a difficulty. Migrants certainly bypassed the rules supposed to limit their 
movements more often than can be counted. From the inhabitants of the Mweru-Luapula areas resolutely 
choosing the Katangese mines and markets because it was more convenient to them to the dismay of those who 
wanted to send them to the south, to the Lunda of Kanongesha Ndembi fleeing to Angola to avoid reprisal for 
their supporting the ANC over UNIP, border crossing in Zambia certainly had a transgressive quality to it. 
Throughout the colonial era, people have crossed the border for a variety of purposes: safety, search for 
employment, trade, visiting relatives, (self-)imposed political exile etc. The concept of nation-state therefore is 
very useful if one is attempting to study its particular effects on African societies and history. Unfortunately it 
often obscures part of the other aspects that affect that history. The nation-state is a new concept as far as Africa 
is concerned, introduced as it was less than 150 years ago. It is intrinsically artificial and so, logically, are the 
‘threats’ that it is supposedly facing. For all these reasons, in the case of the Copperbelt, the nation-state should 
not be taken as de facto basis for intellectual enquiry. 
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3. Border Conflicts in the Later Twentieth Century 
Before bringing this argument to a close, it should be mentioned that the northern border of the Zambian 
‘nation-state’ remained very much what it was in colonial years throughout the later twentieth century: a porous, 
contended and awkward-shaped boundary. Although complex negotiations continued – not to say dragged on – 
throughout the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, the various disputes over segments of the border, such as the Mweru-
Tanganyika section, were never brought to a conclusion. As soon as Zambia became independent, its first 
government had to deal with a number of reported problems along the boundary, which even prompted the 
Surveyor General and Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources to suggest setting up 
a boundary commission in August 1966 to demarcate the disputed Mweru-Tanganyika section. However, 
keeping with the habit taken in colonial times, no commission was ever established.1 The lack of demarcation 
has continued to lead to periodic disputes, sometimes resulting in violence. A recurring problem was the 
Katanga pedicle through which many Zambians were compelled to travel to reach the Copperbelt (among other 
places). Zambians travelling through the pedicle were regularly mistreated or subjected to levies by frustrated 
(because badly-paid) Congolese soldiers.2 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the border problem became 
embroiled in a series of eruption of escalating violence. 
Following defeat at the hands of the United Nations in late 1961 and 1962, Tshombe’s mercenary force in 
Katanga, the Katangese ‘gendarmes’, gradually dissolved. Many decamped to Angola where, in order to earn 
their keep, they fought alongside the Portuguese Forces against the Angolan nationalist movements (MPLA, 
PNLA and UNITA). They were soon joined by the Kanongesha’s Lunda fleeing UNIP’s reprisal in November 
1965.3 These exiled mercenaries sporadically re-emerged from Angola to create trouble in Congo and Zambia 
alike.4 For example, those of the Lunda who had fled Mwinilunga to join the ranks of the Angolan military, re-
emerged in the night between 26 and 27 November 1968, i.e. three weeks before the Zambian general elections, 
and razed three villages of UNIP supporters to the ground.5 But the greatest conflict emerged in 1977 and 1978 
with two failed attempts at invading Shaba (as Katanga was renamed under Mobutu’s zairinisation campaign), 
known as Shaba I and II respectively. On March 8, 1977, the Front for the National Liberation of Congo 
(FNLC), a group largely composed of former members of the Katangese gendarmerie, crossed the border into 
Shaba from Angola.6 Shaba II, in contrast to the first Shaba invasion, did not consist of an outright invasion of 
Zairian territory, but of an infiltration of Zaire (as Congo was known from 1971) via Zambia. In May 1978, 
FLNC battalions entered Shaba through a part of northern Zambia that was inhabited by the same groups 
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(Lunda and Ndembu) as many members of the FNLC.1 In both cases, not only did the insurgents found little 
opposition from local populations along their way, but they also acquired new recruits from among their Lunda 
kinsmen.2 Thanks to this sympathisation, the two invasions were quick and efficient (in 1978, the rebels were 
able to capture Kolwezi) though in the end both were nipped in the bud thanks to foreign intervention (mostly 
French and Belgian). During the invasion of 1978, in particular, the use of Zambian territory, which Kaunda 
claimed to know nothing about,3 strained diplomatic relations between Zaire and Zambia. In addition, the 
suppression of the revolts led to minor border problems and skirmishes, caused by the great numbers of refugees 
who escaped through Zambia.4 
But ultimately it was the undemarcated Mweru-Tanganyika section that provoked the most tension 
between the two countries. In August 1980, Zambia accused Zaire of establishing a border post some 30 km 
within Zambian territory in the Kaputa area on the western end of the Mweru-Tanganyika section near Lake 
Mweru. Tensions escalated rapidly again in early 1982 when a series of skirmishes occurred along the border in 
the Kaputa area. The tension soon spread to the watershed section where exchanges of fire reportedly took place 
in February and March 1982, causing several deaths. Although a prisoner release was organised in April 1982, 
tensions continued fuelled by a communiqué of Lusaka radio claiming that two more Zairian border posts had 
been established within Zambian territory in the Kaputa area. Problems along all Zaire-Zambia borderland areas 
continued for several years, and Zairians were often scapegoated for the region’s problems of crime and 
insecurity, including the smuggling of minerals such as emeralds and other commodities.5 Shaba still relied on 
Zambia for the supply of essential commodities such as sugar, mealie-meal, cooking oil and soap but cross-
border trade had been limited by the Zambian government in an attempt to protect its own domestic market. As 
a result, there was an increase in illegal trade and when the Zambian government took measures to stop this, it 
was interpreted as provocation by the Zairian authorities. Then, in July 1984, Zambia deported over 2,000 
Zairians while in return Zaire expelled a similar number of Zambians from Shaba.6 In a context of such latent 
tension, many skirmishes occurred between 1980 and 1984, some of which resulted in the sending of troops but 
none appears to have escalated into large-scale military operations.  
According to D.W. Davidson, Documents from the US Department of State indicate that Zaire and 
Zambia had set up a joint technical committee to settle the disputed Mweru-Tanganyika section during the 
tensions in 1982. On December 20, 1987, Zambian Cabinet Secretary Charles Manyema stated that this 
committee had reached an agreement on the Mweru-Tanganyika boundary section, but that their  
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recommendations still had to be approved by Kaunda and Mobutu.1 It was not until September 19, 1989 that the 
treaty was signed by Presidents Mobutu and Kaunda in the Zairian town of Nsele near Kinshasa, after which 
President Kaunda announced:  
‘The signing of this treaty is truly a proud moment for Africa. It shows that left to themselves, African 
countries are sufficiently mature to resolve even the most serious of problems in an amicable 
manner.’2
 
 
Unfortunately, the text of this agreement does not appear to have ever been made public so its content is 
unknown.
 
Some sources indicate that the treaty addressed frontier security, trans-border smuggling as well as 
supposedly delimiting a new boundary along the Mweru-Tanganyika section. Still, minor skirmishes and 
problems continued, making it doubtful whether any demarcation of the Mweru-Tanganyika section had 
actually taken place. In early December 1997, the Zambian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister stated in the 
Zambian Parliament that he blamed ‘the physical non-demarcation of Zambia’s border with the Democratic 
Republic of Congo on the state of insecurity (along the boundary)’ and added that
 
Zambia was willing to 
undertake physical demarcation but the state of insecurity along the boundary and ‘uncooperative attitude which 
characterised the former Zaire’
 
had hampered efforts.3 As a result of this continuous failure to settle on an 
agreement, the Mweru-Tanganyika section, remains undemarcated and a source of diplomatic tension. Very 
recently (May 17, 2013), Zambian fishermen were arrested for ‘illegal fishing’ on the Congolese side of Lake 
Tanganyika. Subsequently fishermen asked, in terms very similar to those used some hundred years before, for 
‘delimitation exercise’ to be instituted in order ‘to clearly mark Zambia’s borderline with its neighbour’.4 
History has a way of repeating itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 D.W. DAVIDSON, Marking Territory, p.189. 
2 ‘Border agreement signed with Zaire’ ZANA/PANA – Zambian News Agency, 19 September 1989 as quoted in D.W. DAVIDSON, 
Marking Territory, p.190. 
3 D.W. DAVIDSON, Marking Territory, p.191. 
4 ‘DRC soldiers hold 16 Zambians’, The Times of Zambia, 17 May 2013, available at http://www.times.co.zm/?p=10887 , [accessed on 
17 May 2013].  
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